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Abstract
As has been widely discussed, the GSM system only offers unilateral authentication
of the mobile phone to the network; this limitation permits a range of attacks. While
adding support for mutual authentication would be highly beneficial, changing the way
GSM serving networks operate is not practical.
The 3G and 4G mobile systems rectify the GSM weakness by providing mutual
authentication between phone and network, and significantly improve their security
properties by comparison with 2G (GSM). However, significant shortcomings remain
with respect to user privacy, most notably the decades-old privacy problem of disclosure
of the permanent subscriber identity (IMSI), a problem arising in all generations of
mobile networks and that makes IMSI catchers a real threat. Although a number
of possible modifications to 2G, 3G and 4G protocols have been proposed designed
to provide greater user privacy, they all require significant alterations to the existing
deployed infrastructures, which are almost certainly impractical in practice.
In this thesis we investigate whether it is possible to improve the security and
privacy properties of the current mobile systems without changing the deployed infras-
tructure, i.e. the serving networks and mobile phones.
We describe a novel modification to the relationship between a subscriber identity
module (SIM) and its home network which allows mutual authentication without af-
fecting the GSM infrastructure, including the phones; the only necessary changes are
to the authentication centres and the SIMs.
We further propose novel authentication schemes for 3G and 4G systems to defeat
IMSI catchers. Our first scheme makes use of multiple IMSIs for an individual USIM
to offer a degree of pseudonymity for a user. The second scheme prevents disclosure
of the subscriber’s IMSI by using a dynamic pseudo-IMSI that is only identifiable by
the subscriber’s home network. A major challenge in using pseudonymous IMSIs is
possible loss of identity synchronisation between a USIM and its home network, an
issue that has not been adequately addressed in earlier work. We present an approach
for identity recovery to be used in the event of pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation. Both
schemes require changes to the home network and the USIM, both owned by a single
entity in the mobile systems, but not to the serving network, mobile phone or other
internal network protocols, enabling simple, transparent and evolutionary migration.
We provide analyses of the schemes, and verify their correctness and security properties
using ProVerif.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context of Research
Mobile phones have become an integral part of our daily lives. We use them at work,
at home and everywhere in between to stay connected to the world around us. The
growth in mobile subscribers over the years has been very substantial. At present,
approximately sixty-three percent of the world population are connected to a mobile
network [121].
The major growth in use of mobile networks started with the introduction of the
second generation (2G) GSM network in the early 1990s. We are now in the era of
fourth generation (4G) mobile networks; however, legacy mobile systems, i.e. GSM and
third generation (3G) mobile networks, continue to operate to support a large segment
of the mobile subscribers [42, 134]. Even today, approximately forty-four percent of
global connections use GSM technology and thirty percent use 3G mobile technology;
as yet 4G mobile networks only support twenty percent of global connections [42].
Although 4G subscriptions are growing fast, legacy mobile systems remain of huge
practical importance worldwide, and are unlikely to be replaced for many decades to
come. Moreover, for practical reasons, all later generation mobile technology needs to
support the earlier generation technology, which makes security flaws in legacy networks
potential threats to all mobile subscribers. As a result, finding ways of improving the
security offered by existing mobile systems is clearly of great practical significance.
A wide range of approaches [46, 48, 71, 81, 82, 108, 113, 116] have been proposed
to improve the security and privacy features of GSM, 3G and 4G networks. However,
they all require significant changes to the deployed network infrastructure; that is they
require modifications to all the participating entities, i.e. to the serving networks, home
networks, and mobile devices, as well as the network protocols. Unfortunately, it is clear
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that making such modifications to widely deployed mobile systems is almost certainly
impractical in practice. Prior to commencing the work described in this thesis, it was
not known whether it is possible to improve the security and privacy properties of the
current mobile systems without changing the deployed network infrastructure, i.e. the
serving networks and mobile phones. Addressing this question has provided the main
motivation for the work described in this thesis.
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis, and is organised as follows. In
Section 1.2 we discuss the research motivation. Section 1.3 outlines the major con-
tributions. A list of relevant publications is presented in Section 1.4, and Section 1.5
concludes the chapter with a brief outline of the thesis.
1.2 Motivation
While first generation (1G) mobile systems did not provide any security features, se-
curity has been an integral part of such systems since the advent of 2G. For example,
GSM, perhaps the best known 2G system, provides a range of security features, includ-
ing authentication of the mobile user to the network, data confidentiality across the air
interface, and a degree of user pseudonymity through the use of temporary identities.
However, the absence of network authentication in GSM leaves the system open to a
wide range of threats (see, for example, [125, 130, 136]). Despite the introduction and
deployment of 3G (UMTS) and 4G (LTE) mobile systems, which rectify this shortcom-
ing by providing mutual authentication between phone and network, GSM remains of
huge practical importance worldwide and is unlikely to be replaced for many decades to
come. As a result, incorporating new features to improve the security offered by GSM,
without the need for changes to deployed phones, access networks, and protocols, is
of great practical importance. This observation motivates the investigation of a novel
scheme to include network-to-phone authentication in GSM mobile systems in a way
that is completely transparent to the deployed network infrastructure.
Although the security properties of the 3G and 4G mobile networks have signifi-
cantly improved by comparison with GSM, significant shortcomings remain with respect
to user privacy. The possibility of user tracking by intercepting air interface traffic was
considered in the design phase of the second generation GSM network, and was ad-
dressed by the use of a changing pseudonym, the temporary mobile subscriber identity
(TMSI), instead of the permanent international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) for
transmissions across the radio link. Newly allocated TMSIs are transmitted to the
phone by the network in encrypted form to prevent linking of TMSIs or of a TMSI
to the IMSI. The same mechanism was adopted in the 3G [162] and 4G [93] systems.
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Although the temporary identity is used instead of the IMSI in most cases, in certain
situations the IMSI is sent in cleartext by the mobile. One such case is when a mobile
device is switched on and wishes to connect to a new network, and hence will not have
an assigned temporary identity. Another case is where the network is unable to identify
the IMSI from the presented temporary identity and is therefore obliged to request the
transmission of the IMSI [31, 114]. An active adversary can exploit this and masquer-
ade as a legitimate network to request the permanent identity [3]. Such an adversary is
known as an ‘IMSI catcher’ [151], and is a threat to all generations of mobile networks.
Although IMSI catchers were initially only available to government agencies because
of their cost and complexity, advances in hardware technology and the availability of
software has made IMSI catcher capabilities affordable for almost anyone. During the
last couple of years, widespread use of unregulated IMSI catchers has been observed
in a number of countries [45, 100, 150]. Security agencies have reported on the use of
IMSI catchers by criminals and foreign intelligence agencies [66, 159], indicating that
such attacks are now a serious issue.
Over the years, a wide range of possible solutions to the IMSI catcher problem
have been proposed [48, 50, 71, 94, 108, 113, 142, 143]; unfortunately, they all require
significant modifications to the air interface protocol, which would require changes to
the operation of all the serving networks as well as all the deployed phones. As a result,
it seems likely that making the necessary major modifications to the operation of the
air interface after deployment is infeasible in practice. It would therefore be extremely
valuable if a scheme to reduce the threat from IMSI catchers and thereby better protect
user privacy could be devised which does not require significant changes to the existing
network infrastructures and has minimal computational cost. This observation has
motivated the work described in this thesis towards devising novel schemes to improve
user identity privacy in mobile systems which could actually be deployed.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis we describe the results of research into the possible enhancement of
the security and privacy properties of the GSM, 3G and 4G mobile networks, as well
as analyses of the deployability of certain previously proposed solutions. We further
propose new schemes to add network authentication to GSM networks, and to enhance
user identity privacy in the GSM, 3G, and 4G mobile networks without affecting the
intermediate network entities, notably the serving networks and mobile equipment. Of
the contributions, I formulated the research problem and came up with the proposed
schemes, and my supervisor provided guidance and necessary corrections.
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The main contributions of this thesis are as follows.
• Although many authors have proposed schemes designed to improve the security
and privacy properties of GSM by providing mutual authentication and/or hiding
the permanent subscriber identity, they all require changes to the existing radio
interface protocols. It is somewhat counterintuitive to propose that authentica-
tion of the network to the phone can be achieved without modifying the way in
which the existing access networks and phones operate. However, this is what we
have done. This apparently paradoxical result is achieved by using a technique
we refer to as RAND hijacking. This involves using the authentication ‘challenge’
RAND, which serves as a nonce in the existing unilateral authentication protocol
and is sent from the network to the phone, to contain data which enables the
recipient SIM to verify its origin and freshness. That is, the RAND is hijacked
to act as a communications channel between a home network and a SIM. We
propose a novel authentication scheme for GSM where, instead of generating the
RAND at random, it contains information enabling the network to be authenti-
cated; this information is sent in encrypted form so that to an eavesdropper it
is indistinguishable from a random value. We provide a detailed analysis of the
scheme and verify its correctness and security properties using ProVerif.
• We analyse certain recently proposed modifications to the operation of mobile
systems intended to address user privacy threats. Specifically, we critically ex-
amine the proposals of Arapinis et al. [48]. This analysis reveals that the proposed
modifications are impractical in a variety of ways; not only are there security and
implementation issues, but the necessary changes to the operation of the system
are very significant and much greater than was envisaged by the authors. In
fact, some of the privacy issues appear almost impossible to address without a
complete redesign of the security system, meaning that making significant sys-
tem changes to address some of them are unlikely to be worth the effort. The
shortcomings of the proposed ‘fixes’ exist despite the fact that the modifications
have been verified using a logic-based modelling tool, suggesting that such tools
need to be used with great care. We also suggest possible alternative approaches
to some of the modifications.
• We address the decades-old privacy problem of disclosure of the permanent sub-
scriber identity (IMSI), a problem arising in all generations of mobile networks
that makes IMSI catchers a real threat. A number of possible modifications to
existing protocols have been proposed to address the problem; however, almost
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all require significant changes to existing deployed infrastructures, and are there-
fore impractical to implement in practice. We propose an approach which does
not require any changes to the existing deployed network infrastructures, i.e. to
the serving networks or mobile devices, but offers improved user identity protec-
tion over the air interface. The proposed schemes make use of multiple IMSIs for
an individual subscriber, thereby offering a degree of pseudonymity for a user.
The only changes required are to the operation of the authentication centre in
the home network and to the SIM/USIM, both owned by a single entity. We
present two different approaches to the use and management of multiple IMSIs,
and report on experiments to validate their deployability. The schemes could
be deployed immediately since they are completely transparent to the existing
network infrastructure.
We further improve our proposed scheme to address a possible shortcoming. The
improved scheme prevents disclosure of the subscriber’s IMSI by using a dynamic
pseudo-IMSI that is only identifiable by the USIM’s home network. A major chal-
lenge in using dynamic pseudo-IMSIs is possible loss of identity synchronisation
between a USIM and its home network, an issue which has not been adequately
addressed in previous work. We present an approach for identity recovery to
be used in the event of pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation. The scheme requires
changes to the home network and the USIM, but not to the serving network, mo-
bile phone or other internal network protocols, enabling simple, transparent and
evolutionary migration. We discuss the strengths and limitations of the scheme,
and verify its correctness and security properties using ProVerif.
1.4 Publications
Publications containing some of the research results described in this thesis are listed
below.
• M. S. A. Khan and C. J. Mitchell, ‘Another look at privacy threats in 3G mobile
telephony’, in: W. Susilo and Y. Mu (eds.), Information Security and Privacy—
19th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2014, Wollongong, NSW, Australia, July
7–9, 2014. Proceedings, Springer-Verlag LNCS 8544, Berlin (2014), pp.386–396.
• M. S. A. Khan and C. J. Mitchell, ‘Improving air interface user privacy in mo-
bile telephony’, in: L. Chen and S. Matsuo (eds.), Security Standardisation Re-
search, Second International Conference, SSR 2015, Tokyo, Japan, December
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15–16, 2015, Proceedings, Springer-Verlag LNCS 9497, Berlin (2015), pp.165–
184.
• M. S. A. Khan and C. J. Mitchell, ‘Retrofitting mutual authentication to GSM
using RAND hijacking’, in: G. Barthe, E. Markatos and P. Samarati (eds.), Se-
curity and Trust Management—12th International Workshop, STM 2016, Herak-
lion, Crete, Greece, September 26–27, 2016, Proceedings, Springer-Verlag LNCS
9871, Berlin (2016), pp.17–31.
• M. S. A. Khan and C. J. Mitchell, ‘Trashing IMSI catchers in mobile networks’,
in: G. Noubir and M. Conti and S. K. Kasera (eds.), 10th ACM Conference
on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, WiSec 2017, Boston,
MA, USA, July 18-20, 2017. Proceedings, ACM (2017), pp.207–218.
All the previously mentioned publications were supervised by C. J. Mitchell. A
further publication co-authored whilst conducting my PhD research is as follows.
• M. N. Kayuni, M. S. A. Khan, W. Li, C. J. Mitchell and P. Yau, ‘Generating
unlinkable IPv6 addresses’, in: L. Chen and S. Matsuo (eds.), Security Stan-
dardisation Research, Second International Conference, SSR 2015, Tokyo, Japan,
December 15–16, 2015, Proceedings, Springer-Verlag LNCS 9497, Berlin (2015),
pp.185–199.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The reminder of this thesis is divided into four parts, as follows.
1. Part I describes necessary background material. It contains two chapters, as
follows.
• Chapter 2 describes those aspects of the system architecture, user identi-
ties, air interface protocols, and services of 2G mobile systems necessary to
understand the rest of the thesis.
• Chapter 3 outlines aspects of the system architecture, user identities, air
interface protocols, and services of 3G and 4G mobile systems relevant to
the rest of the thesis.
2. Part II describes the security and privacy threats arising from use of GSM. It fur-
ther presents novel schemes to support mutual authentication, and to improve air
interface user privacy in GSM networks. It contains the following three chapters.
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• Chapter 4 gives an overview of known security and privacy issues arising
from the lack of mutual authentication and disclosure of the permanent
subscriber identity in GSM networks. It also discusses previous attempts to
address these issues.
• Chapter 5 describes and analyses a novel scheme to provide mutual authen-
tication in GSM without affecting the serving networks or phones.
• Chapter 6 describes and analyses a scheme to improve air interface user
privacy in GSM networks, that does not require modifications to the serving
networks or phones.
3. Part III addresses privacy threats arising in 3G and 4G mobile systems. Novel
schemes designed to address the threat of IMSI catchers in mobile networks are
presented. It contains three chapters, as follows.
• Chapter 7 reviews known privacy issues arising from disclosure of the perma-
nent subscriber identity in 3G and 4G. It also discusses previous attempts
to address these issues.
• Chapter 8 presents a critical analysis of the proposed modifications to the
operation of 3G mobile systems due to Arapinis et al. [48], intended to ad-
dress threats to user identity privacy; it further proposes possible alternative
means of mitigating these threats.
• Chapter 9 describes and analyses novel schemes to address the decades-old
privacy problem of disclosure of the permanent subscriber identity, focussing
in particular on 3G and 4G.
4. Part IV concludes the thesis by summarising the main contributions as well as
highlighting possible areas for future work. This part of the thesis consists of a
single chapter, Chapter 10 .
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Overview
Part I describes necessary background material. It contains two chapters, as follows.
• Chapter 2 describes those aspects of the system architecture, user identities, air
interface protocols, and services of 2G systems necessary to understand the rest
of the thesis.
• Chapter 3 outlines aspects of the system architecture, user identities, air interface
protocols, and services of 3G and 4G systems relevant to the rest of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
2G Mobile Systems
2.1 Introduction
The 2G GSM1 (global system for mobile communications) system, developed initially by
the European conference of postal and telecommunications administrations (CEPT) and
then adopted by the European telecommunications standard institute (ETSI), replaced
the 1G analogue mobile systems. The first GSM system was developed in Finland by
the operator Radiolinja in 1991, and GSM remains the most widely-used technology
for wireless networks worldwide [42]. This chapter introduces those parts of the GSM
technology relevant to the remainder of the thesis, with a particular focus on the
security and privacy features.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we briefly describe the archi-
tecture of GSM. Section 2.3 outlines the identities used within a GSM network. In
Section 2.4 we describe in detail the GSM authentication protocol, which underlies all
the GSM security and privacy features. Section 2.5 outlines the GSM services key to
this thesis. In Section 2.6 we describe relevant features of a SIM. Section 2.7 concludes
the chapter by briefly reviewing the general packet radio service (GPRS), a GSM-based
2G data communications technology.
2.2 System Architecture
Although the only visible part of a mobile network architecture is the set of intercon-
nected and stationary radio towers distributed over the geographical coverage area of
a mobile network operator (MNO), there is a complex network behind the scenes pro-
viding seamless wireless communication services. In this section we give a simplified
1Originally known as groupe spe`cial mobile, GSM was renamed following the worldwide adoption
of the standard.
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overview of the architecture of the GSM network, focusing on those entities that are
of relevance to this thesis. Figure 2.1 illustrates the architecture and the connections
between these components. Further details can be found in technical specifications
GSM 03.02 [87] and 3GPP TS 43.020 [40].
2.2.1 Overview
The infrastructure for a GSM network can be divided into two subsystems: the base
station subsystem (BSS) and the network subsystem. The stationary radio towers be-
long to the BSS. To attach to a network, a mobile phone, a mobile station in GSM
terminology, connects via its radio interface to a radio tower. The radio tower, also
known as a base transceiver station (BTS) or simply a base station (BS), relays radio
traffic to and from the mobile network and provides over-the-air access to the network.
Each BTS covers a specific area called a cell, and is identified by its cell identity. Cells
are grouped together to form a location area (LA), which is controlled by a single base
station controller (BSC). The BTSs and BSCs form the BSS, also known as the radio
network, which contains the functionality necessary to enable mobile users to connect
to the network over the radio interface. The radio interface is usually referred to as the
air interface.
Figure 2.1: GSM system architecture (simplified)
The network subsystem is the back-end component of the GSM network architec-
ture, and is known as the core network. The mobile switching center (MSC) is the
controlling element of a core network. A number of BSCs are connected to a sin-
gle MSC, and the MSC is responsible for controlling call setup and routing, and for
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mobility management. The gateway-MSC (GMSC) connects the mobile network to
the public switched telephone network (PSTN)—the global telephony network. Two
separate databases contain subscriber account information, namely the home location
register (HLR) and the visitor location register (VLR); these databases form part of
the core network, and are connected to the MSC to support its operation, for example,
for authentication of subscribers, location management, and organizing handover to a
BSC. The VLR holds dynamic information regarding the subscribers currently roam-
ing in the jurisdiction of the MSC, information which is maintained until the subscriber
is handed over to a different MSC.
Each MNO maintains a HLR that is used to store information about its subscribers.
The HLR holds a record for each subscriber, where a record contains the following
information:
• the subscriber’s permanent identity, known as the IMSI;
• the subscriber’s phone number;
• the set of services available to this subscriber;
• the identity of the MSC currently responsible for forwarding mobile terminated
services to this subscriber; and
• the subscriber-specific authentication data.
Although a subscriber is normally assigned only a single phone number, an HLR
could store multiple phone numbers for a subscriber. Generally there is only one HLR
for an MNO; however, an MNO could implement the HLR in a distributed way to
support a large numbers of users. The HLR is associated with an authentication center
(AuC) that stores the cryptographic credentials required for communicating with the
SIM; specifically, the AuC shares a unique secret key K with each SIM issued by
the MNO to which it belongs, and is responsible for computing subscriber-specific
authentication data.
The equipment identity register (EIR) is a database of the identities of mobile de-
vices used in the global GSM network. A mobile device identity, known as international
mobile equipment identity (IMEI) (see Section 2.3.2 below), can be classified as white-
listed, grey-listed, or black-listed. The EIR enables the MSC to prevent specific mobile
devices, e.g. banned or stolen mobile phones, from accessing its services. The possible
use of the EIR in a GSM network is discussed in Section 4 of the technical specifications
GSM 02.16 [85] and 3GPP TS 22.016 [21]. Each MSC of a GSM network is connected
to the EIR; a centralised EIR could serve the MNOs in a specific region.
12
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2.2.2 Security Context Classification
The entities in GSM network architecture can be grouped into the three categories
described below, where the categories are based on the trust inter-relationships. We
use these categories when describing security-related functionality in the remainder of
the thesis.
2.2.2.1 Mobile Station
A complete mobile phone is referred to as a mobile station (MS), where the term
encapsulates not only the mobile equipment (ME), i.e. the phone, but also the subscriber
identity module (SIM) within it, where the SIM takes the form of a cut-down smart card.
The ME is made up of components which may have been designed and manufactured by
a range of vendors, whereas the SIM is always owned and managed by the subscriber’s
MNO. The ME must support all the mandatory features of the GSM standards, and is
known as a 2G ME . The SIM embodies the relationship between the human user and
the issuing MNO, including the IMSI, the mobile number, and other user (subscriber)
data, together with a secret key K shared with the issuing network which forms the
basis for all the air interface security features. Further details of the SIM are given in
Section 2.6.
2.2.2.2 Serving Network
The radio network, along with the MSC and its associated VLR, forms part of the
serving network (SN). This is the network from which a subscriber receives telecom-
munication services. To support roaming subscribers, the SN could be managed by
an MNO different from the MNO with which the subscriber has a contract for the
provision of mobile services. This arrangement needs to be supported by a roaming
agreement between the MNOs concerned. Given the absence of a subscriber agreement
between a roaming subscriber and an SN, there is no direct trust relationship between
them, although there is an indirect relationship since the SN is trusted by the home
network, as described in the next section. However, the SN must follow the protocol
specification when communicating with the MS and home network.
2.2.2.3 Home Network
The HLR and the AuC operated by a single MNO together form the home network
(HN) component of a mobile network. The HN is the source of trust for the user of
a mobile network, and is individually managed by each MNO. The HN is responsible
for subscriber authentication, authorisation, and cryptographic key generation. As
13
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mentioned above, the AuC stores the subscriber’s secret key K, and is responsible for
computing authentication data and cryptographic keys for an individual subscriber;
given its sensitivity, access to the AuC is restricted to the HLR.
2.3 System Identities
2.3.1 IMSI
An IMSI is a string of 15 decimal digits which uniquely identifies a GSM subscriber
worldwide; it is used for subscriber-related signalling in the network. The structure of
an IMSI is defined in technical specifications GSM 03.03 [5], 3GPP TS 23.003 [23] and
E.212 [157]. As stated above, it is stored in the subscriber’s SIM and in the HLR; it
is the key to all information about subscribers. An IMSI is made up of the following
three parts (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Structure of an IMSI
• Mobile Country Code (MCC): The first three digits of an IMSI are the MCC that
identifies the subscriber’s home country. The allocation of MCCs is administered
by the ITU-T (the Telecommunication standardisation sector of the International
Telecommunications Union)2.
• Mobile Network Code (MNC): The next two or three digits uniquely identify the
MNO of a subscriber within the country identified by the MCC, and are known
as the MNC. The length of the MNC, i.e. whether it is two or three digits, is
a national matter, and MNC values are managed by the national administrator.
A unique MNC is necessary because there are usually multiple mobile networks
within a country. In the United Kingdom, for example, the following MNCs are
used: 10 for O2, 15 for Vodafone, 30 for T-Mobile, and 33 for Orange.
• Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN): The remaining nine or ten dig-
its form the MSIN, and are administered by the network operator. The MSIN
uniquely identifies a subscriber of an MNO.
2http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Pages/default.aspx
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IMSIs thus have geographical significance, and are typically managed by the net-
work operator in blocks. The MCC and MNC combination uniquely identifies the HN,
and is known as the public land mobile network identity (PLMN-ID); analogously, the
MNC and MSIN combination uniquely identifies a subscriber within a national context,
and is known as the national mobile subscriber identity (NMSI). The MSIN is used
by the network operator to identify the subscriber for billing and other operational
purposes. So, each IMSI uniquely identifies the mobile user, as well as the user’s HN
and home country; hence, it has privacy and security significance. The IMSI for a
subscriber is normally fixed.
2.3.2 IMEI
An IMEI is a string of 15 decimal digits used to uniquely and permanently identify
an ME, allowing a stolen equipment to be blacklisted in the EIR. It plays no role in
the provision of communication services, and a network cannot verify its authenticity.
It might be accompanied by a software version number, in which case the identity
is called an international mobile equipment identity software version (IMEISV). Be-
cause of possible software upgrades to a terminal, the IMEISV might change during
the terminal’s lifetime, while the IMEI remains the same. Although the technical spec-
ifications [6, 24] describe an IMEI as temporary subscriber data, subscribers typically
use a mobile device for a significant period of time; hence, an IMEI is quasi-permanent,
and if sent in cleartext it could compromise user privacy. Further details can be found
in technical specifications GSM 03.03 [5], and 3GPP TS 23.003 [23].
2.3.3 MSISDN
The phone number of a subscriber, known in GSM as the mobile station international
ISDN number (MSISDN) [86], is a string of up to 15 decimal digits, of which the
first three are the country code (CC), the international code of the subscriber’s home
country. The remaining digits are the national mobile number, which consists of a
national destination code (NDC) and a unique subscriber number. The composition
of the MSISDN is such that it can be used as a global address in the core network
for routing data to the HLR of the MS. The CC and the NDC provide the necessary
routing information, and the MSISDN is used in delivering mobile terminated (MT)
services (see Section 2.5.4). If further routing information is required, it should be
contained in the first few digits of the subscriber number [5, 158]. Since the introduction
of mobile number portability blurs the significance of the NDC, routing data can if
necessary be obtained by other means. Further details can be found in the relevant
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standards [5, 23, 158].
The MSISDN is typically public information for a subscriber. It is not used to
identify a subscriber in the network, and is not included in the signalling messages sent
across the air interface. As a result, it is outside the scope of this thesis, and we do not
consider it further here.
2.3.4 TMSI
As discussed in Section 1.2, a TMSI is a temporary subscriber identity used in place
of an IMSI in transmissions across the air interface, with the goal of providing user
pseudonymity. The TMSI is allocated by the MSC, and is transferred to the MS via
an encrypted channel. The MSC maintains the relationship between a TMSI and its
associated IMSI. Since the MSC uses the subscriber’s IMSI in communications across
the core network, maintaining the mapping of an IMSI from a TMSI is critical for
successful network operation. We discuss this issue in detail in the next chapter (see
Section 3.7).
A TMSI consists of four octets. Since a TMSI has only local significance, i.e. within
an MSC and the area controlled by an MSC, its structure and coding are chosen by
the SN [5, 23]. When a subscriber moves from one LA to another, its TMSI is updated
by the SN. Although a subscriber is temporarily traceable via its TMSI, the length of
time a single TMSI remains valid is limited, and is configurable by the SN.
2.3.5 LAI
A location area identity (LAI) uniquely identifies an LA within a mobile network, where
LAs are geographical sub-divisions of the area covered by a single MSC. An LAI is a
combination of the PLMN-ID of the mobile network and a location area code (LAC).
A LAC is two bytes long, and is managed by an MSC [5, 23].
2.4 Authentication Protocol
To prevent unauthorised MSs gaining access to network service, GSM incorporates
an authentication procedure which enables the network to verify that the SIM in an
MS is genuine, and has the identity it claims. This procedure is known as the GSM
authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol; this protocol is at the core of air
interface security, since it also establishes a session key used for subsequent traffic
encryption.
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The AKA is performed between the MSC of the SN and the MS as part of a range
of network operations, including when:
• a change is necessary to the subscriber-related information element in the VLR
or HLR, including one or both of;
– a location update involving change of MSC,
– the activation or deactivation of a supplementary service;
• an MS attempts to access a service, such as a mobile originating or a mobile
terminating service; or
• an MS makes its first network access after a restart.
Although user identification is not part of the AKA protocol, it is an implicit
prerequisite for executing the protocol. In the user identification phase, the MS will,
whenever it can, identify itself using its TMSI, and the MSC determines the IMSI
from the TMSI using its own process. If the MSC fails to determine the IMSI from
the supplied TMSI, it requests the MS to send its IMSI using a user identity request
message; the MS responds with its cleartext IMSI in a user identity response message.
Once the SN learns the IMSI, it selects the next unused element from an IMSI-
specific list of authentication vectors (AVs), stored in the SN’s VLR. The AV contains
all the data necessary to perform AKA. If the list is empty, the SN determines the
subscriber’s HN by parsing the IMSI, and contacts this network to request a new set
of AVs, which are typically sent in small batches (to overcome latency).
On receipt of such a request, the HN’s AuC retrieves the secret key K for the
specified IMSI, and uses it to generate a batch of AVs. These AVs are generated using
a pair of cryptographic functions known as A3 and A8. These functions only need to
be implemented by the HN and the SIMs it issues, and the choice of functions is up to
the network; nevertheless, the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP)3 recommends
use of the corresponding 3G functions in a modified way [41]. The function A3 is a
32-bit MAC generating function and A8 is a 64-bit key derivation function (KDF).
Generating an AV involves the following steps (see Figure 2.3(a)); which can be
repeated as necessary to generate a batch.
1. A 128-bit random (or pseudorandom) value RAND is generated.
2. The AuC computes the 32-bit value XRES as XRES = A3K(RAND).
3http://www.3gpp.org
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3. The AuC computes the 64-bit key Kc as Kc = A8K (RAND).
4. AV = (RAND ,XRES ,Kc).
The generated AVs are then sent back to the SN, which can then use one of them
to conduct AKA.
The core of AKA is a challenge-response protocol. The messages exchanged among
the involved parties, i.e. the MS, the SN, and the HN, are shown in Figure 2.4, and the
computations involved are shown in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Computations of GSM AKA key values
The challenge-response procedure operates as follows. Further details can be found
in technical specifications GSM 03.20 [2], 3GPP TS 43.020 [40] and GSM 04.08 [7].
1. The serving MSC sends RAND to the MS as an authentication challenge. The
ME passes the received RAND to the SIM using the RUN GSM ALGORITHM
command.
2. The SIM computes SRES = A3K(RAND) and Kc = A8K (RAND), where A3 and
A8 are the same functions as used by the HN to generate the AV, SRES is a 32-bit
signed response, and Kc is a 64-bit session key used to encrypt data sent across
the air interface. Note that precisely the same computation was performed by
the AuC to generate XRES and Kc earlier (see Figure 2.3(b)).
3. The SIM returns SRES and Kc to the ME. The ME keeps the session key Kc to
use in data encryption, and forwards SRES to the serving MSC.
4. The serving MSC compares the received SRES with the value of XRES from the
AV; if they agree then the MS is deemed authenticated.
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Figure 2.4: GSM AKA message flow
After successful authentication of an MS by a serving MSC, both the MS and the
MSC hold a valid session key Kc. The MSC transfers this key to the appropriate BSC,
where it is used for traffic encryption using one of the standardised algorithms (i.e.
one of A5/1, A5/2 and A5/3), as selected by the BSC of the SN. The serving MSC
also assigns a TMSI and sends it to the MS; the BSC will encrypt the TMSI prior to
transmission across the air interface, just as it does for voice traffic.
2.5 Network Activities
We next summarise certain network operations of particular relevance to security and
privacy.
2.5.1 IMSI Attach
After a mobile device is switched on, its first action is to register with the network to
enable it to send and receive calls. This is achieved using the IMSI attach process.
Radio communication between the MS and the SN takes place over various types of
channel, including dedicated channels, shared channels and broadcast channels. When
a mobile device is switched on, it listens for a SYSTEM INFORMATION message ad-
vertised by a network over a broadcast channel known as the broadcast common control
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channel (BCCH). Such messages contain a range of information about the network,
including the PLMN-ID of the radio tower; the identification of the radio tower, con-
sisting of the LAC and the cell identity; and the frequencies used by neighbouring cells.
On receiving the message, the MS compares the PLMN-ID values in the message with
the list of permitted networks stored in its SIM. If there is a match, the MS responds
to the network with a channel request and, as soon as a channel is assigned, the MS
initiates the attachment process (see Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Steps in mobile station attachment
The IMSI attach procedure is described in Section 4.4.3 of technical specification
GSM 04.08 [7]. It is accomplished using the location update procedure, where the
update type information element in the location update request message sent by the MS
to the network indicates IMSI attach. This location update request message includes the
IMSI of the MS. On receiving the message, the SN authenticates the MS using AKA,
described in Section 2.4. If authentication is successful, the SN updates the location
information of the subscriber at the subscriber’s HN (see Section 2.5.2 below), and
notifies the MS; otherwise, the SN sends the MS a reject message. After a successful
IMSI attach, the MS is sent a TMSI, which is used as its identifier in subsequent
communication.
2.5.2 Location Update
When a subscriber moves to a new location area, the HN must be notified so that the
MS can continue to receive mobile-terminated services (see Section 2.5.4), e.g. receiving
calls or texts. An MS can initiate a location update procedure with the SN for a range
of reasons, e.g. for a periodic location update to inform the network of its presence
in a certain location area; normal location update because of a change of location
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area; or during an IMSI attach. The reason for the location update is indicated in
the update type field in the location update request message [7]. The main steps in the
location update procedure are listed below. Further details can be found in technical
specifications GSM 03.20 [2], GSM 04.08 [7], and GSM 03.12 [83].
1. The MS sends a location update request message containing its TMSI and LAI to
the MSC of the SN.
2. If the MSC in the SN is the same as that indicated by the LAI, the serving
MSC determines the IMSI from the TMSI using its VLR; otherwise, it follows
the process described in technical specification GSM 09.02 [8] to collect the cor-
responding IMSI, along with any unused AVs, from the ‘old’ MSC, i.e. the MSC
which was most recently connected to the MS. If the serving MSC fails to deter-
mine the IMSI by this method, it requests the MS to send its IMSI using a user
identity request message, and the MS responds with its cleartext IMSI in a user
identity response message.
3. The SN performs the AKA protocol, enables ciphering with the new key, and
allocates a new TMSI to the MS as described in Section 2.4; it then initiates a
location update with the HN, involving the following steps.
(a) The serving MSC sends its identifier and the IMSI in a location update
request message to the subscriber’s HN.
(b) On receiving the message, the HN updates the location information for the
subscriber identified by the IMSI, and sends a cancel location request to the
‘old’ MSC for this subscriber.
(c) The old MSC sends an acknowledgement for the location cancellation to the
HN.
(d) The HN sends an acknowledgement for the location update request to the
initiating MSC.
4. The SN sends a location update accept or location update reject message to the
MS.
2.5.3 Paging
Paging is used by an SN to locate an MS to which a connection needs to be established.
In order to deliver a service to a user, the serving MSC needs to know the precise
location of the MS. An ME typically reverts to an idle state most of the time to save
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stored battery energy, and is therefore not in constant contact with the SN; thus the SN
does not know which radio tower provides the best radio signal to the MS. However,
the SN is aware of the location area in which the MS was most recently, and so it
broadcasts a paging message throughout the location area to alert the MS.
A paging message is sent from the SN to all mobile devices in a particular area,
and contains either an IMSI or a TMSI. The GSM standard [7] specifies three types
of paging requests, known as type 1, type 2, and type 3 paging messages. The three
paging message types allow different numbers of MSs to be addressed with a single
message. Types 1, 2 and 3 paging messages respectively allow one or two, two or three,
or four MSs to be paged simultaneously. If an MS detects a paging message containing
its IMSI or its current TMSI, it establishes a dedicated channel with the SN and sends
the network a paging response message containing its current TMSI.
2.5.4 Mobile Terminated Services
How a network service is managed varies depending on whether the service originates
or terminates at an MS. A mobile terminated (MT) service is one that is passively
received by a subscriber, e.g. receiving a phone call or a short message.
The MT services are supported by the paging procedure. When an MT service is
to be delivered, the core network first determines the responsible MSC for the target
subscriber with the help of the subscriber’s HLR. Next, the MSC obtains the location
information for the destination subscriber from the VLR, and sends a paging message
to all BSCs in the subscriber’s location area. The message contains the identity of
the subscriber, usually either an IMSI or a TMSI. The BSC broadcasts the paging
message via all the BTSs in its jurisdiction. If the target subscriber responds with a
paging response message, it undergoes an authentication, ciphering and service setup
procedure with the SN; the pending service is subsequently delivered to the MS. Paging
in mobile systems could be spoofed; we discuss this issue further in Section 4.5.5.
2.6 The SIM
The SIM is the cornerstone of GSM security, since it contains the IMSI and the associ-
ated 128-bit permanent key K. The cryptographic mechanisms used in authentication
and key generation, i.e. A3 and A8, are implemented in the SIM. The properties of the
SIM are specified in technical specifications GSM 02.17 [84] and 3GPP TS 42.017 [4].
In the original GSM specification and until release 4 of the 3GPP specifications4, the
physical smart card itself was called a SIM, so the specifications use the term ‘a SIM
4http://www.3gpp.org/specifications/specification-numbering
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card’. From release 4 of the 3GPP specifications, the smart card itself is called a uni-
versal integrated circuit card (UICC), and the term SIM now refers to an application
running in the UICC. This change of approach allows for later generation network
access applications, e.g. the universal subscriber identity module (USIM) and the IMS
SIM (ISIM), to run on the same smart card platform. The UICC supports communi-
cations between the ME and an application in a UICC through well defined commands.
The properties of the UICC are defined in technical specification ETSI TS 102.221 [88].
In this section we briefly describe the data storage capabilities of a UICC, focussing
on the SIM and the USIM application, communications between an application residing
in a UICC and the ME, and a feature of the SIM, known as the SIM application toolkit,
that is of great use in designing the schemes we describe later in the thesis.
2.6.1 Memory Structure
A UICC stores data in a file system organised as a rooted tree with at most one file
associated with each node. File types included elementary files (EFs) and dedicated
files (DFs). Each EF stores a set of data units, records or objects. EFs are always
leaf nodes in the tree, and DFs are used to group EFs; thus a DF is only a leaf node
if it is empty. The master file (MF) is a mandatory and unique DF that serves as the
root of the file system tree. Files can be addressed in various ways, depending on the
file type; for example, they can be addressed by variable-length names or by two-byte
identifiers, which may be concatenated to absolute and relative paths. Basic actions,
e.g. read or update, on UICC data are controlled by access conditions which must be
satisfied before the action can be performed. The access control policies are defined in
3GPP specifications [10, 12].
An application in a UICC consists of a set of functions, and has an associated
subtree in the file system. The application’s root DF is called an application dedicated
file (ADF). Such ADFs are addressed by their unique DF name which must be listed
in the EFDIR — an application-independent file that is a descendant of the MF. When
an ME initially accesses the UICC, if the EFDIR is not found in the UICC, or if the
USIM application, which has identifier ADFUSIM , is not listed in the EFDIR, the UICC
selects the SIM application; hence, a UICC must always contain the SIM application.
Both the SIM and USIM applications store a range of data about the subscriber,
the supported services, and the network. For example, they store the subscriber’s
IMSI, phone number, current location, and subscriber-specific cryptographic creden-
tials. These data are stored in specific EFs, e.g. the IMSI is stored in the EFIMSI .
The SIM data storage requirements are specified in Section 6 of technical specifications
GSM 02.17 [84] and 3GPP TS 42.017 [4]. Figure 2.6 shows the simplified file structure
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Figure 2.6: UICC file structure (simplified) [12, 28]
of a UICC supporting both the SIM and the USIM applications.
Although the EFIMSI and the EFMSISDN files are present for both the SIM and the
USIM applications, their file names and the file identifiers for the two applications are
identical (see Figure 2.6). These EFs contain the same information for use in different
networks. This allows for memory efficient implementation of a SIM together with a
USIM, since the files can be shared by the two applications.
2.6.2 Application Protocol Data Units
Data is exchanged between an application residing in a UICC and the ME in the form
of application protocol data units (APDUs). An APDU sent by the ME is called a
command APDU, and is answered by the application residing in the UICC using a
response APDU . A matching pair of messages is referred to as a command–response
pair.
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Figure 2.7(a) shows the structure of a command APDU. The first four bytes, known
as the command header, are mandatory. The class byte specifies a group of commands,
i.e. the value ‘A0’ indicates commands for the SIM application. The code transmitted
in the instruction byte indicates a specific command, telling the application which
operations to perform. Command arguments are encoded in the parameter bytes P1
and P2 . The remaining parts of the command APDU are optional, where the command
data length denotes the number of input bytes contained in the command data field,
and is present if the command APDU carries additional data. The response data length
encodes an upper bound for the size of the result data in the expected response APDU.
Figure 2.7: Command and response APDU
Figure 2.7(b) shows the structure of a response APDU. The response data is op-
tional, and is present if the instruction specified in the command APDU generates
response data. The status bytes, SW1 and SW2, are mandatory, and respectively cat-
egorise the outcome of the finished operation, and inform the ME about necessary
follow-up commands. Further details can be found in technical specification ETSI TS
102.221 [88].
2.6.3 The SIM Application Toolkit
The SIM application toolkit (SAT) is a service operating across the SIM–ME interface
that provides a mechanism for a SIM to initiate an action to be taken by the ME.
As discussed in the previous section, communications between an ME and a SIM are
command–response based; the SAT provides a set of commands, also known as SIM
toolkit (STK) commands, which allow a SIM to initiate an action with an ME. A SIM
that supports the SAT is known as a proactive SIM .
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The GSM technical specification [12] states that an ME must communicate with
a SIM using either the T=0 or T=1 protocol, specified in ISO/IEC 7816-3 [106]. In
both cases the ME is always the master and thus initiates commands to the SIM; as
a result there is no mechanism for the SIM to initiate communications with the ME.
This limits the possibility of introducing new SIM features requiring the support of the
ME, as the ME needs to know in advance what actions it should take. The proactive
SIM provides a mechanism that allows the SIM to indicate to the ME, using a response
to an ME-issued command, that it has some information to send. The SIM achieves
this by including a special status byte ‘91’ followed by the length of the instruction to
send in the response APDU, which signals both the successful termination of the ME’s
last command as well as the length of the information describing the pending proactive
command. The ME is then required to issue the FETCH command to retrieve the
proactive command [9, 13]. The SIM responds with the proactive command, and the
ME must execute it and return the result in the TERMINAL RESPONSE command.
To avoid cross-phase compatibility problems, this service is only permitted to be used
between a SIM and an ME that support the STK commands. The fact that an ME
supports specific STK commands is revealed when the ME sends the TERMINAL
PROFILE command during SIM initialisation.
The SIM can make a range of requests using the SAT service. Examples include:
requesting the ME to display SIM-provided text, initiating the establishment of on-
demand channels, and providing local information from the ME to the SIM. Although
support of STK commands is optional for an ME, if an ME claims compliance with a
specific GSM release then it is mandatory for the ME to support all functions of that
release [13]. Since 1998 almost all of the MEs produced have been SAT-enabled, and
today almost every ME on the market supports SAT. Further details can be found in
technical specifications GSM 11.14 [13] and 3GPP TS 51.014 [9].
2.7 General Packet Radio Service
The general packet radio service (GPRS) is a GSM-based 2G data communication
technology. Originally, GSM only supported circuit-switched (CS) data, for voice com-
munications and short messages. GPRS is a backward-compatible update to GSM
supporting the transfer of packet-switched (PS) data in a GSM network. Support for
PS data is achieved by including additional entities, i.e. the SGSN and the GGSN, in
the core network.
The GPRS security functions, i.e. the authentication of a subscriber and cipher
key management, remain the same as in GSM. However, there are changes to certain
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network operations. Significant changes in GPRS systems include the following.
• GPRS introduces an additional temporary subscriber identity, known as the P-
TMSI .
• GPRS uses a separate session key for GPRS data encryption.
• GPRS employs a new location identity, known as the routing area identity (RAI),
analogous to the LAI in GSM.
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3G and 4G Mobile Systems
3.1 Introduction
Third generation (3G) mobile systems, such as the universal mobile telecommunications
system (UMTS), are the successor to 2G mobile technology, and represent an evolution
of the GSM mobile networks. Analogously, fourth generation (4G) mobile systems,
represented by the long-term evolution (LTE) system, introduce an all-Internet protocol
(IP) based network infrastructure, as part of their evolution of 3G mobile technology. In
this chapter we briefly describe the 3G and 4G mobile systems, explaining the relevant
features and providing the terminology we use throughout the thesis. We describe in
detail the authentication schemes used in these systems, which form a key part of the
research results described.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we briefly de-
scribe the architecture of 3G and 4G mobile systems. Section 3.3 outlines the identities
in 3G and 4G networks relevant to this thesis. In Section 3.4 we describe in detail the
3G and 4G authentication protocols. Section 3.5 briefly describes the relevant features
of a USIM. In Section 3.6 we re-examine the network activities described in Section 2.5
in the context of 3G and 4G networks. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter by briefly
reviewing how a subscriber’s temporary identities are managed in mobile systems, a
topic of particular relevance to the schemes we describe later in this thesis.
3.2 System Architecture
In this section we present a simplified description of the network architecture for 3G
and 4G mobile systems. A detailed description of the 3G network architecture can be
found in technical specification 3GPP TS 23.101 [16], and the 4G network architecture
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is described in detail in technical specifications 3GPP TS 23.401 [25] and 3GPP TS
36.401 [39].
3.2.1 3G Mobile Systems
Like GSM mobile systems, the network infrastructure of a 3G network can be divided
into two main parts, namely the radio access network (RAN) and the core network.
There are two types of RAN in a 3G system. The universal terrestrial radio access
network (UTRAN) is the newly introduced 3G RAN, whereas the GSM/EDGE radio
access network (GERAN) is the GSM radio access network. The stationary radio towers
provide the network-based termination point for the radio interface, and are known as
Node B in UTRAN and BTS in GERAN. Multiple radio towers can be connected to
the controlling unit of the RAN, referred as the radio network controller (RNC). To
attach to a 3G network, a mobile phone, a user equipment (UE) in 3GPP terminology,
connects via its radio interface to a RAN, which is itself connected to the core network.
The services provided by the core network are divided into two domains: the circuit-
switched (CS) domain, and the packet-switched (PS) domain. The network elements in
the CS domain are the MSC, its associated VLR, and the GMSC; the functions of these
entities are the same as those in a GSM network (see Section 2.2.1). The serving GPRS
support node (SGSN) and the gateway GPRS support node (GGSN) are the entities in
the PS domain. PS connections are managed by the SGSN, where the SGSN maintains
its own VLR to store data about these connections. The roles of this VLR are the same
as those of the MSC’s VLR. Analogously, the SGSN is the counterpart of the MSC for
the PS domain. The GGSN is responsible for controlling IP services both within the
MNO and to the outside world, such as the Internet.
The MSC, GMSC, SGSN, and GGSN are connected to the MNO’s HLR. Analo-
gously to GSM, the HLR is associated with an AuC. The functions of the HLR and the
AuC in 3G systems are similar to their GSM counterparts. However, there are differ-
ences in the detailed operation of the 3G HLR and AuC compared to GSM, necessary to
support the 3G authentication protocol (see Section 3.4). Figure 3.1 gives a simplified
view of the 3G systems architecture and of the connections among its components.
The UE encapsulates both the ME and the USIM, where a USIM is an application
residing in a UICC. The ME contains the radio functionality and the protocols required
to communicate with 3G network, i.e. it supports both the 2G and 3G RAN; it is also
known as a 3G ME. The USIM consists of a group of functions for network access,
and stores a wide range of data about the subscriber and the network, including the
subscriber’s IMSI. Further details of the USIM are given in Section 3.5.
The SN is responsible for communications with the UE via its RAN; hence, the
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Figure 3.1: 3G systems architecture (simplified)
RAN, along with the MSC, SGSN, and their associated VLRs form part of the SN. As
in GSM, the HLR and the AuC are part of the HN, and so, as in GSM, if the subscriber
is roaming, the HN and SN are controlled by different MNOs.
3.2.2 4G Mobile Systems
The network infrastructure of 4G mobile systems is significantly different to that of
2G and 3G. The 4G infrastructure only supports PS data; reflecting this change, the
4G mobile system is known as the evolved packet system (EPS). 4G introduces a new
radio access network, namely the evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (E-
UTRAN). The radio towers in a 4G network have greater computing power, and are
known as evolved Node B (eNB). The eNB is the only network element in the E-
UTRAN, and two eNBs are connected via a direct interface facilitating fast handover
between eNBs. Figure 3.2 gives a simplified view of the 4G systems architecture.
The network entities in the core network of 4G mobile systems are the mobility
management entity (MME) and the serving gateway (S-GW), where the MME manages
the control/signalling data and the S-GW manages the user data. This separation
is a new feature in 4G. Earlier generation mobile systems supporting PS data are
allowed to inter-operate with 4G systems; hence, SGSN is part of the 4G core network.
The MME is responsible for authenticating subscribers, tracking the location of UEs,
paging and other signalling data management. The S-GW, with the support of the
PDN gateway, provides a data service to the subscriber. The HLR and AuC of a
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Figure 3.2: 4G systems architecture (simplified) [25, 37]
3G network are replaced with a single entity, known as the home subscriber server
(HSS). The HSS stores mobility and service data for subscribers, and contains the
functionality of an AuC. The HSS is responsible for generating authentication and key
management data. The MME is connected to the HSS to support its operation, e.g. to
obtain authentication data and to update location information.
The organisation of a UE remains the same as for 3G. There are no significant
functional changes in the USIM. However, the 4G ME needs to support the new radio
functionality to operate in the E-UTRAN. In 4G mobile systems, the E-UTRAN, along
with the MME, the SGSN and the S-GW, forms part of the SN, whereas the HSS is
part of the HN.
3.3 System Identities
The identities described in Section 2.3 are also used in 3G and 4G network operations.
The use of an IMEI in 4G is regulated by the 4G standards which prohibit a UE from
transmitting an IMEI until after a security context has been activated [93]; as a result,
if equipment behaves in accordance with the standards, the IMEI should not pose a
privacy threat. The 3G and 4G systems also introduce new system identities. We next
briefly describe those new identities of particular relevance to user privacy.
3.3.1 P-TMSI
A P-TMSI is a temporary subscriber identity in the 3G PS domain. Like the TMSI,
it is used in place of the IMSI across the air interface [23]. P-TMSIs are allocated
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and managed by the SGSN. The SGSN stores the P-TMSI and its associated IMSI,
and retrieves the IMSI from a P-TMSI for use in the core network. The structure of a
P-TMSI is the same as that of a TMSI used in the CS domain (see Section 2.3.4). A
P-TMSI is updated by the SGSN when the subscriber changes its routing area identity
(RAI) (see Section 3.3.3 below).
3.3.2 GUTI
A globally unique temporary UE identity (GUTI) is a temporary subscriber identity
used in the 4G EPS to provide an unambiguous identification of a UE without revealing
its permanent identity. It is allocated and managed by the MME.
A GUTI is composed of a globally unique MME identifier (GUMMEI) and the UE’s
current M-TMSI for this MME. A GUMMEI contains the PLMN-ID of the network
and the MME identifier (MMEI). An MMEI is made up of the MME group identity
and the MME code, where the MME code is unique inside an MME coverage area [23].
Although the GUTI contains additional information, its function is the same as the
TMSI and P-TMSI.
3.3.3 RAI
A routing area identity (RAI) identifies the routing area (RA) serviced by a single RNC.
It is used in the PS domain in 3G networks. An RA is made up of a group of radio
towers, analogously to an LA. However, the coverage area of an RA is a sub-division
of the area covered by an LA. An RAI is composed of an LAI and a routing area code
(RAC), where the RAC is a 8-bit field unique within an LA.
3.3.4 TAI
A 4G tracking area identity (TAI) identifies the tracking area (TA). TAs are small and
non-overlapping units of area, which make up the coverage area of an MME. A TA is
analogous to the location area and routing area used in GSM and 3G, respectively. A
TAI contains the PLMN-ID of the network and a tracking area code (TAC), where the
TAC is a unique code assigned by the MME.
3.4 Authentication
Authentication in 3G and 4G is performed using the AKA protocol, also known as
3GPP AKA. As in GSM, 3GPP AKA is at the core of air interface security for 3G
and 4G systems. In this section we describe the 3GPP AKA protocol in detail. We
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further briefly review the error reporting features of 3GPP AKA and the properties of
the cryptographic functions used in 3GPP AKA.
The authentication protocols used in 3G and 4G are similar; hence, unless otherwise
stated, we use 3G terminology. A detailed description of the 3G AKA protocol can be
found in technical specification 3GPP TS 33.102 [31], and a description of 4G AKA
can be found in technical specification 3GPP TS 33.401 [34].
3.4.1 The AKA Protocol
The AKA protocol is regularly performed between the SN and the UE for a range
of reasons, as discussed in Section 2.4. It is initiated once the subscriber has been
identified to the SN. In the subscriber identification phase, the UE sends its identity,
i.e. its IMSI or one of the temporary identities (TMSI, P-TMSI, or GUTI depending
on the access network), to the SN. On receiving the user identity, the SN first tries
to determine the subscriber’s IMSI; that is, if the IMSI is not sent, the SN tries to
determine it from the received temporary identity using its own process. If the SN
fails to determine the IMSI from the supplied temporary identity, it requests the UE
to send its IMSI in cleartext, just as in GSM.
Once the serving network has learnt the IMSI, it selects the next unused element
from an IMSI-specific list of AVs, stored in the serving network’s VLR. If the list
is empty, the SN determines the subscriber’s HN by parsing the IMSI, and sends an
authentication data request to this network. However, in 4G it is suggested not to store
AVs in the SN [34, 93]; hence, in this case the SN always needs to contact the HN to
request a new AV.
On receipt of such a request, the HN’s AuC retrieves the secret key K for the spec-
ified IMSI, and uses it to generate a set of AVs. These AVs are generated using a set of
cryptographic functions, known as f1-f5, where f1 and f2 are message authentication
code (MAC) functions, f3 is a cipher key derivation function, f4 is an integrity key
derivation function, and f5 is a cipher mask generating function. These functions only
need to be implemented by the home network and the USIMs it issues, and none of
these functions are standardised. However, the 3GPP technical specifications [35, 36]
give an example set of algorithms for these functions.
Generating an AV involves the following steps (see Figure 3.3), which can be re-
peated as necessary.
1. A 128-bit random (or pseudorandom) value RAND is generated.
2. The AuC computes the 64-bit MAC as MAC = f1K (RAND ,SQN ,AMF ), where
SQN is a 48-bit IMSI-specific sequence value and AMF is a 16-bit MNO-specific
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Figure 3.3: Generating an AV in the AuC
management data field.
3. The AuC computes the n-bit value XRES as XRES = f2K (RAND), where the
value of n is a multiple of 8 and is between 32 and 128.
4. The AuC computes the 128-bit cipher key CK as CK = f3K (RAND).
5. The AuC computes the 128-bit integrity key IK as IK = f4K (RAND).
6. The AuC computes the 48-bit anonymity key AK as AK = f5K (RAND).
7. The 128-bit authentication token AUTN is generated as AUTN = (SQN ⊕AK ) ‖
AMF ‖ MAC , where ‖ denotes concatenation and ⊕ denotes bitwise exclusive-or.
8. A 3G AV is generated as AV = (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN), and a 4G AV
is generated as AV = (RAND, XRES, KASME, AUTN).
The value KASME in a 4G AV is the master session key used to derive interface-
specific session keys. It is computed as KASME = KDFCK ,IK (SQN ⊕AK ,
SNId ), where KDF is a generic key derivation function described in the 3GPP
technical specifications [33, 34], and SNId is the serving network identity.
The generated AVs are then sent back to the serving network, which can then use
one of them to conduct AKA. The messages exchanged among the involved parties,
i.e. the UE, the serving network, and the home network, are shown in Figure 3.4, and
the computations involved are shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.5.
In order to participate in AKA, the UE, in fact the USIM installed inside the UE,
must possess two values:
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Figure 3.4: Authentication message flow in 3G mobile systems
• a long term secret key K, known only to the USIM and the USIM’s HN, and
• a sequence number SQN, maintained by both the USIM and the HN.
The key K never leaves the USIM, and the values of K and SQN are protected
by the USIM’s physical security features. The 48-bit SQN enables the UE to verify
the freshness of the user authentication request. The AK functions as a means of
encrypting SQN ; this is necessary since, if sent in cleartext, the SQN value would
potentially compromise user privacy, given that the value of SQN is USIM-specific.
Like GSM AKA, the core of 3GPP AKA is a challenge–response protocol, which
starts with the SN sending a user authentication request to the UE. More specifically,
the request message contains two values, RAND and AUTN, from the AV. The ME
passes the received RAND and AUTN to the USIM using the AUTHENTICATE com-
mand. On receipt of these two values, the USIM uses the received RAND, along with
its stored value of K, to regenerate the value of AK using the f5 function, which it
can then use to recover SQN . It next uses its stored key K, together with the received
values of RAND, SQN, and AMF, in function f1 to regenerate XMAC ; if the newly
computed value agrees with the MAC value received in AUTN then the first stage of
authentication has succeeded. The USIM next checks that SQN is a ‘new’ value; if so
it updates its stored SQN value and the network has been authenticated. If authen-
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Figure 3.5: Computations in the USIM
tication succeeds, the USIM computes two cryptographic keys, i.e. CK and IK, and
another message authentication code, the RES, and sends them to the ME. The ME
stores the cryptographic keys for subsequent use, and forwards the RES to the network
as part of the user authentication response. If this RES agrees with the value expected
by the network (i.e. the XRES in the AV) then the UE is deemed authenticated by the
SN. Figure 3.5(a) shows the computations in the USIM.
After successful authentication, the UE and the SN establish an agreed security
context. The SN allocates a temporary identity, i.e. a TMSI or P-TMSI in a 3G system
or a GUTI in a 4G system, and sends it to the UE via an encrypted channel.
Note that the MNO-specific value of AMF has no impact on the operation of 3G
AKA. However, it is standardised in 4G AKA, where bit 0, the most significant bit,
of AMF represents the separation bit indicating 4G authentication data, and bits 1
to 7 are reserved for future use. The remaining 8 bits are kept for MNO-specific
purposes [31].
3.4.2 Error Reporting Features
The 3GPP AKA protocol could fail for a variety of reasons [26]. In this thesis we
are interested in the following types of failure, namely those that involve the user
authentication challenge.
• MAC-failure: A MAC-failure arises when the MAC value sent by the network
does not match the value the USIM computes. It is reported to the SN via a
signalling message. On receipt of a MAC-failure, the SN re-initiates AKA with a
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new AV.
• Sync-failure: A sync-failure arises when the SQN value sent by the network is
not greater than the USIM’s stored value. It is communicated to the HN via
a special token, known as AUTS . An AUTS is constructed by concatenating
a masked version of the USIM’s SQN (SQNMS ) and a MAC computed by the
USIM, known as MAC-S (see Figure 3.5(b)). The USIM computes MAC-S using
the function f1∗ with inputs: the received RAND, its stored key K, SQNMS , and
a dummy value of AMF [31]. The function f1∗ is a variant of the f1 function
used in the AKA protocol. To conceal SQNMS , the USIM masks it with an
anonymity key AK, computed using a variant of f5 known as f5∗. When an SN
receives the AUTS token, the SN forwards it to the HN with other parameters,
including the value RAND used in computing AUTS (see Section 6.3.5 of 3GPP
TS 33.102 [31]).
When an HN receives an AUTS token, it first computes AK and retrieves the
USIM’s SQN value from the AUTS token. The HN then uses the retrieved value
of SQN to verify the token. The HN adjusts its stored value of SQN to restore
synchronisation with the USIM, computes an AV with the new value, and sends
this AV to the SN for use in AKA.
3.4.3 Properties of the Cryptographic Functions
The AKA protocol relies on the cryptographic functions f1–f5, f1∗, and f5∗, imple-
mented in both the USIM and the AuC of the home network. We use the functions f1
and f5 in a modified way in designing our schemes; hence, we next briefly describe the
properties of these functions.
The function f1 generates a MAC value on the inputs using the key K. The function
has the property that it must be computationally infeasible to derive the key K from
knowledge of the inputs and the output of f1 [32]. Example of such functions include
CBC-MAC or HMAC [107].
The function f5 outputs a derived key when given as input a master key K and a
128-bit string. Like f1, it must be computationally infeasible to derive the master key
K from knowledge of the input string and the output of f5 [32].
3.5 The USIM
A USIM is a smart card application residing in a UICC that is employed by a UE
to access 3G and 4G mobile networks. It stores a wide range of data in EFs about
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the subscriber, the services supported, and the network, including the subscriber’s
IMSI. We described the storage structure of a USIM application in Section 2.6.1. The
mandatory information storage requirements for a USIM application are defined in
3GPP TS 21.111 [20]. The USIM links the subscriber to the issuing MNO, contains
the cryptographic functions required to execute the AKA protocol, and forms the basis
for the air interface security features.
The USIM application exchanges information with the ME using command–response
pairs, much like a SIM, as discussed in Section 2.6.2. The structure of the command
and response APDUs are similar to those exchanged with a GSM SIM (see Figure 2.7).
However, the value of the class byte in the USIM commands is different from that of
the SIM commands, and a USIM supports a 3G-specific set of commands identified
by the ‘INS’ byte. Further details of the USIM can be found in technical specification
3GPP TS 31.102 [28].
One of the mandatory requirements for 3G mobile systems is to support the 2G
mobile services transparently to the users [22]; hence, a 3G UE must be able to support
the 2G radio access protocols. In this section we briefly describe the USIM features
which allow a USIM to support 2G functionality. We also describe another USIM
feature, known as the USIM application toolkit, that is of key importance in designing
the schemes we describe later in the thesis.
3.5.1 Modes of Operation
Support for 2G access networks is a mandatory requirement for a USIM application. A
3G ME, i.e. an ME supporting both 2G and 3G, must select the USIM application when
it is present in the UICC regardless of the radio access technology. This implies that a
3G UE will never use a SIM application if it is present on the UICC, but it nevertheless
must support the 2G services transparently to the subscriber. This requires the USIM
application on the UICC to support 2G functionality to enable it to provide service
when its host ME roams in a 2G mobile network.
A USIM application stores the 2G-specific data in its rooted file tree, i.e. in ADFUSIM .
More specifically, the dedicated file DFGSM−Access contains the necessary data (see Fig-
ure 2.6). Since the ME can only use the 3G command set to interact with the UICC,
the UE never runs GSM AKA when it roams in a 2G network; instead the USIM op-
erates in something called virtual 2G mode to run the GSM authentication protocol.
In virtual 2G mode, the USIM receives only the value of RAND as the authentication
parameter. On receiving RAND, the USIM first executes f2 to generate the RES, f3
to compute the CK, and f4 to compute the IK . Subsequently, it applies the conver-
sion function c3 to compute the 2G Kc from the CK and IK, the conversion function
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c2 to generate the 2G SRES from the RES, and returns SRES and Kc to the ME.
The USIM switches to virtual 2G mode on receiving a particular command parameter
depending on the current radio access network. The conversion functions, i.e. c2 and
c3, are described in annex B of technical specification 3GPP TR 31.900 [17].
The other possible USIM operation mode is known as the 3G + Kc mode, where
the 2G ciphering key Kc is included in the USIM’s authentication response, and the
ME picks the relevant values depending on the current radio access network. The key
Kc is computed using the conversion function c3 as described above.
The fact that a USIM supports the above described modes of operation in addition
to its usual 3G mode is disclosed in its service table. The USIM needs to support
service number 27, known as GSM access, to operate in 3G + Kc mode. Generally this
mode is always active if the service GSM access is available in the USIM. Alternatively,
USIM service number 38, known as GSM security context, must be activated in the
USIM to operate in virtual 2G mode. The ME learns the set of services supported by
the USIM during USIM initialisation.
3.5.2 USIM Application Toolkit
Analogously to the SIM Application Toolkit, the USIM application toolkit (USAT) is
a service operating across the interface between the USIM and the ME. It provides
a mechanism for a USIM application to initiate an action to be undertaken by the
ME. A USIM that supports the USAT is known as a proactive UICC . A proactive
UICC provides a set of commands, known as the proactive commands, which allow the
USIM to operate with an ME. The proactive commands are grouped into a variety of
classes, and an ME supporting an individual class must support all the commands in
that specific class.
A proactive UICC extends the services provided by a proactive SIM described in
Section 2.6.3. The execution steps of a proactive command are exactly same as that
of the SAT command, and so the description of SAT in Section 2.6.3 also applies
to USAT. Further details of USAT commands can be found in the relevant 3GPP
standards [29, 89].
3.6 Network Activities
We next re-examine the network activities described in Section 2.5 in the context of
3G and 4G mobile systems.
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3.6.1 IMSI Attach
The IMSI attach procedure in 3G and 4G is similar to the attach procedure in GSM
(see Section 2.5.1). In both systems, when a UE is switched on, it listens for a specific
SYSTEM INFORMATION message containing the PLMN-ID of the radio tower. On
receiving the message, the UE compares the PLMN-ID values in the message with the
list of permitted networks stored in its USIM. If the UE finds a match, it initiates the
IMSI attach process.
In 3G systems the UE requests the SN to initiate a location update procedure (see
Section 3.6.2 below), indicating an IMSI attach in the update type field of the request
message. This location update registers the UE in the network, and updates the LAI
and RAI of the UE simultaneously. The IMSI attach procedure in 3G is described in
Section 4.4.3 of 3GPP TS 24.008 [26].
In 4G systems the UE sends an attach request message to the MME, where the
message includes an IMSI or an old GUTI, the old GUTI type, and the attach type.
The value of the attach type indicates an IMSI attach. On receiving such a message,
the MME authenticates the UE, updates the location information, and sends the UE a
response. The IMSI attach procedure in 4G is described in Section 5.3.2 of 3GPP TS
23.401 [25].
3.6.2 Location Update
The location update procedures in 3G and 4G are both similar to the corresponding
procedure in GSM (see Section 2.5.2). In both 3G and 4G, the UE sends its stored
temporary identity, last visited location identity, and the type of location update to
the SN. However, the events that can initiate a location update differ between 3G and
4G. For example, in 3G, if a subscriber is attached to the PS domain, a change in
the RAI of the subscriber’s roaming area initiates a location update procedure, as does
a change in the value of the LAI associated with the subscriber. In 4G, the location
update procedure is initiated when the subscriber roams in a TA with a TAI that is
not in the list of TAIs currently stored by the UE. A detailed list of possible triggers
for a location update in 4G can be found in Section 5.3.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [25].
On receiving the location update request, the SN runs the AKA protocol, enables
the security context, and sends a new temporary identity to the UE; it then initiates a
location update with the subscriber’s HN, involving the following steps.
1. The serving MSC (in 3G CS connections), SGSN (in 3G PS connections), or
MME (in 4G), sends its identifier and the IMSI in a location update request to
the subscriber’s HLR (in 3G) or HSS (in 4G).
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2. On receiving the message, the HLR or HSS updates the location information for
the subscriber identified by the IMSI, and sends a cancel location request to the
‘old’ MSC, SGSN, or MME for this subscriber.
3. The ‘old’ MSC, SGSN, or MME sends an acknowledges for the location cancel-
lation to the HLR or HSS.
4. The HLR or HSS sends an acknowledges for the location update request to the
initiating MSC, SGSN, or MME.
The SN sends a location update accept or location update reject message to the
UE. Further details of location management in 3G and 4G can be found in 3GPP TS
23.012 [15] and 3GPP TS 23.401 [25].
3.6.3 Paging
The paging process in 3G and 4G is similar to that in GSM (see Section 2.5.3). In
3G, paging is controlled by the 3G MSC and SGSN in the same way as it is managed
by a 2G MSC in GSM. In both 3G and 4G, the paging message contains either an
IMSI or a temporary identity. The 3G system defines two types of paging messages,
known as paging type 1 and paging type 2 (see Sections 10.2.20 and 10.2.21 of 3GPP
TS 25.331 [27]), where paging type 2 messages are integrity protected when transmitted
across the air interface. However, paging type 1 messages are not integrity protected
(see Section 6.5.1 of 3GPP TS 33.102 [31]). Further details of paging in 3G can be
found in the 3GPP standard [27].
Paging also serves the same purposes in 4G systems, and is used by the MME in
similar ways as in 3G. However, 4G introduces smart paging, which enables the MME
to broadcast a paging message in an area covered by a single eNB. Paging in 4G mobile
systems is described in Section 5.3.2 of 3GPP TS 36.331 [38].
3.6.4 Mobile Terminated Services
As in GSM (see Section 2.5.4), MT services in 3G and 4G are supported by the paging
procedure. In both systems, the core network first determines the responsible MSC (in
3G CS connections), SGSN (in 3G PS connections), or MME (in 4G), for the target
subscriber with the help of the subscriber’s HLR (in 3G) or HSS (in 4G) to deliver
the MT service. Next, the responsible entity uses the paging process to establish a
connection with the target subscriber, which is followed by subscriber authentication,
security context and service setup, and delivery of the pending service to the subscriber.
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3.7 Synchronisation of Temporary Identity
In GSM, 3G and 4G, a pseudonym (temporary identity) is normally used in place of the
permanent subscriber identity (the IMSI) in communications across the air interface,
whereas communications in the core network are based on the IMSI. The relationship
between the subscriber’s temporary identity and its IMSI is maintained by the VLR
in GSM and 3G systems, and by the MME in 4G systems. Synchronisation of the
temporary identity between the UE and the SN is necessary for successful operation.
In this section we briefly review how subscriber temporary identities are managed, and
how identity desynchronisation is addressed by the network.
Temporary identities are allocated by the SN, and are sent to the UE. On receiving
the identity, the UE updates its stored temporary identity, and acknowledges the event.
The SN waits for a predetermined time period for an acknowledgement from the UE.
If the SN does not receive an acknowledgement, it records both the old and the new
temporary identities against the corresponding IMSI. While this scenario holds, the SN
uses the subscriber’s IMSI when communicating with the UE across the air interface
regarding the provision of MT services. After successful connection establishment, the
SN renews the temporary identity, that is, it deletes the association between the IMSI
and the existing temporary identity to allow the released identity to be allocated to
another UE, and allocates a fresh temporary identity.
For mobile-originated communications, the SN allows the UE to identify itself using
either the old or the new temporary identity. This helps the SN determine the tem-
porary identity that is currently stored in the UE. The SN subsequently deletes the
association between the other temporary identity and the IMSI to allow this temporary
identity to be allocated to another user [31].
Although details of how temporary identities are managed are up to the MNO, it
cannot guarantee synchronisation of the temporary identity between the UE and the
SN. For example, if a UE becomes unresponsive to network queries for a significant
period of time, the SN may reallocate the previously allocated temporary identity to
another subscriber; hence, air interface protocols allow the correct IMSI to be recovered
from a desynchronised temporary identity.
The SN assumes loss of identity synchronisation when it receives repeated MAC-
failure messages from AKA attempts. To recover from identity desynchronisation, the
SN requests the UE for its IMSI in cleartext. On receiving the IMSI, the SN first checks
whether there has been a desynchronisation of the temporary identity; if so, the SN
runs AKA and allocates a new temporary identity.
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Overview
Part II describes the security and privacy threats arising from use of GSM. It further
presents novel schemes to support mutual authentication, and to improve air interface
user privacy in GSM networks. It contains the following three chapters.
• Chapter 4 gives an overview of known security and privacy issues arising from the
lack of mutual authentication and disclosure of the permanent subscriber identity
in GSM. It also briefly discusses previous attempts to address these issues.
• Chapter 5 describes and analyses a novel scheme to provide mutual authentication
in GSM without affecting the serving networks or phones.
• Chapter 6 describes and analyses a scheme to improve air interface user privacy
in GSM, that does not require modifications to the serving networks or phones.
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Security and Privacy Issues in
GSM
4.1 Introduction
The GSM mobile system was designed back in the 1980s, and hence the threat analysis
underlying its design reflected the types of threat that were deemed realistic at that
time. Several decades later, it is hardly surprising that threats deemed unrealistic back
then are now practical realities, meaning that GSM possesses a range of significant
security and privacy vulnerabilities. In this chapter we briefly describe the known GSM
security and privacy vulnerabilities arising from its lack of network authentication and
the disclosure of the permanent subscriber identity. We further describe a range of
possible modifications that have been proposed to try to address these threats.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews the security and
privacy features of the GSM air interface. In Section 4.3 we give a classification of the
possible types of attack on a mobile system. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 describe the relevant
security and privacy threats in GSM. In Section 4.6 we review previous attempts to
address the security and privacy threats described in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Finally,
Section 4.7 concludes the chapter with a discussion of the motivation for the work
presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.2 Security and Privacy Features
The GSM system introduced security and privacy support, something not present in
the first generation of mobile systems. It provides the following security and privacy
features for the GSM air interface:
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• IMSI confidentiality,
• IMSI authentication,
• user data confidentiality on physical connections,
• connectionless user data (short message) confidentiality, and
• signalling information element confidentiality.
We next briefly describe these features. Further details can be found in GSM
02.09 [11].
4.2.1 Subscriber Identity (IMSI) Confidentiality
The purpose of IMSI confidentiality is to avoid an interceptor of mobile traffic being
able to identify which subscriber is using a given resource on the radio path; hence,
it protects subscribers against possible tracking. The provision of this feature implies
that the IMSI should not be transmitted in cleartext in any signalling message on the
radio path.
As discussed in Section 1.2, instead of using the IMSI, a TMSI is used to identify
a mobile subscriber on the radio path to provide subscriber pseudonymity. However,
there are certain special circumstances in which the IMSI is transmitted across the air
interface. Note that an IMSI is always sent across an unencrypted channel since the
key necessary for channel encryption is not available to the network until the network
knows which MS it is communicating with. This violates user privacy and limits the
effectiveness of the IMSI confidentiality feature. This potential breach of subscriber
privacy occurs in the following circumstances.
• When an ME is switched on: In this case there is neither a valid temporary
identity nor security context information available to the MS; hence, the MS has
no option but to use its IMSI to identify itself to the SN.
• When an SN fails to retrieve the IMSI : Since the SN must know the subscriber’s
IMSI to authenticate, as discussed in Section 2.4, the SN maintains a mapping
between temporary identities and corresponding IMSIs. However, an SN might
fail to retrieve the IMSI for a received temporary identity for a range of reasons,
e.g. a crash or malfunction of the VLR database, or a faulty implementation of
temporary identity management. In such scenarios the SN requests the MS for
its IMSI, and the MS responds with the IMSI.
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• When an ‘old’ SN fails to provide the requested IMSI : When an MS initiates a lo-
cation update procedure because of a change in LAI, the SN forwards the received
temporary identity to the subscriber’s ‘old’ MSC requesting the subscriber’s IMSI
(see Section 2.5.2). However, the ‘old’ MSC could fail to provide the requested
IMSI, e.g. if the ‘old’ MSC has already deleted its record of the subscriber, or if
the communication between the SN and the ‘old’ SN fails because of a commu-
nication error. In such cases the SN requests the MS for its IMSI, and the MS
responds with the IMSI.
• When the temporary identity shared by the MS and the SN is desynchronised : In
this scenario the SN retrieves an IMSI which is not that of the communicating
MS. This causes a failure in subsequent operations (see Section 3.7). To recover
from identity desynchronisation, the SN requests the MS to send its IMSI across
the air interface.
• When an SN broadcasts a paging message: The scenarios described above cover
legitimate network operations that require an MS to disclose its IMSI across the
air interface. In addition, an SN sends an IMSI across the air interface in paging
messages, more specifically in paging type 1 messages (see Section 2.5.3).
4.2.2 Subscriber Identity (IMSI) Authentication
Subscriber identity (IMSI) authentication ensures that the subscriber identity (IMSI
or TMSI) transferred by the MS within the identification procedure across the radio
path, is as claimed.
IMSI authentication is triggered by the MSC of the SN. Several scenarios exist
in which an MSC will perform an authentication, depending on whether the TMSI or
IMSI is used for identification, and whether the TMSI can be used to retrieve an AV
as necessary to perform the authentication procedure. Details of the authentication
process are given in Section 2.4.
4.2.3 Data Confidentiality
The purpose of this feature is to ensure privacy of user data when sent across traffic
channels (i.e. voice communications data), user data sent via signalling channels (i.e.
short messages), and user-related signalling information elements included in signalling
messages.
Data confidentiality is achieved by the use of encryption. More specifically, the
function A5, a GSM-specific stream cipher algorithm, is used to encrypt user data
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before it is sent across the air interface. The encryption key, Kc, is refreshed as part of
every successful authentication. Several versions of A5 exist, and a negotiation between
the MS and the base station of the SN is carried out to decide which version of A5 to
use.
Confidentiality of signalling information elements applies to certain fields of the
signalling messages exchanged between an MS and a base station. The user-related
signalling information element, i.e. the IMSI, TMSI or IMEI, used to establish the
connection is not protected; however, the IMSI, IMEI, calling subscriber directory
number (in mobile terminating calls), and the called subscriber directory number (in
mobile originated calls) are protected when sent after connection establishment [11].
To ensure identity confidentiality, the TMSI is transferred via an encrypted channel at
allocation time.
4.3 Types of Attacker/Attack Modes
Before describing the relevant attacks, in this section we briefly outline the mobile
system attack model of relevance to this thesis, as described by Shaik et al. [147].
In the attack model, the following three attack modes are based on the attacker’s
capability. We use the term attacker and adversary interchangeably in the rest of the
thesis.
• Passive: An attacker in this mode is able to silently eavesdrop on over-the-air
(radio) transmitted data. To achieve this, the passive adversary has access to
a hardware device, for example a universal software radio peripheral (USRP)1
and associated software as necessary to observe and decode radio-transmitted
messages.
• Semi-Passive: A semi-passive adversary is, in addition to passive monitoring, able
to trigger the transmission of signalling messages to subscribers using interfaces
and actions that are legitimately available in mobile systems. For example, a semi-
passive adversary can trigger the transmission of a paging message to a subscriber
by sending a message or initiating a call to the target subscriber. The adversary
is assumed to be aware of an identity of a subscriber, such as a Facebook profile or
a mobile phone number. A semi-passive adversary is analogous to the honest-but-
curious or semi-honest adversary model used for cryptographic protocols [99].
• Active: An active adversary can set up and operate a fake base station or radio
tower to establish unauthorised communications with a subscriber. The capabili-
1http://www.ettus.com/product/details/UB210-KIT
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ties required for active attacks include knowledge of mobile network configurations
and access to appropriate hardware, e.g. a USRP, that can be used to imperson-
ate an SN to the target mobile device. An active adversary is analogous to the
malicious adversary model used for cryptographic protocols [99].
4.4 Fake Base Station Attack
In GSM, although the MS is authenticated to the SN, the SN is not authenticated to
the MS (see Section 2.4). That is, GSM AKA provides unilateral, rather than mutual,
authentication. This allows the possibility of attacks in which an active adversary
masquerades as a base station of an SN to one or more MSs. This is known as a fake
base station attack.
Active attacks involving the impersonation of network elements were considered
when GSM was originally designed, but were not deemed to be worth addressing. The
perceived complexity of building base station devices was assumed to be so high that
the risk arising from the threat was assessed as being rather small. Further, the fact
that traffic exchanged between the base station and the MS is encrypted reduces the
risks arising from the lack of mutual authentication (see also [138]).
However, a level of threat does remain, not least because of the following facts.
• The cost of base station devices has fallen rapidly, and ‘testing’ devices capable
of emulating a genuine base station are readily available [166, 168].
• The use of encryption on the air interface is completely controlled by the base
station, and some networks do not ‘switch on’ data encryption.
These factors make the use of a false base station a serious threat to the claimed
security and privacy properties of GSM. That is, GSM systems possess a wide range
of security and privacy vulnerabilities. We next explore the precise implications of the
fake base station threat by describing selected examples of possible active attacks on
the radio path.
4.5 Threats Arising from Base Station Impersonation
4.5.1 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
In a man-in-the-middle attack the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the com-
munication between two parties who believe they are directly communicating with each
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other. Possible man-in-the-middle attacks on the GSM air interface have been exten-
sively discussed [53, 56, 125, 126, 130, 136, 138, 160]. Before outlining one possible
man-in-the-middle attack previously discussed by Mitchell [130] and Pagliusi [136], we
briefly explain the resources assumed to be available to the attacker. Note that, apart
from the attack described immediately below, the attacks discussed in Sections 4.5.2–
4.5.5 are also all examples of this general class of attack.
The attacker must have a device capable of emulating a base station. In addition
the attacker should have a valid subscription to a GSM network and an MS device,
presumably incorporating the attacker’s SIM, able to communicate with a genuine base
station. The attacker’s MS should be integrated with the emulated base station.
The fact that the SN always decides whether or not to enable encryption makes it
possible for a fake base station to act as an intermediary between an MS and a genuine
network. The attack steps are as follows.
1. The attacker uses its fake base station to capture the target MS. That is, the
target MS, presumably belonging to an individual whose calls the attacker wishes
to intercept, registers with the attacker’s fake base station, believing it to be a
base station belonging to a legitimate network.
2. When authentication needs to take place between the captured MS and the fake
base station, the fake base station sends an arbitrary RAND value to the MS,
and can ignore the SRES returned in response. The fake base station does not
enable encryption on the link to the MS, so the fact that it does not know the
encryption key does not matter.
3. Since the MS will not be encrypting air interface traffic, the fake base station can
detect when the MS makes a call, and can also read the dialled digits. The fake
base station then uses its integrated MS to talk to the genuine network to place
a call to the same destination using the IMSI or TMSI belonging to the attacker.
4. All traffic sent via the fake base station (the man-in-the-middle) is simply relayed
between the target MS and the attacker’s MS. If the genuine network chooses to
enable encryption, then the fake base station can communicate with it successfully
since it is using its own SIM for this leg of the communications (see Figure 4.1).
5. The fake base station can now seamlessly listen to all the voice traffic sent to and
from the victim MS, and can monitor all the associated signalling information
elements, including the called and calling numbers.
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Figure 4.1: Possible scenario for the man-in-the-middle attack
If the genuine SN enables data encryption, the attacker has to pay for all the calls
which it intercepts; however, this may be a small price to pay for the confidential
conversations that it intercepts.
Mitchell [130] further described similar attacks with variations in the required re-
sources, e.g. an attacker without a valid mobile subscription could spoof an answer to
a called number, redirect a call to any destination chosen by the attacker, or set up
prank calls to a target subscriber.
4.5.2 Barkan-Biham-Keller Attack
The fact that the network always decides whether or not to enable encryption and
also chooses the A5 variant to be used allows the well known Barkan-Biham-Keller
attack, [52, 53]. This attack enables recovery of the encryption key; this then enables
unlimited interception of phone calls. The attack takes advantage of the following key
facts.
• The encryption algorithm A5/2 is very weak, and can be broken in real-time [52,
96].
• The SN decides which encryption algorithm to use.
• The same key Kc is used with all three variants (A5/1, A5/2, A5/3) of the GSM
encryption algorithm.
• GSM AKA allows reuse of an authentication challenge RAND .
One possible scenario for the attack is as follows. Suppose an attacker intercepts the
GSM AKA exchanges between the SN and an MS, notably including the RAND, and
also some of the subsequent encrypted voice exchanges involving that MS. Suppose also
that the MS is subsequently switched on within the range of a fake network operated by
the attacker. The fake network inaugurates the AKA protocol with the MS and sends
the previously intercepted RAND, causing the SIM in the MS to generate the same Kc
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as was used to encrypt the previously intercepted data. The MS responds with SRES,
which the fake network ignores, and the fake network now enables encryption using
A5/2. The MS will now send data to the SN encrypted using A5/2 and Kc; because
of certain details of the GSM protocol, the plaintext data will contain predictable
redundancy. The fake network now takes advantage of the weakness of A5/2 to recover
Kc from the combination of the ciphertext and known redundancy in the corresponding
plaintext. The key Kc can now be used to decrypt all the previously intercepted data,
which may have been encrypted using a strong encryption algorithm such as A5/3.
4.5.3 IMSI Catching Attack
IMSI catching attacks have been discussed previously in a number of research papers
— see, for example, [56, 68, 138, 151]. The fact that there is a provision to allow a base
station to request an MS to send its IMSI in cleartext across the air interface means
that there is a very straightforward way for a fake base station to compromise IMSI
confidentiality. The fake base station simply sends the user identity request message
to the MS. In response, the MS sends the IMSI in a user identity response message
(as always, the IMSI is sent via an unencrypted channel). This is known as an IMSI
catching attack. A fake base station associated with such attack is widely known as an
IMSI catcher. The first case of the use of an IMSI catcher recorded in the literature [151]
occurred in 1996 in Germany.
Once an IMSI has been obtained by an unauthorised party it can be used to deter-
mine the associated phone number, e.g. with the help of the MNO to which the IMSI
belongs. A very similar IMSI catcher attack also works against 3G and 4G networks,
as we discuss in Chapter 7.
4.5.4 User Linkability Attack
This attack exploits the fact that GSM AKA allows reuse of an authentication challenge.
Mitchell [130] discusses this threat, which stems from the observation that if a base
station sends a particular RAND value to an MS, then the MS always return the same
SRES value in response.
Suppose an attacker with a fake base station has at some time in the past intercepted
a genuine (RAND, SRES ) pair for a particular MS; then the attacker can determine
whether an MS is the same as the previously identified MS by sending it the same
RAND value and observing the response. That is, the authentication response can be
used to distinguish between MSs. This allows an attacker to trace the target subscriber
within an attacker’s coverage area as long as the target subscriber uses the same SIM.
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4.5.5 IMSI Paging Attack
IMSI paging attacks have been discussed by a number of authors [48, 49, 98, 117, 147].
This attack exploits a specific type of signalling message, known as a paging message
(see Section 2.5.3); more specifically, it exploits a paging type 1 message. Such messages
are sent from the SN to all mobile devices in a particular area, and contain either an
IMSI or a TMSI. If an MS detects such a message containing its IMSI or its current
TMSI then it responds with a message containing its current TMSI.
The key fact which makes the IMSI paging attack feasible is that the paging mes-
sages are not cryptographically protected; hence an active adversary can introduce
spurious paging messages into the network. This can be used both to detect the pres-
ence of an MS with a specific IMSI in a location, and to learn the current TMSI for
this device.
Since there exist scenarios in which an SN fails to identify the correct TMSI of a
subscriber, e.g. when an SN does not receive an acknowledgement to a TMSI allocation
message, the SN is obliged to use a subscriber’s IMSI to support MT services (see
Section 3.7); thus, the use of type 1 paging message cannot be avoided. However, the
SN can limit the use of type 1 paging messages to minimise the threat to subscriber
privacy arising from passive adversaries. A number of studies [98, 117] have shown
that in real-world networks the vast majority of paging requests are of type 1. Using
this fact, Kune et al. [117] demonstrate how GSM paging messages enable a passive
adversary to learn the subscriber location.
4.6 Fixing GSM
The lack of network authentication in GSM enables a range of fake base station at-
tacks, and so adding network authentication could mitigate many of the vulnerabilities
described above. In this section we review key examples of (a) prior art that describes
ways of adding network authentication to GSM, and (b) previously proposed techniques
for protecting the privacy of the IMSI.
4.6.1 Inclusion of Network Authentication
The possibility of adding network authentication to GSM has been considered by the
3GPP technical specification group. Two 3GPP TSG documents [81, 82] proposed the
introduction of network authentication into GSM. Ericsson [82] proposed transferring
authentication responsibility to the terminal by implementing the core of the 3G AKA
protocol entirely in software. However, the scheme in turn raised other security threats.
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Neither of the proposals were adopted, presumably because of cost/feasibility issues.
Apart from the work within 3GPP, many authors have described possible ways of
improving the GSM authentication protocol [46, 67, 70, 90, 91, 116, 119, 122]. However,
most of them involve completely redesigning GSM AKA, requiring changes to all the
SNs as well as all the deployed phones. We next review key examples of this work.
Kumar, Shailaja and Kavitha [116] propose an identity-based mutual authentication
scheme for GSM. Although their scheme protects against replay and man-in-the-middle
attacks, it introduces identity-based cryptography [148] into a system which currently
only uses symmetric cryptography; unsurprisingly, the scheme requires modifications
to the operation of all entities involved in authentication, i.e. the SIM, the ME, the SN,
and the HN. Agarwal, Shrimali and Lal Das [46] describe a somewhat similar scheme
that provides mutual authentication using identity-based cryptography.
Lo and Chen [122] present a mutual authentication scheme for GSM using public-
key cryptography [141]. However, this again requires significant infrastructural changes,
including modifications to the operation of the SIM, ME, SN, and HN.
Fanian, Berenjkoub and Aaron Gulliver [90, 91] propose a mutual authentica-
tion scheme for GSM following the timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication
(TESLA) multicast authentication protocol [137]. The scheme involves completely re-
designing the authentication protocol, and hence requires changes to the operation of
all the GSM entities.
Choi and Kim [70] propose an authentication scheme for GSM supporting mutual
authentication. Although the scheme makes use of the existing cryptographic tech-
niques, it involves completely redesigning the message flows; that is, the MS generates
a RAND, computes an SRES, and sends them to the network. Like the earlier schemes,
this scheme also modifies the operation of the SIM, phone, SN and HN.
Lee, Hwang and Yang [119] propose an extension of GSM authentication to include
network authentication. The scheme relies on symmetric cryptography and the A3
function, available to both the SIM and the AuC of the HN, to perform network
authentication. It makes the use of an MS-generated time-stamp value T which is sent
to the HN via the SN. On receiving T , the AuC of the HN verifies that it is current;
if so, the AuC computes a network authentication token as A3K(T ), and sends the
computed token along with the required authentication data to the SN. The SN sends
the token and the earlier received T with the usual authentication challenge to the MS.
The MS verifies the received value of T , computes the network authentication token
in the same way as it was computed in the HN, and compares the computed token
with the received token. If they match, the network is deemed authenticated by the
MS. The HN also computes a temporary master key and sends it to the SN. The SN
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uses this master key to compute subsequent AVs, and authenticates the MS using the
existing authentication process; that is, mutual authentication is performed when the
MS first joins the SN. All subsequent authentications with the same SN are performed
without ensuring mutual authentication, which is clearly a drawback of the proposed
scheme.
Chang, Lee and Chang [67] proposed a modified version of the Lee-Hwang-Yang
scheme addressing the drawback mentioned above. However, like the Lee-Hwang-Yang
scheme, the Chang-Lee-Chang proposal involves modifying the protocol messages to
include additional parameters, i.e. a time-stamp and a token; hence, both schemes
require modifications to the operation of the ME and SN.
Since all these schemes require significant changes to the operation of all the entities
in a GSM network, they are most unlikely to be deployed in practice. Of course, these
schemes might be worth considering for use in future networks, but how authentication
might work in 5G networks and beyond is outside the scope of the work described here.
4.6.2 IMSI Privacy Protection
The problem of the lack of robust user identity privacy in mobile networks is more than
two decades old, and has been discussed extensively. A wide range of research trying
to address the problem exists; although recent work mostly focuses on the privacy
threats to 3G and 4G, there is a significant body of established research addressing
GSM privacy; we summarise below key elements of that work.
In the mid 1990s, Samfat, Molva and Asokan [143] addressed the conflicting re-
quirements of untraceability and disclosure of identity during authentication in mobile
networks. They proposed the use of an alias which is only understandable to the user’s
HN in order to hide the user’s real identity from both eavesdroppers and the SN. Their
scheme uses probabilistic public-key encryption of the real identity for alias computa-
tion. Since GSM does not support public-key cryptography, adoption of the scheme
would introduce significant changes to the GSM architecture. A similar scheme was
described by Samfat and Molva [142] with the goal of protecting the confidentiality of
the subscriber IMSI.
Herzberg, Krawczyk and Tsudik [102] and Ateniese et al. [50] discuss issues with
anonymity and location privacy in mobile networks. They propose a range of anonymity
approaches intended to conceal the real identity of an user, including what they call
a time-based alias computation, a home-centric approach, and a public-key based ap-
proach. Of particular relevance here is the home-centric approach, in which the HN
computes aliases for its users and sends them to the user in user authentication mes-
sages. Aliases are computed by encrypting a combination of a (variable) salt and the
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‘real’ identity, which means that aliases are longer than the real identities.
Lee, Hwang and Yang [118] propose a privacy enhanced scheme for GSM to improve
user identity and location privacy. Their scheme avoids the need for the IMSI to
ever be sent across the air interface. It introduces an HN-managed TMSI (equivalent
to an alias), which contains the subscriber’s PLMN-ID and an encrypted version of
the subscriber’s IMSI, concatenated with a time-stamp value. Although the use of
symmetric encryption is suggested, it is not clear how the HN identifies the correct key
to decrypt the IMSI embedded in the TMSI. A new TMSI (HN-managed) is allocated
in every location update.
The problem of loss of user privacy arising from cleartext IMSI transmission across
the air interface also arises in 3G and 4G networks, and this is discussed further in
Chapter 7.
Most significantly from the perspective of this thesis is the fact that all the previous
proposals to enhance IMSI privacy protection require major changes to the operation
of all GSM networks, including modifications to the SN, HN, ME and SIM. Making
such fundamental changes would be hugely costly and very difficult to manage, and
this makes it most unlikely that any of the schemes will ever be deployed in practice.
4.7 Research Motivation
GSM has been criticised for its weak security design, and a range of security flaws have
been uncovered after its deployment. As discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, GSM is
vulnerable to a wide range of threats because of the absence of network authentication.
Nevertheless, GSM continues to be widely used.
Despite the introduction and deployment of 3G and 4G mobile systems, which rec-
tify the authentication shortcoming by providing mutual authentication between phone
and network, GSM remains of huge practical importance worldwide and is not likely
to be phased out for many decades to come. As a result, finding a way to incorporate
network authentication into GSM in a way which can be deployed in practice is of great
practical importance. Section 4.6.1 described some of the key existing proposals for
adding network authentication to GSM AKA; unfortunately, they all require significant
modifications to the air interface protocol, which would require changes to the operation
of all the serving networks as well as all the deployed phones. As noted in Section 4.6.1,
it seems likely that making the necessary major modifications to the operation of the
air interface after deployment is infeasible in practice. This observation motivates the
investigation of possible ways of including network-to-phone authentication in GSM in
a way that is completely transparent to the intermediate network infrastructure, and
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hence only requires SIMs and the HN to be upgraded. Since both the SIM and the HN
are managed by a single MNO, such a solution can be rolled out piecemeal with no
impact on the existing global infrastructure. We describe and analyse such a scheme
in the next chapter.
Similarly, all the previously proposed solutions to the IMSI catcher problem, as
described in Section 4.6.2, require significant modifications to the operation of GSM,
which affects all the entities in the network and the deployed phones. This again makes
them very unlikely to be deployed. This observation has motivated work on possible
changes to the operation of the mobile systems to defeat IMSI catchers that do not
require significant changes to the existing network infrastructure and that have minimal
overhead. This is the main focus of Chapter 6.
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Chapter 5
Retrofitting Mutual
Authentication to GSM
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we describe a novel scheme to add network-to-phone authentication
to the GSM mobile system, in a way that is completely transparent to the existing
network infrastructure. As described in the previous chapter, GSM only supports
authentication of the phone to the network, leaving the system open to a wide range
of threats. Although 3G and later generation mobile systems rectify this problem by
incorporating mutual authentication between phone and network, GSM remains of huge
practical importance worldwide, as discussed in Chapter 1. Therefore, finding ways of
upgrading GSM post-deployment appears to be worthwhile. While adding support
for mutual authentication in GSM would be highly beneficial, changing the way GSM
serving networks operate is not practical.
The scheme described in this chapter introduces a novel modification to the re-
lationship between a SIM and its home network which allows mutual authentication
without changing the existing mobile infrastructure, including the phones; the only
necessary changes are to the authentication centres and the SIMs. This enhancement,
which could be deployed piecemeal in a completely transparent way, not only addresses
a number of serious vulnerabilities in GSM but is also the first proposal explicitly de-
signed to enhance GSM authentication that could be deployed without modifying the
existing network infrastructure. The main content of this chapter was presented at
STM 2016, and has been published in the proceedings [111].
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The adversary model for the
scheme is described in Section 5.2. This is followed in Section 5.3 by an introduction
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to the notion of RAND hijacking. In Section 5.4, the novel enhanced version of the
GSM authentication scheme is described, and Section 5.5 describes how the SIM can
use the results of network authentication to affect MS behaviour. In Section 5.6, we
describe possible changes to the USIM application to support network authentication
when a 3G or 4G subscriber roams in a 2G network. An analysis of the novel scheme is
provided in Section 5.7. In Section 5.8, we present a ProVerif-based formal verification
of the proposed scheme with the goal of verifying the claimed security and privacy
properties. The relationship of the proposed scheme to the prior art is discussed in
Section 5.9. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary in Section 5.10.
5.2 Adversary Model
In this section we describe the adversary model for the novel scheme. The scheme is
designed to address real-life threats to a GSM network; more specifically, it addresses
the attacks described in Sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2, and 4.5.4. In these attacks, the primary
goal of the adversary is to force MSs to attach to its fake base station, thereby binding
them to a less secure GSM network and exposing them to the attacks described in
the previous chapter. The scheme is thus designed to combat active adversaries, as
described in the adversary model of Section 4.3.
In designing the scheme we make the underlying assumption that the 3G authen-
tication functions, f1 and f5, are sound. We also implicitly assume that the SIM, the
ME and the network have not been compromised.
The adversary is assumed to be able to:
• run an independent GSM base station;
• maintain connections with a genuine network;
• intercept messages sent across the air interface by a target subscriber;
• modify these air interface messages;
• reply air interface messages; and
• initiate a connection with a target subscriber.
However, the adversary has no control over the core network entities involved in
the communication, and is unable to intercept any message transmitted across the core
network. Thus, the model does not consider state sponsored adversaries who may be
running their own legal serving network.
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5.3 RAND Hijacking
We use the term RAND hijacking to refer to the idea of using the RAND, sent from
the network to the UE during AKA, as a way of conveying information from the AuC
to the SIM. That is, instead of generating the RAND at random, it is generated to
contain certain information; this information is sent in encrypted form so that to an
eavesdropper the RAND is indistinguishable from a random value.
This idea was apparently first described in a patent due to Dupre´ [79]. However, the
use Dupre´ makes of the idea is rather different to that proposed here. Later, Vodafone
introduced the concept of a special RAND [173] in 3GPP TSG document S3-030463.
The special RAND allows the HN to indicate which encryption algorithm is to be used
by an ME depending on the attached serving network. Thus, the purpose of the special
RAND was completely different to that proposed here. The other published references
to the notion [71, 110, 163] independently propose the use of RAND hijacking for
improving the privacy properties of GSM, 3G and 4G networks. As far as we are
aware, no previous authors have proposed the use of this technique with the explicit
goal of providing mutual authentication in GSM networks.
5.4 Network-to-SIM Authentication
We now propose a way of using RAND hijacking to enable authentication of the network
to the SIM. For this to operate, the SIM must be programmed to support the scheme,
as well as possess certain (modest) additional data, as detailed below. The AuC of the
network issuing the ‘special’ SIM must also store certain additional data items for each
such SIM, and must generate RAND values in a special way for such SIMs. No other
changes to existing systems are required. It is important to note that the system could
be deployed gradually, e.g. by including the additional functionality in all newly issued
SIMs, whilst existing SIMs continue to function as at present.
5.4.1 Prerequisites
In addition to sharing K, A3 and A8 (as required for executing the standard GSM AKA
protocol), the SIM and AuC must both be equipped with the following information and
functions:
• functions f1 and f5, where f1 is a MAC function and f5 is a cipher mask
generation function, both capable of generating a 64-bit output;
• a secret key Ka to be used with functions f1 and f5 which should be distinct
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from K — to minimise memory requirements, Ka and K could, for example, both
be derived from a single SIM-specific master key;
• a 48-bit counter to be used to generate and verify sequence numbers1.
The functions could be precisely the same as their counterparts used in 3G (UMTS).
Indeed, the function names and string lengths have deliberately been made identical to
those used in 3G systems to make implementation and migration as simple as possible.
5.4.2 Protocol Operation
The novel AKA protocol only differs from the ‘standard’ GSM AKA protocol (as de-
scribed in Section 2.4) in the way the authentication vector is generated in the HN,
and in the way RAND is processed by the SIM; more specifically the scheme changes
the way in which RAND is calculated by the AuC of the HN, and includes additional
steps in processing the received RAND by the SIM. Thus, since the scheme involves
changes only in the AuC and SIM, it should be clear that the scheme is inherently
transparent to the serving network and the ME. We describe below how the AuC and
the SIM are changed.
5.4.2.1 Modifications to AuC
The AuC is modified to generate the value RAND in a different way; that is, the
scheme makes changes to step 1 of the AV generating process described in Section 2.4.
To generate a new authentication triple, the AuC proceeds as follows (see Figure 5.1,
in which the dotted block represents the usual operation of the AuC).
1. The AuC uses its counter value to generate a 48-bit sequence number SQN, which
must be a fresh value for this user account.
2. A 16-bit value AMF is also generated, which could be set to all zeros or could be
used for purposes analogous to the AMF value for 3G networks.
3. A 64-bit tag value MAC is generated using function f1, where
MAC = f1Ka(AMF||SQN).
4. A 64-bit encrypting mask AK is generated using function f5, where
AK = f5Ka(MAC).
1As in 3G, an AuC might choose to manage a single counter shared by all user accounts (see, for
example, [129]).
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Figure 5.1: Generating an AV in the novel scheme
5. The 128-bit RAND is computed as
RAND = ((AMF||SQN)⊕AK)||MAC.
6. The XRES and Kc values are computed in the standard way, that is XRES =
A3K(RAND) and Kc = A8K(RAND).
5.4.2.2 Modifications to SIM
The SIM is modified to allow verification of the network during the operation of AKA;
the scheme involves the following changed operation of step 2 of the challenge-response
procedure, described in Section 2.4 (see Figure 5.2, in which the dotted block represents
the usual operation of the SIM).
Figure 5.2: Computations at SIM in the novel scheme
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1. On receipt of the 128-bit RAND value, the SIM first splits it into two 64-bit
strings X and MAC*, where X||MAC* = RAND.
2. A 64-bit decrypting mask AK* is generated using function f5, where
AK* = f5Ka(MAC*).
3. A 16-bit string AMF* and a 48-bit string SQN* are computed as:
AMF*||SQN* = X ⊕AK*.
4. A 64-bit tag XMAC is computed as:
XMAC = f1Ka(AMF*||SQN*).
5. The recovered sequence number SQN* is compared with the SIM’s stored counter
value, and XMAC is compared with MAC*:
(a) if SQN* is greater than the current counter value and XMAC = MAC*,
then:
i. the network is deemed to be successfully authenticated;
ii. the SIM’s counter value is updated to equal SQN*; and
iii. SRES and Kc are computed as specified in step 2 of the GSM AKA
challenge-response procedure described in Section 2.4;
(b) if either of the above checks fail, then:
i. network authentication is deemed to have failed;
ii. the SIM’s counter value is unchanged; and
iii. SRES and Kc are set to random values.
It should be clear that AK*, AMF*, MAC* and SQN* should respectively equal the
AK, AMF, MAC and SQN values originally computed by the AuC in Section 5.4.2.1.
5.4.3 Design Rationale
The composition of the RAND value in the above scheme has been made as similar
as possible to the 128-bit value AUTN used to provide network-to-UE authentication
in the 3G AKA protocol. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, as stated above, by
adopting this approach it is hoped that implementation of, and migration to, this new
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scheme will be made as simple as possible for network operators. Secondly, the 3G
AKA protocol is widely trusted to provide authentication, and it is hoped that trust
in the novel scheme will be maximised by adopting the same approach.
The only differences between the 3G AUTN and the above construction of RAND
are relatively minor, and are as follows.
• In 3G, the AK value is computed as a function of the entire RAND, whereas
here it is necessarily only computed as a function of the last 64 bits of RAND .
However, these last 64 bits are computed as a function of data which changes for
every authentication triple, and hence the AK should still do an effective job of
concealing the content it is used to mask.
• In 3G the AK is only 48 bits long, and is only used to encrypt (mask) SQN .
Here we use it to mask SQN and AMF, to ensure that a ‘new style’ RAND is
indistinguishable from an ‘old style’ randomly generated RAND to any party
without the key Ka.
• In 3G, the MAC is computed as a function of RAND, SQN and AMF, whereas
in the above scheme it is computed only as a function of SQN and AMF, again
for obvious reasons. This is the only significant difference from the perspective
of authenticating the network to a UE, but we argue below in Section 5.7.2 that
this change does not affect the security of the protocol.
The AUTN checking process proposed here and that used in 3G are essentially the
same.
One other issue that merits mention is the fact that it is proposed that the SIM
outputs random values if authentication fails. It is necessary for the SIM to output
values of some kind, since this is part of the existing SIM-ME protocol. That is,
placeholder values are required. It is also important for reasons discussed below that the
SIM should not output the correct session key Kc. The only other ‘obvious’ placeholder
values would be to use fixed strings, but the use of random values seems advantageous
if these values are sent across the network (in the case of the SRES value) or used for
encryption purposes (for Kc). The advantage of this approach is that it will prevent an
eavesdropper distinguishing between a successful and a failure AKA; it will also avoid
the leaking of user-specific information and thereby prevent the user linkability attack
described in Section 4.5.4.
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5.5 Using the Authentication Results
In the previous section we showed how the SIM can authenticate the network; that
is, as a result of the modifications to the SIM described in Section 5.4.2.2, the SIM
will know whether or not the RAND genuinely originates from the AuC and is fresh.
However, we did not describe any way for the ME to know whether authentication
has failed or succeeded — indeed, the ME will not understand the concept, as we are
assuming it is a ‘standard’ GSM device.
We propose that the SIM application toolkit feature, described in Section 2.6.3,
be used to achieve the desired objective. We implicitly assume that the ME supports
the class e proactive commands. Next, we briefly describe the proactive commands
that could be used for this purpose. Although we use 2G terminology to describe the
commands, the commands also work with the USIM application. Further details can
be found in technical specifications GSM 11.14 [13], 3GPP TS 51.014 [9], and 3GPP
TS 31.111 [29].
• GET CHANNEL STATUS : This proactive command requests the ME to return
the current status of all available data channels. The ME then sends a TERMI-
NAL RESPONSE command, containing a channel status data object for each
dedicated channel identifier.
• CLOSE CHANNEL: This proactive command requests the ME to close the data
channel identified by the channel identifier. On receiving the command, the ME
releases the data transfer, discards the remaining data, and informs the SIM that
the command has been successfully executed using a TERMINAL RESPONSE
command.
In the event of a network authentication failure, when sending the SRES and Kc
(in this case random) values back to the ME, the SIM should signal to the phone that
it has information to send. When, as a result, the ME sends the FETCH command
to the SIM, the SIM should respond with the GET CHANNEL STATUS command to
retrieve details of the channels established in the current connection. Upon receiving
the channel information in the TERMINAL RESPONSE command, the SIM uses the
response status byte in its response to request the ME to send a further FETCH
command. Once it receives the FETCH command, the SIM responds with a CLOSE
CHANNEL command, specifying the channel identifier of the data channel that has
just been established, details of which it received from the ME in response to its
previous CHANNEL STATUS command. The interactions between a SIM and an ME
are summarised in Figure 5.3. The proactive commands issued by the SIM should cause
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Figure 5.3: SIM-ME interactions to drop any established connection
the phone to drop the connection, and (hopefully) prevent any attempted use of the
key Kc. The values 90 and 91, shown in Figure 5.3, represent the values of the status
byte sent by the SIM in response to the previous command, where the value 90 means
OK, and the value 91 instructs the ME to issue a FETCH command to retrieve data
from the SIM. The ‘length’ with the status byte 91 indicates the length of the data in
bytes which the SIM wants to send.
5.6 Inter-Networking Issues
We next describe possible changes to the USIM application to support network authen-
tication in the case where a 3G or 4G subscriber roams in a 2G network.
As discussed in Section 3.5.1 a UE never runs GSM AKA when it roams in a 2G
network; instead the USIM operates in virtual 2G mode to run the GSM authentication
protocol. Hence, the network authentication logic introduced in the scheme proposed
in Section 5.4 needs to be incorporated into the operation of virtual 2G mode to protect
3G and 4G subscribers roaming in 2G networks. We describe the modified virtual 2G
mode below.
In virtual 2G mode, the USIM receives RAND as the authentication parameter.
On receiving RAND, the USIM first verifies its integrity and authenticity. To do so the
USIM follows the steps described in Section 5.4.2.2, except for step 5(a)iii. Step 5(a)iii is
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replaced with the usual operation of the virtual 2G mode, in which the USIM computes
the 2G SRES and Kc, using the functions f2, f3, f4, c2, and c3 as described in
Section 3.5.1. The USIM uses the authentication result as described in Section 5.5.
The steps introduced into the operation of the modified virtual 2G mode involve
the use of functions f1 and f5. However, as described in Section 5.4.1, these functions
are assumed to be available in the USIM. It is also assumed that the USIM has access
to the key Ka.
5.7 Analysis
5.7.1 Deployment Issues
We next consider certain practical issues that may arise when using the scheme pro-
posed in Section 5.4.
It seems that at least some GSM networks issue authentication triples in batches (see
Section 3.3.1 of GSM 03.20 [2]), thereby reducing the inter-network communications
overhead. Currently, the order in which GSM authentication triples are used does not
matter. However, in the scheme described above, triples must be used in a way that
ensures that the embedded SQN is fresh. This may seem problematic; however, since
the requirement to use authentication datasets in the correct order already applies to
the corresponding 5-tuples used in 3G, serving networks will almost certainly already
be equipped to do this.
In existing GSM networks it is possible, although prohibited by the technical speci-
fications [2], for serving networks to ‘re-use’ authentication triples, i.e. to send the same
RAND value to a MS on multiple occasions. This will no longer work with the new
scheme, since the SIM will detect re-use of a RAND value. Arguably this is good, since
re-use of RAND values is highly insecure: such behaviour would allow the interceptor
of a RAND/SRES pair to impersonate a valid MS and perhaps steal service at that
MS’s expense, an attack that would be particularly effective in networks not enabling
encryption.
Finally note that, in order to fully implement the scheme described in Section 5.4,
MEs need to support class e STK commands, although, as discussed in Section 2.6.3,
this proportion seems likely to be very high. It is not clear what proportion of mobile
phones in current use support these STK commands.
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5.7.2 Security
We divide our security discussion into three parts: confidentiality and privacy issues,
authentication of network to SIM, and authentication of SIM to network.
5.7.2.1 Confidentiality and Privacy Issues
In ‘standard’ GSM the RAND value is randomly selected, and so does not reveal
anything about the identity of the phone to which it is sent. In the scheme proposed
in Section 5.4, the RAND is a function of a SIM-specific key as well as a potentially
SIM-specific SQN value. However, the SQN is sent encrypted, and, assuming the
functions f1 and f5 are well-designed, an interceptor will not be able to distinguish
an intercepted RAND computed according to the new scheme from a random value.
Thus the scheme does not introduce a new threat to identity confidentiality.
The new scheme does not change the way the data confidentiality key Kc is gener-
ated, so the strength of data confidentiality is not affected.
5.7.2.2 Network-to-SIM Authentication
The novel protocol for network-to-SIM authentication bears strong similarities to the
corresponding protocol for 3G. It also conforms to the one-pass unilateral authen-
tication mechanism specified in clause 5.1.1 of ISO/IEC 9798-4 [103, 105]. All the
protocols in this standard have been formally analysed (and shown to be secure) by
Basin, Cremers and Meier [54, 55]. Whilst these arguments do not provide a completely
watertight argument for the protocol’s security, it is clearly a significant improvement
over no authentication at all.
An interesting side observation deriving from the novel scheme is that the 3G and
4G AKA protocols appear to be overly complex. The randomly generated RAND value
sent from the network to the SIM, which is used to authenticate the response from the
SIM to the network, is actually unnecessary, and the AUTN value could be used in
exactly the same way as the RAND is currently. Whilst such a change is not possible
in practice, it would have avoided the need for the AuC to generate random values and
saved the need to send 16 bytes in the AKA protocol.
It is interesting to speculate why this design redundancy is present. It seems pos-
sible that network-to-SIM authentication was added as a completely separate protocol
to complement the GSM-type SIM-to-network authentication mechanism, and no-one
thought how the two mechanisms could be combined and simplified (as in the mecha-
nism we propose).
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5.7.2.3 SIM-to-Network Authentication
The novel scheme does not affect how the existing SIM-to-network authentication pro-
tocol operates, except that a random RAND is replaced by one which is a cryptographic
function of a sequence number. The new-style RAND remains unpredictable to anyone
not equipped with the key Ka, and is deterministically guaranteed to be non-repeating
(a property that only holds in a probabilistic way for a random RAND). To see why the
RAND is non-repeating, suppose two separate RAND values sent to the same USIM
incorporate the same MAC values (as necessary if they are to be the same). It follows
that the AK values used to mask the SQNs embedded in the RAND values will also be
the same and thus, since the SQN values themselves will be different, the two RAND
values will also differ. That is, it possesses precisely the qualities required by the ex-
isting protocol, and hence the security of SIM-to-network authentication is unaffected.
We give a formal proof of our claim below.
Claim 5.7.1. The value of RAND in the new scheme is deterministically guaranteed
to be non-repeating.
Proof. Suppose Ra and Rb are RAND values generated by an AuC for a subscriber,
where
• Ra = ((SQNa ‖ AMF )⊕AKa) ‖MACa and
• Rb = ((SQNb ‖ AMF )⊕AKb) ‖MACb.
and where SQNa and SQNb are distinct values of SQN .
It is sufficient to prove that the value Ra and Rb must differ if SQNa and SQNb
differ. For simplicity we assume that the value of AMF is constant, which is generally
true for real-world networks.
Suppose Ra = Rb. Then MACa = MACb , since R includes MAC . Hence AKa =
AKb, since AK = f5Ka (MAC ). It follows that Ra = (SQNa ‖ AMF )⊕AKa 6= (SQNb
‖ AMF )⊕AKb = Rb . The result follows by contradiction.
5.7.3 Impact on Known Attacks
We conclude our analysis of the protocol by considering how it affects possible attacks
on GSM networks.
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5.7.3.1 Fake Network Attacks
As discussed in Section 4.5.1, if a phone joins a fake GSM serving network, then this
fake network can send any RAND value it likes as part of the AKA protocol, and the
MS will complete the process successfully. If the network does not enable encryption,
then communications between the MS and the network will work correctly, which could
enable the network to act as an eavesdropping man-in-the-middle by routing calls from
the captured MS via a genuine network. This will no longer be true if the new scheme is
implemented, since the SIM will instruct the ME to drop the connection when supplied
with a non-genuine RAND value.
Of course, it may be possible for a fake network to avoid the AKA protocol alto-
gether, and simply start communication with a newly attached MS. However, it is not
clear whether MEs will accept such unauthenticated communication.
5.7.3.2 Barkan-Biham-Keller Attacks
We next consider a particular type of fake network attack, namely the Barkan-Biham-
Keller attack described in Section 4.5.2. The attack requires the re-sending of an ‘old’
RAND to an MS. Since in the new scheme the SIM verifies the sequence number embed-
ded in the authentication challenge as part of the enhanced AKA, the new scheme will
clearly prevent such an attack, i.e. the Barkan-Biham-Keller attack will be prevented,
at least in most practical scenarios.
5.7.3.3 User Linkability Attacks
As discussed in Section 4.5.4, this attack requires the re-sending of an ‘old’ RAND to
an MS, and makes use of the SIM-computed SRES value for that specific RAND . Since
the new scheme returns a random SRES when the same RAND is re-sent to an MS,
the new scheme will prevent such an attack.
5.8 Formal Verification
To verify the security properties of the proposed scheme formally we make use of
ProVerif, an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier [58]. We first introduce the
ProVerif tool, following Blanchet, Smyth and Cheval [60]. We then give a ProVerif
model of the proposed scheme, together with a formalisation of the security and privacy
properties under analysis. The formal model described here only considers the 2G SIM,
and not the USIM. Finally, we describe the results of the ProVerif analysis.
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5.8.1 The ProVerif Tool
The ProVerif tool is designed to be used to verify the secrecy and authentication prop-
erties of a cryptographic protocol that interacts using public communication channels.
Since these channels are assumed to be controlled by a very powerful environment, cap-
turing an attacker with Dolev-Yao capabilities [78], ProVerif simulates the Dolev-Yao
attacker model. In this model an attacker has complete control over the communication
channels; that is, the attacker may read, modify, delete, and inject messages. However,
cryptography is assumed to be perfect; that is, the attacker is only able to perform
cryptographic operations when in possession of the required keys. In other words, it
is restricted to applying only the cryptographic primitives specified by the user. The
environment also captures the behaviour of dishonest participants; hence, only honest
participants need to be modelled in ProVerif. The tool can analyse protocols with
unbounded sessions using automated procedures.
To analyse a protocol in ProVerif, a ProVerif model of the protocol and the security
properties of interest are provided as input to the tool. The tool translates the input
into a set of statements, known as Horn clauses, which are automatically provided to
the tool’s resolution algorithm. The resolution algorithm verifies the security properties
using these Horn clauses, and outputs an indication of whether the security properties
hold for the input protocol model. If the tool can derive a fact in contradiction to a
desired security property, it finds an attack and outputs the actions an attacker may
take to break the security property; such an attack trace can be used to reconstruct
the attack. However, when no fact contradicting the desired security property can be
derived, the tool outputs that the security property holds.
In certain cases the tool may generate a false attack or may not terminate an
analysis. Derivation of facts during the translation into Horn clauses, or an infinite
loop generated by the Horn clauses, might cause such an outcome. However, such
outcomes are unusual in practice. Although the analysis by ProVerif is not complete,
which means that it may not be capable of proving a property that holds, it is sound;
that is, when ProVerif verifies that a property is satisfied, then the model does guarantee
that property.
ProVerif has been used to verify a wide range of cryptographic protocols. For exam-
ple, Smyth et al. [149] and Kremer, Ryan and Smyth [115] used it to analyse the security
properties of a number of e-voting protocols, and Delaune, Kremer and Ryan [75] used
it to analyse the privacy properties of a similar set of protocols. Chen and Ryan [69]
used ProVerif to evaluate the authentication protocols employed by the trusted platform
module (TPM), and discovered vulnerabilities. Abadi and Blanchet [43] used ProVerif
to verify the certified email protocol [44]. ProVerif has also been used to verify the se-
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curity and privacy properties of the 2G, 3G and 4G mobile networks. Tang, Naumann
and Wetzel [156] analysed the AKA protocols in inter-generation mobile systems using
ProVerif. Arapinis et al. [48, 49] and van den Broek, Verdult and de Ruiter [163] used
ProVerif to verify the security properties in their ‘fixed’ version of the protocol.
5.8.2 Formal Model of the New Scheme
ProVerif’s input language is the process calculus, used to model concurrent systems;
hence, protocols are modelled using process calculus syntax. We next describe the part
of the language we use to model the scheme proposed earlier in this chapter. Further
details of the grammar of the ProVerif language and its syntax can be found in the
ProVerif manual [60].
A ProVerif model of a protocol is divided into three parts: the declarations, the
process macros, and the main process. We next provide a summary of these three
parts of the model for the enhanced GSM AKA scheme – full details are provided in
Appendix A.1. The ProVerif model we present immediately below is a modified version
of the model due to Tang, Naumann and Wetzel [154, 156].
5.8.2.1 The Declarations
The declarations part includes a finite set of types and free variables, and formalises the
behaviour of cryptographic primitives using a set of functions known as constructors,
and corresponding rewrite rules known as destructors. Constructors are used to build
terms used by a protocol, and take the form fun f (t1 , ....., tn) : t , where f is a construc-
tor, t is its return type, and t1, ....., tn are the types of its arguments. In the syntax
discussed here, n is always a positive integer. The term returned by a constructor can
be a single variable. Destructors are used to manipulate terms formed by construc-
tors, and take the form reduc forall x1 : t1 , ....., xn : tn ; g(M1 , .....,Mn) = M , where g
is a destructor, and the terms M1, .....,Mn and M are built from the application of
constructors to variables x1, ....., xn of types t1, ....., tn, respectively. When an instance
of the term g(M1, .....,Mn) is encountered during execution, it is replaced by M .
Listing 5.1 contains the salient parts of the declarations for the enhanced GSM
AKA protocol. The full listing is given in Appendix A.1. In Listing 5.1, the a3, a8, f1,
f5 constructors model the authentication-specific cryptographic functions, bitstring is
the ProVerif’s built-in type, and mac, key, resp, sessionKey, and anonymityKey are
user-defined types. The constructor encrypt models the ⊕ operator used to conceal
the SQN value in the proposed scheme. To retrieve the SQN value from RAND in the
MS, the destructor decrypt is used.
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Listing 5.1: Enhanced GSM AKA model: Summary of declarations
1 (∗ Construc tors and d e s t r u c t o r s ∗)
2 fun a3 ( bitstring , mac , key ) : r e sp .
3 fun a8 ( bitstring , mac , key ) : sess ionKey .
4 fun f 1 ( bitstring , key ) : mac .
5 fun f 5 (mac , key ) : anonymityKey .
6 fun encrypt ( bitstring , anonymityKey ) : bitstring .
8 reduc fora l l m: bitstring , k : anonymityKey ; decrypt ( encrypt (m, k ) ,
k ) = m.
10 (∗ Secrecy query ∗)
11 free sqn : bitstring [ private ] .
12 query attacker ( sqn ) .
14 (∗ A u t h e n t i c a t i o n query ∗)
15 query x1 : ident , x2 : sess ionKey ; event ( endSN( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> event (
begSN( x1 , x2 ) ) .
16 query x1 : ident , x2 : sess ionKey ; event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> event (
begMS( x1 , x2 ) ) .
The declarations part also formalises the security properties to be verified. We are
interested in verifying the secrecy property of SQN and the mutual authentication fea-
ture. The ProVerif tool verifies the secrecy of any term by proving the reachability prop-
erty, and the authentication features are verified using correspondence assertions [59].
The following query syntax is used to achieve our goal.
• query attacker (M), queries the secrecy of the term M . If an attacker finds a way
to learn M , the query fails. In other words, ProVerif attempts to verify that any
state in which the term M is known to the adversary is unreachable.
• query x1 : t1, ....., xn : tn; event(e(M1, .....,Mj)) =⇒ event(e∗(N1, ....., Nk)),
where M1, .....,Mj , N1, ....., Nk are terms constructed using the variables x1, ....., xn
of types t1, ....., tn and e, e
∗ are declared events, queries a possible relationship be-
tween events. The events mark important stages reached by the protocol but do
not otherwise affect the behaviour of the process, and the relationships between
events are specified as correspondence assertions [174]. The query is satisfied if,
for each occurrence of the event e, there is a previous execution of event e∗. More-
over, the parameterisation of the events e and e∗ must satisfy any relationships
defined by its arguments; that is, the variables x1, ....., xn have the same value in
M1, .....,Mj and in N1, ....., Nk.
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In line 11 of Listing 5.1, we declare a free variable sqn of type bitstring. Free
variables are available to the attacker unless they are declared private by appending
[private]. Since we are interested in verifying the secrecy of this variable, we declare
the variable as private. Lines 12, 15, and 16 in Listing 5.1 query the security properties
of interest for the proposed scheme. The events begSN, endSN, begMS, endMS are
described below, in the process description where they are used.
5.8.2.2 The Process Macros
Process macros are sub-processes defined in order to ease development. Macros take the
form let R(x1 : t1, ....., xn : tn) = P , where R is the macro name, P is the sub-process
being defined, and x1, ....., xn of types t1, ....., tn respectively are the free variables of
P . We define three process macros to model the processes of the MS, SN, and HN.
We assume that the MS and SN communicate with each other through a public
channel (the pubChannel variable in the model) and that the communication channel
between the SN and HN (the secureChannel variable in the model) is private. The
receipt of a message in a process is represented by in(c, x), where c is the communication
channel and x is the received message. Similarly, sending a message is represented by
out(c, y), where c is the communication channel and y is the sent message. A destructor
application of the form let M = D in P else Q tries to rewrite D and matches the
result with M ; if this succeeds, then the variables in M are instantiated accordingly
and P is executed; otherwise, Q is executed. The conditional construct, if M = N
then P else Q, checks the equality of two terms M and N , and then behaves as P or
Q accordingly. We omit the else branch of a let or a conditional, when the process Q
is 0, meaning a null process.
The MS process, described in the processMS sub-process (see Listing 5.2), sends the
IMSI across the public channel for authentication, and then waits for an authentication
challenge (RAND), which is the concatenation of the encrypted SQN and the MAC.
On receiving the RAND, the process uses the destructor functions to retrieve SQN, to
compute a MAC, and to compare the computed MAC with the received MAC. If they
match, authentication of the SN is validated; in such a case, the process marks the event
endMS (line 9 in Listing 5.2) with the IMSI and the corresponding session key as event
parameters. The process also marks the event beginSN (line 10 in Listing 5.2) with the
IMSI and the corresponding session key as event parameters and sends the computed
SRES, the basis of MS authentication, across the public channel to be received by the
SN process. However, if the MAC comparison fails, the process sends a random value as
SRES across the public channel. The event endMS indicates that authentication of the
SN by the MS has completed. Similarly, the event begSN implies that authentication
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of the MS by the SN has started.
Listing 5.2: Enhanced GSM AKA model: MS process (highlights)
1 l et processMS=
2 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , imsi ms ) ) ;
3 in ( pubChannel , (=CHALLENGE, enc sqn ms : bitstring , mac ms : mac) ) ;
4 l et ak ms : anonymityKey = f5 (mac ms , k i ) in
5 l et sqn ms : bitstring = decrypt ( enc sqn ms , ak ms ) in
6 i f f 1 ( sqn ms , k i ) = mac ms then (
7 l et res ms : re sp = a3 ( enc sqn ms , mac ms , k i ) in
8 l et kc ms : sess ionKey = a8 ( enc sqn ms , mac ms , k i ) in
9 event endMS( imsi ms , kc ms ) ;
10 event begSN( imsi ms , kc ms ) ;
11 out ( pubChannel , (SRES, res ms ) ) ) e l s e (
12 new d r e s : r e sp ;
13 out ( pubChannel , (SRES, d r e s ) ) ) .
SN protocol execution is described in the processSN sub-process (see Listing 5.3).
On receiving the IMSI from the public channel, the process sends the IMSI across the
private channel to the HN, and waits for an AV. When it receives the AV, it marks
the event begMS (line 6 in Listing 5.3), with the IMSI and the corresponding session
key as event parameters, and sends the received authentication challenge across the
public channel to the MS. The process then waits for the SRES, and on receiving
a value from the public channel, it compares it with the XRES in the AV. If they
match then authentication of the MS is completed; in such a case, the process marks
the event endSN (line 10 in Listing 5.3), with the IMSI and corresponding session key
as event parameter. Like the events described in processMS, the event begMS implies
that authentication of the SN by the MS has started, and the event endSN indicates
that authentication of the MS by the SN has completed.
HN protocol execution is described in the processHN sub-process (see Listing 5.4).
This process always interacts with the secure channel. It receives an AV request from
the SN, computes an AV using defined constructors and destructors, and sends the AV
to the SN.
5.8.2.3 The Main Process
The main process of the ProVerif model encodes the complete protocol. We encode
the modified GSM AKA protocol using the macros defined in the previous section. We
model the execution of unbounded number of MS processes as (!processMS), where the
symbol ‘!’ represents replication and instantiates the parallel execution of an unbounded
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Listing 5.3: Enhanced GSM AKA model: SN process (highlights)
1 l et processSN=
2 in ( pubChannel , (=ID , ims i sn : ident ) ) ;
3 out ( secureChannel , (AV REQ, i ms i sn ) ) ;
4 in ( secureChannel , (=AV, ims i hn sn : ident , enc sqn sn : bitstring ,
5 mac sn : mac , x r e s s n : resp , kc sn : sess ionKey ) ) ;
6 event begMS( ims i hn sn , kc sn ) ;
7 out ( pubChannel , (CHALLENGE, enc sqn sn , mac sn ) ) ;
8 in ( pubChannel , (=SRES, r e s s n : re sp ) ) ;
9 i f r e s s n = x r e s s n then
10 event endSN( ims i hn sn , kc sn ) .
Listing 5.4: Enhanced GSM AKA model: HN process (highlights)
1 l et processHN=
2 in ( secureChannel , (=AV REQ, ims i hn : ident ) ) ;
3 get keys(=imsi hn , k i hn ) in
4 l et mac hn : mac = f1 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
5 l et ak hn : anonymityKey = f5 ( mac hn , k i hn ) in
6 l et enc sqn hn : bitstring = encrypt ( sqn , ak hn ) in
7 l et xres hn : re sp = a3 ( enc sqn hn , mac hn , k i hn ) in
8 l et kc hn : sess ionKey = a8 ( enc sqn hn , mac hn , k i hn ) in
9 out ( secureChannel , (AV, imsi hn , enc sqn hn , mac hn , xres hn ,
kc hn ) ) .
number of copies of processMS, in parallel to the SN and HN processes. The parallel
execution of processes P and Q is represented as P |Q. Listing 5.5 shows the main
process that embodies the modified GSM AKA protocol. A full listing of the ProVerif
code can be found in Appendix A.1.
Listing 5.5: Enhanced GSM AKA model: Main process
1 process
2 ( ( ! processMS ) | processSN | processHN )
5.8.3 Verification Result
We ran the encoded protocol described in Section 5.8.2 in ProVerif to verify the secrecy
and authenticity properties. The tool output RESULT not attacker(sqn[]) is true,
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which means that the attacker is not able to get the value of SQN . Since AMF is
transferred in exactly the same way as SQN and is used similarly in the proposed
scheme, in the protocol model we do not model AMF explicitly (SQN in the model can
be thought of as the concatenation of SQN and AMF ); hence the ProVerif verification
also shows that AMF secrecy is maintained.
In response to the first correspondence assertion query, the tool output RESULT
event(endSN (x11029, x21030)) =⇒ event(begSN (x11029, x21030)) is true, which indi-
cates that authentication of the MS by the SN is achieved. In response to the second
correspondence assertion query, ProVerif returned RESULT event(endMS(x1,x2)) =⇒
event(begMS(x1,x2)) is true, which implies that network authentication by the phone
is achieved. These two results imply that the mutual authentication property holds.
Table 5.1: Comparison of security properties
Properties/Protocol GSM AKA Proposed scheme
Authentication of Phone Yes Yes
Authentication of Network No Yes
Privacy of SQN NA Yes
Privacy of AMF NA Yes
We also formally modelled the existing GSM AKA protocol. The ProVerif model of
GSM AKA that we used is presented in Appendix A.2. We ran the encoded protocol
in ProVerif to confirm that the existing GSM AKA lacks the network authentication
property. Table 5.1 compares the security properties of the novel scheme with the
existing GSM AKA, where a ‘Yes’ implies that the ProVerif tool has verified that the
indicated property holds, and ‘NA’ means that the indicated property is not applicable.
The ProVerif outputs for both the existing GSM AKA protocol and the enhanced
version are given in Appendix A.3.
5.9 Relationship to the Prior Art
This is by no means the first practical proposal for enhancing GSM to incorporate
mutual authentication. Indeed, the 3G AKA protocol, discussed in Section 3.4.1, can be
regarded as doing exactly that. Although two 3GPP TSG documents [81, 82], described
in Section 4.6.1, proposed the introduction of network authentication into the GSM
network, neither of the schemes was adopted, presumably because of cost/feasibility
issues. Other proposals have been made, as discussed in Section 4.6.1. However, all
previous proposals are completely impractical in that they would require changes to
the GSM infrastructure. Such major changes to a widely deployed scheme are simply
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not going to happen.
The most similar proposals to that given here are some of the other schemes using
RAND hijacking, summarised in Section 5.3. In particular, van den Broek, Verdult
and de Ruiter [163] propose a similar structure for a hijacked GSM RAND, in their
case including a sequence number, a new temporary identity for the SIM, and a MAC,
all encrypted in an unspecified way. However, their objective is not to provide authen-
tication of the network to the SIM, but to provide a way to reliably transport new
identities from the AuC to the SIM.
5.10 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a method for enhancing the GSM AKA protocol to
provide authentication of the network to the MS, complementing the MS-to-network
authentication already provided. This provides protection against some of the most
serious threats to the security of GSM networks. This is achieved in a way which leaves
the existing serving network infrastructure unchanged, and also does not require any
changes to existing MEs (mobile phones). That is, unlike previous proposals of this
general type, it is practically realisable.
We have analysed the proposed modification to GSM AKA using the ProVerif tool,
and shown that the modified protocol provides mutual authentication without leaking
any confidential data.
A number of practical questions remain to be answered, including the proportion
of MEs supporting ‘class e’ STK commands, the behaviour of MEs in networks which
never perform the AKA protocol, and whether SNs can be relied upon to use GSM
authentication triples in the intended order. Discovering answers to these questions
remains as future work.
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Chapter 6
Improving Air Interface User
Privacy in GSM
6.1 Introduction
Although a number of possible modifications to 2G protocols to enhance user privacy
have been proposed, as described in Section 4.6.2, they all require significant alterations
to the existing deployed infrastructures, something that is almost certainly impractical
to achieve in practice. In this chapter we introduce new approaches to the use and
management of multiple IMSIs in a SIM with the goal of enhancing user pseudonymity
on the air interface in a way which does not require any changes to the existing deployed
network infrastructures, i.e. to the serving networks or the mobile devices. Similar
approaches also form the basis of schemes designed to enhance user identity privacy in
3G and 4G, described in Chapter 9.
The only changes required by the new scheme are to the operation of the authenti-
cation centre in the home network and to the SIM, both owned by a single entity in the
mobile system. We describe two approaches to the use and management of multiple
IMSIs in a SIM, and report on experiments to validate their deployability.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. A description of the threat
model is presented in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 outlines a novel approach to improving
air interface user privacy using multiple IMSIs. The procedure to update an IMSI in
a SIM is described in Section 6.4. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 provide descriptions of two
proposed approaches to the use and management of multiple IMSIs in a SIM. Results
from our experimental evaluation are presented in Section 6.7. An analysis of the
proposed approaches is presented in Section 6.8. Section 6.9 provides a discussion of
related work. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 6.10.
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6.2 Threat Model
In this section we describe the threat model underlying the schemes proposed in this
chapter. As described in Section 2.3.1, the IMSI is used to identify the subscriber for
authentication and access provision; since the IMSI is a permanent user identity, the
air interface protocols are designed to minimise the number of circumstances in which
it is sent across the air interface. However, we have already observed that there are
circumstances (see Section 4.2.1) in which an adversary can cause an MS to send its
IMSI across the radio path. This is the threat we aim to mitigate.
We observe that GSM AKA does not provide network authentication, and so is un-
able to guarantee an authenticated channel between the MS and the HN. We implicitly
assume that the SIM, ME, and the network have not been compromised.
The main objective of the proposed schemes is to reduce the impact of IMSI dis-
closure, thereby enhancing user privacy. That is, although the possibility of IMSI
compromise remains unchanged, we propose making the IMSI a short term identity
and hence avoid the disclosure of a single long-term user identity. In doing so we must
also ensure that two different IMSIs for the same MS are not linkable, at least via the
network protocol. The main risk introduced by use of multiple-IMSI schemes is the
possibility of loss of IMSI synchronisation between MS and HN; this issue is addressed
in Section 6.8.
As in the adversary model described in Section 5.2, we consider active adversaries,
more specifically IMSI catchers, in the threat model.
6.3 A Pseudonymity Approach
The idea underlying the schemes described in this chapter is to associate multiple
IMSIs with a single account, thereby supporting a form of pseudonymity on the air
interface. The use of multiple IMSIs is described here using GSM terminology; however,
a precisely analogous approach would apply equally to both 3G and 4G systems.
At present, a SIM holds one IMSI along with other subscription and network pa-
rameters. We propose that a SIM and the HN support the use of varying IMSIs for a
single user account, in such a way that no modification is required to the operation of
any intermediate entities, notably the serving network and the ME itself. This allows
the provision of a more robust form of pseudonymity without making any changes to
the air interface protocol. In this section we consider how a change of IMSI can be
made.
The following issues need to be addressed to allow use of multiple IMSIs.
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• Transferring IMSIs: Clearly, before a SIM switches to a new IMSI, it must be
present in the SIM and in the database of the HN. Also, new IMSIs must always
be chosen by the HN to avoid the same IMSI being assigned to two different
SIMs. This requires a direct means of communication between the HN and the
SIM (which must be transparent to the SN and the ME, since our objective is
to enable changing of an IMSI without making any changes to existing deployed
equipments). In Sections 6.5 and 6.6, we introduce two strategies for transferring
IMSIs from the HN to a SIM.
• Triggering an IMSI change: Whether the SIM or the HN is responsible for trig-
gering a change of IMSI, logic needs to be implemented to cause such a change
to take place. Regardless of whether the SIM or the HN makes the decision,
logic needs to be in place in the SIM either to make the decision or to receive
the instruction to make the change from the HN; for convenience we refer to
this logic as an application, although this is not intended to constrain how it is
implemented. The decision-making logic could take account of external factors,
including, for example, the elapsed time or the number of AKA interactions since
the last change; indeed, if the ME included an appropriate user-facing applica-
tion, then it might also be possible to allow user-initiated changes. Of course, if
the HN is responsible for triggering the change of IMSI, then it needs a means of
communicating its decision to the SIM that is transparent to the existing infras-
tructure, including the SN and the ME. This issue is addressed in Sections 6.5
and 6.6.
• Use of a new IMSI : Clearly the IMSI needs to be changed in such a way that both
the HN and the SIM know at all times which IMSI is being used, and the HN
always knows the correspondence between the IMSI being used by the SIM and
the user account. An IMSI change can be triggered either by the SIM or by the
HN, as we describe above. However, use of a new IMSI is always first implemented
by the SIM, since it is the appearance of a mobile device in a network using a
particular IMSI which causes a request to be sent by the SN for authentication
information for use in the AKA protocol. That is, when the ME sends an IMSI
to the SN, it is forwarded to the HN. Once the HN sees the ‘new’ IMSI it knows
that an IMSI change has occurred and can act accordingly.
This requires that the HN knows that both the previously used IMSI and the
‘new’ IMSI belong to the same account. This will require some minor changes to
the operation of the HN’s account database, i.e. to allow more than one IMSI to
point to a single account. However, this does not seem likely be a major problem
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in practice.
• Rate of change of IMSI : The rate of change of IMSI will clearly be decided by the
SIM-issuing network (which equips the SIM with the IMSI-changing application).
We observe in this context that Section 10.3.2 of GSM 11.11 [12] and 3GPP TS
51.011 [10], and Section 4.2.2 of 3GPP TS 31.102 [28] recommend that IMSI
updates should not occur frequently. The rate of change of an IMSI could be
determined by the customer contract with the issuing network; for example, a
SIM which changes its IMSI frequently might cost more than a fixed-IMSI SIM
(or one that only changes its IMSI occasionally), and could be marketed as a
special ‘high-privacy’ service.
• Implementing an IMSI change: Since the use of a new IMSI is always implemented
by the SIM, a mechanism will be required for the SIM to indicate to the ME that
the IMSI has changed; this is important to ensure the use of the new IMSI across
the air interface. We propose that the SIM application toolkit feature described
in Section 2.6.3 be used by the SIM to achieve this objective. We describe the
details of the procedure in Section 6.4 below.
As noted above, using multiple IMSIs requires a direct and transparent means
of communication between the HN and the SIM. The unstructured supplementary
service data (USSD) protocol appears at first sight to be a possible channel for such
communications. However, the security properties of USSD are not satisfactory, since
they are dependent on the underlying network [62]. As a result we do not consider the
use of USSD further.
6.4 Transfer of New IMSI to ME
We now describe the procedure to update an IMSI in the SIM and to allow the ME to
be made aware of the new IMSI. We assume that the SIM will change the IMSI when
the ME is in idle state; we therefore propose that, as part of the IMSI change process,
the SIM initiates a proactive command that enables an exchange of data eventually
resulting in the ME learning the new IMSI. The commands to achieve the desired
objectives are described below. Further details can be found in technical specifications
GSM 11.14 [13], 3GPP TS 51.014 [9], and 3GPP TS 31.111 [29].
• REFRESH : This proactive command requests the ME to carry out a SIM initial-
isation using the procedure described in Section 11.2.1 of GSM 11.11 [12], and/or
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advises the ME that the contents of EFs on the SIM have been changed. The
command also makes it possible to restart a card session by resetting the SIM.
The command supports five different modes as follows.
– SIM initialisation: This mode tells the ME to carry out SIM initialisation
using the procedure described in Section 11.2.1 of GSM 11.11 [12], starting
after the card holder verification 1 (CHV1) verification procedure.
– File change notification: This mode informs the ME of the identity of the
EFs that have been changed in the SIM. If there is an image of certain
SIM EFs in the ME memory, this information can be used by the ME to
determine whether it needs to update this image.
– SIM initialisation and file change notification: This is a combination of the
two modes above.
– SIM initialisation and full file change notification: This mode causes the
ME to perform the SIM initialisation procedure of the first mode above,
and also informs the ME that EFs have been changed in the SIM. If there
are any images of SIM EFs in the ME memory, the ME shall completely
update them.
– SIM reset : This mode causes the ME to run the GSM session termination
procedure and to deactivate the SIM in accordance with GSM 11.11 [12].
Subsequently, the ME activates the SIM again and starts a new card session.
The SIM reset mode is used when a SIM application requires complete SIM
initialisation procedures to be performed.
• STATUS : This command is frequently issued by an ME to a SIM, and is used
to check the presence of the SIM. When the ME is an idle state, the command
gives an opportunity for a proactive SIM to indicate that the SIM wants to issue
a SIM application toolkit command to the ME.
The following steps are used to implement the IMSI change and to notify the change
of IMSI to the ME.
1. As noted in Section 2.6.1, the IMSI is contained in the elementary file EFIMSI .
When the SIM wishes to change the IMSI, it first updates this file accordingly.
2. At the first opportunity, the SIM uses the response status byte of the STATUS
command to indicate to the ME that it wishes to issue a command (see Fig-
ure 6.1). The value 91 and the length, shown in Figure 6.1, represent the value
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Figure 6.1: SIM-ME interactions to transfer the new IMSI
of the status bytes sent by the SIM in response to the STATUS command, and
instruct the ME to issue a FETCH command to retrieve data from the SIM,
where the length indicates the length of data in bytes which the SIM wants to
send (in this case the size of REFRESH command, see below).
3. When the ME responds with a FETCH command, the SIM sends a REFRESH
command to the ME and sets the status bytes as 90|00, indicating a successful
command execution. Precisely which REFRESH mode should be used here is
up to the operator issuing the SIM; the main requirement is that the command
ensures that the ME refreshes its copy of the EFIMSI .
4. On receiving the REFRESH command, the ME performs according to the mode
set in the command, and informs the SIM about the result of the command execu-
tion using a TERMINAL RESPONSE command. However, when the command
mode is set to SIM reset, the ME does not send a TERMINAL RESPONSE ;
instead the SIM application interprets a new activation of the contacts of the
SIM as an implicit TERMINAL RESPONSE . The REFRESH command, if used
in an appropriate mode and with suitable parameters, will cause the ME to read
the EFIMSI , allowing it to learn the new IMSI. As a result, the next time that
the ME needs to send its IMSI to the SN, it will send the new value.
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6.5 Predefined Multiple IMSIs
In this and the next section, we describe two general approaches to the practical man-
agement of multiple IMSIs for a SIM. Our first means of deploying multiple IMSIs
involves a SIM being pre-equipped with a number of IMSIs. These IMSIs are all asso-
ciated with a single account in the HN’s account database. Initially, one of the IMSIs
is stored in EFIMSI . We propose below two ways of initiating an IMSI change in this
case.
6.5.1 SIM-Initiated IMSI Change
This is the simpler of the two approaches. As discussed in Section 6.3, we suppose that
the SIM has an application that decides when to trigger an IMSI change. When the
logic encoded in the application decides to make a change, the SIM updates the EFIMSI
file with a new IMSI. The new IMSI will clearly need to be selected from the predefined
list. How the list is used is a matter for the issuing network. For example, the IMSIs
could be used in cyclic order or at random (or, more probably, pseudo-randomly).
The SIM causes the ME to switch to the ‘new’ IMSI using the procedure described in
Section 6.4.
6.5.2 Network-Initiated IMSI Change
In this case, the HN decides when to trigger an IMSI change. The HN will have a richer
set of information to use to decide when to change IMSI than the SIM. For example,
the HN could change the IMSI whenever the SIM changes SN or after a fixed number
of calls.
As discussed in Section 6.3, when the HN decides to trigger an IMSI change, it
must, by some means, send an instruction to the SIM. However, we have not been able
to find a guaranteed secured channel in the current GSM specifications that could be
used to transfer such an instruction to the SIM; as a result, this approach does not
seem to work for GSM. However, this approach could be used in 3G and 4G mobile
systems, as described in Chapter 9.
Note that modifications to GSM proposed in Chapter 5, allow the establishment
of an authenticated channel between the HN and the SIM during authentication, since
the modified GSM AKA ensures mutual authentication. We discuss this issue further
in Chapter 9 (see Section 9.3.2).
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6.6 Modifiable Multiple IMSIs
The second proposed means of deploying multiple IMSIs involves distributing new IMSI
values from the HN to the SIM after its initial deployment, where the HN will choose
each new IMSI from its pool of unused values. Such an approach clearly requires a
means of communicating from the HN directly to the SIM. Like the scheme introduced
in Section 6.5.2, this approach cannot easily be implemented in GSM because of the lack
of a secure communications channel. However, we describe the use of such approach in
3G and 4G networks in Chapter 9.
In parallel work to that described here, van den Broek, Verdult and de Ruiter [163]
present a similar multi-IMSI approach for GSM which does allow new IMSI values to
be sent to the SIM after initial deployment. In their scheme, the subscriber’s IMSI
is replaced with a changing pseudonym called the pseudo mobile subscriber identifier
(PMSI), which is only resolvable by the SIM’s HN. The structure of a PMSI is the same
as that of an IMSI, and it is treated like an IMSI by the SN which is unaware of the fact
it is not an IMSI. They propose a scheme in which a new PMSI, a sequence number
and a MAC are embedded together in the RAND, for transfer to the SIM (using the
RAND hijacking technique introduced in Chapter 5). By embedding a MAC within
RAND, they provide their own secure channel for communication from the HN to the
SIM, addressing the issue discussed in the previous paragraph as a major obstacle to
this approach. The form of their hijacked RAND has some similarities to the modified
RAND employed in the scheme described in Chapter 5 (for very different purposes).
Interestingly, van Den Broek, Verdult and de Ruiter [163] also proposed modifica-
tions to 3G to achieve similar objectives; these are discussed in Chapter 9.
6.7 Experimental Validation
Testing the schemes is challenging due to the unavailability of a test network. However,
the SIMtrace [169] hardware and software provided by the Osmocom project1 enabled
us to test the proposed modifications to the SIM. These tests are relevant both here and
for the schemes described in Chapter 9; for reasons discussed below, tests by a USIM
apply equally to a SIM. We used SIMtrace to monitor USIM-ME communications,
together with SysmoUSIM-SJS1 2, a standards-compliant test UMTS UICC card, as
our main test platform.
To validate the proposed modifications, we first ran an experiment to update the
IMSI value in the test USIM. Using a standard contact smart card reader, smart card
1http://osmocom.org
2http://www.sysmocom.de/products/sysmousim-sjs1-sim-usim
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scripting tool, and a custom script we were able to modify the IMSI value. Later, we
developed a SIM toolkit applet using the Java card framework and the packages included
with the 3GPP technical specification covering the USIM API for Java card [30]. The
SIM toolkit applet used the REFRESH proactive command to cause the ME to fetch
the new IMSI. We chose to use the REFRESH command as it is understood by all
MEs which support proactive commands. To carry out the tests, we loaded the applet
into the test USIM. We connected the test USIM and the ME to the SIMtrace device,
which was connected to a laptop to record the APDUs exchanged between the test
USIM and the ME. We tested the full range of modes of the REFRESH command, as
discussed in Section 6.4. The observations from the experiment are as follows.
1. When a REFRESH command is executed in initialisation and file change noti-
fication mode, a series of read commands are issued by the ME. Although the
record of APDUs exchanged showed that the IMSI file was read, we were unable
to confirm that the read operation actually updated the IMSI value stored in the
ME because we did not have access to a test network.
2. When the REFRESH mode is changed to SIM reset, the ME simply restarted
its session, as expected. These observations confirmed that, if the REFRESH
command is used in the SIM reset mode, the ME is made aware of the new IMSI.
As a result, all future authentication procedures performed by the MS will use
the new IMSI, which will have the effect of notifying the HN of use of the new
IMSI.
During the experiments, we tested a range of standard MEs, all of which support the
proactive command. As mentioned earlier, due to the unavailability of a test network
we were unable to implement the modified HN. However, the changes required at the
HN are purely software changes to the operation of the AuC database, which should
not require significant additional computing resource.
Although we implemented our tests using a USIM, a SIM should give identical
results, since both SIM and USIM understand the REFRESH proactive command and
interpret it in the same way.
6.8 Analysis
The use of multiple IMSIs does not provide a complete solution to user identity confi-
dentiality. While in use, the IMSI still functions as a pseudonym, potentially enabling
the interactions of a single phone to be tracked for a period; of course, this is always
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true for any mobile network when a subscriber resides in a single location area, even
where only a privacy-preserving TMSI is used. Naturally, the more frequently IMSIs
are changed the less the impact of possible tracking, but frequent IMSI changes have
an overhead in terms of database management. The use of a predefined set of IMSIs
further restricts the degree of user identity confidentiality protection. In this case, over
a period of time it might be possible for an eavesdropper to link at least some of the
fixed IMSIs. Overall the IMSI-changing proposal can be seen as allowing a trade-off
between user privacy and the cost of implementing frequent IMSI changes.
Loss of IMSI synchronisation could be a critical issue. If, in the modifiable multiple
IMSIs case, an active adversary is able to persuade the SIM to change its IMSI to an
unauthorised value, then the SIM (and the MS) will cease to be able to access the
network. It is therefore essential that robust cryptographic (and other) means are used
to guarantee the correctness and timeliness of the new IMSI. In the predefined IMSIs
schemes described in Section 6.5, loss of synchronisation cannot arise, as even if the
SIM is persuaded to make an unauthorised change, the new IMSI will be known to the
HN.
In the scheme described in Section 6.5.1, nothing changes in the authentication
protocol, and so, the proposed scheme neither affects the existing security properties
nor introduces any new concern. However, the scheme improves user identity privacy
over the air interface.
6.9 Related Work
Apart from the recent work of van den Broek, Verdult and de Ruiter (described in
Section 6.6), we know of no other proposed modifications to the operation of GSM
with the objective of enhancing user privacy that do not involve major changes to the
network infrastructure (as discussed in Section 4.6.2). However, a number of authors
have proposed the use of multiple IMSIs for a single SIM, as summarised below.
Sung, Levine, and Liberatore [152] proposed a scheme to enhance location privacy
which uses multiple IMSIs for a single SIM, and which has some similarities to the
schemes we propose. However, their scheme involves an additional party in its opera-
tion, needs support by the ME, and requires wireless data connectivity for sending and
receiving calls. The threat model is also very different, in that the HN is considered
as a potential adversary. The scheme employs phones without a local SIM; instead the
phone’s software retrieves a virtual SIM offered by an Internet-accessible third party,
which is used for a limited period and paid for using an anonymous Internet payment
system in which messages are sent via Tor.
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Tagg and Campbell [153] described a scheme to use multiple IMSIs for multiple
networks with a single SIM. Their scheme involves the use of an update server to
provide a suitable IMSI as and when it is required. The objective of their proposal
is to avoid roaming charges by dynamically switching network provider. Marsden
and Marshall [123] proposed a similar approach. The focus of their work is thus very
different to the approaches introduced in this chapter; they also do not provide a means
of transparently transferring new IMSIs to a SIM.
6.10 Summary
In this chapter we introduced two general approaches to using multiple IMSIs for a
mobile subscriber. The goal of these approaches is to improve user privacy by reducing
the impact of IMSI disclosure on the air interface. The proposed approaches provide a
form of pseudonymity on the air interface, even when it is necessary to send the IMSI
in cleartext, and hence reduce the impact of user privacy threats arising from IMSI
capture.
We described a scheme for GSM which does not require any changes to the existing
deployed network infrastructures, i.e. to the SN, air interface protocols or mobile de-
vices. One major advantage is that the proposed scheme could be deployed immediately
since it is completely transparent to the existing mobile telephony infrastructure. Fur-
ther multi-IMSI privacy-enhancing schemes designed for use in 3G and 4G networks,
are described in Chapter 9.
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Privacy Issues in 3G and 4G
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Overview
Part III addresses privacy threats arising in 3G and 4G. Novel schemes designed to
address the threat of IMSI catchers in 3G and 4G are presented. Part III contains
three chapters, as follows.
• Chapter 7 reviews known privacy issues arising from disclosure of the permanent
subscriber identity in 3G and 4G. It also briefly discusses previous attempts to
address these issues.
• Chapter 8 presents a critical analysis of the proposed modifications to the oper-
ation of 3G systems due to Arapinis et al. [48], intended to address threats to
user identity privacy; it further proposes possible alternative means of mitigating
these threats.
• Chapter 9 describes and analyses novel schemes to address the decades-old pri-
vacy problem of disclosure of the permanent subscriber identity, focussing in
particular on 3G and 4G systems.
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Chapter 7
Privacy Issues in 3G and 4G
7.1 Introduction
The security features of 3G and 4G mobile systems represent a significant improvement
on those of GSM, notably by providing mutual authentication between network and
phone, and by incorporating integrity protection for signalling messages sent across
the air interface. 4G systems, such as the long-term evolution (LTE) scheme, further
enhance the data confidentiality feature across the air interface by separating the man-
agement of user data from that of signalling data, and by introducing a hierarchical key
structure in which purpose-specific session keys are derived from KASME (the master
session key, described in Section 3.4.1) to be used by the networking entities involved
in cryptographic data protection. However, as discussed in Section 1.2, user identity
confidentiality across the air interface has remained largely unchanged, relying in all
cases on the use of temporary identities, and it has long been known that the existing
measures do not provide complete protection for the user identity. In this chapter we
describe the privacy properties of 3G and 4G, along with the known privacy threats
arising from use of such systems. We further describe previous research directed to-
wards addressing these threats.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.2 we briefly review key privacy
terminology and the privacy features of the 3G and 4G air interfaces. Privacy threats
arising from the use of 3G and 4G are briefly described in Section 7.3. Section 7.4
reviews previous attempts to address these privacy threats. Finally, in Section 7.5, we
describe the motivation for the work presented in chapters 8 and 9.
92
7.2. USER PRIVACY
7.2 User Privacy
7.2.1 Privacy Terminology
We start our consideration of user privacy by introducing some privacy-related termi-
nology. Unless otherwise stated we follow RFC 6973 [72].
• Anonymity : The property for a user that he or she is not identifiable by an
observer within a set of users, known as the anonymity set.
• Unlinkability : Two or more items of interest (e.g. users, messages, actions) are
unlinkable if an interested party cannot distinguish whether or not they are re-
lated.
• Untraceability : The property for an object that a third party cannot determine
whether or not the object exists or is present. In other words, an observer cannot
follow an object as it moves from one location to another [61].
• Pseudonymity : The property for an individual that he or she is identified by a
pseudonym. Pseudonymity is enhanced, i.e. the pseudonyms are less likely to be
linkable, if:
– less personal data can be linked to the pseudonym,
– the same pseudonym is used less often and across fewer contexts, and
– independently chosen pseudonyms are more frequently used for new actions.
• Identity confidentiality : The property for an individual that only an authorised
party can identify the individual within a set of other individuals.
User anonymity, user unlinkability and user untraceability are closely related, and
are clearly desirable from a user privacy perspective.
7.2.2 Privacy Features
The privacy properties of 3G and 4G mobile systems are listed below. Further details
can be found in 3GPP TS 33.102 [31].
• User identity confidentiality : The property that the permanent user identity
(IMSI) of a user to whom service is being delivered cannot be learnt by monitoring
the radio access link; this privacy feature ensures user anonymity for the air
interface. This is the same as the IMSI confidentiality feature of GSM, described
93
7.3. PRIVACY THREATS
in Section 4.2.1. The mechanism used to protect the confidentiality of the user
identity in 3G and 4G is the same as that used in GSM. The only difference
is that 4G extends the length of the temporary user identity to accommodate
more system information. Although this change improves flexibility in network
operations, it does not prevent IMSI catching attacks. The scenarios in which the
IMSI is disclosed on the air interface, described in Section 4.2.1, also apply to both
3G and 4G, and so, with respect to the robustness of user identity confidentiality,
3G and 4G are the same as GSM.
• User location confidentiality : The property that the presence or arrival of a user
in a certain area cannot be determined by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
Since location information in 3G and 4G is easily accessible, the robustness of
this property largely depends on how well 3G and 4G protect the confidentiality
of the user identity.
• User untraceability : 3GPP [31] defines this to be the property that an intruder
cannot deduce whether multiple services are delivered to the same user by eaves-
dropping on the radio access link; by definition, this privacy feature also guaran-
tees user unlinkability. Like user location confidentiality, to ensure user untrace-
ability 3G and 4G should protect the confidentiality of the user identity.
To provide the above privacy properties, both 3G and 4G use a pseudonym as
a temporary user identity in place of the IMSI when communicating across the air
interface. To avoid user tracking, the temporary user identity is refreshed after a certain
period of time, configurable by the SN. In addition it is required that any signalling or
user data that might reveal the user’s identity must be sent via an encrypted channel
on the radio access link.
7.3 Privacy Threats
In this section we continue the discussion of privacy threats introduced in Section 4.5.
We focus on those privacy threats relevant to 3G and 4G.
7.3.1 IMSI Catching Attack
The IMSI catcher, described in Section 4.5.3, is a persistent threat to all generations
of mobile systems. We defined IMSI catching attacks in Section 4.5.3. Although IMSI
catchers have mostly been discussed in the context of GSM, their presence in 3G and
4G networks is also feasible. It seems likely that, in practice, active attackers with
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a fake base station capability force 3G- and 4G-capable mobile devices to use GSM
protocols in order to maximise the attack potential.
An IMSI catcher will typically use the configuration data for a genuine network to
set up its fake base station. The fact that the broadcast system information messages
used in 3G and 4G are not cryptographically protected allows an active attacker to
emulate a 3G or a 4G mobile network; such an attacker can request a mobile device
to transmit its IMSI. Since requesting an IMSI is a legitimate network activity (see
Section 4.2.1), the attacker can easily obtain the IMSI of a target user. The feasibility of
IMSI catchers has been practically demonstrated [63, 147], and widely discussed [100].
IMSI catchers for 3G and 4G are commercially available1.
3GPP technical documents TR 33.821 ([14], Section 5.1.1) and TS 21.133 ([3],
annex A.1) discuss the IMSI catcher threat. However, completely removing the threat
of a fake base station is very difficult; communications between a base station and an
unidentified ME are almost inevitably unprotected, since no key is available on which
to base cryptographic protection. The use of asymmetric cryptography could help
significantly, but the introduction of such technology would involve major changes to
network architectures and would also significantly increase implementation complexity.
However, advances in hardware technology and the availability of software [167, 171]
have made IMSI catcher capabilities widely available, which may force regulatory bodies
to take steps to oblige network operators to reduce the threat [132, 146]. Technical
details of the operation of IMSI catchers have been widely discussed in the academic
literature [65, 135, 151].
7.3.2 IMSI Paging Attack
This attack exploits the same flaw that enables the IMSI paging attack in GSM (see
Section 4.5.5). Although 3G and 4G provide integrity protection for many signalling
messages, paging type 1 messages, which contain the subscriber’s IMSI, are not integrity
protected (see Section 3.6.3). Thus, an active adversary can introduce spurious paging
messages into the network to both detect the presence of a UE with a specific IMSI,
and also learn the current TMSI for this device, analogously to the IMSI paging attack
in GSM.
7.3.3 User Linkability Attack
This threat was uncovered by Arapinis et al. [48, 49], and is much like the GSM user
linkability attack described in Section 4.5.4. It exploits the error messages associated
1http://www.pki-electronic.com/products/interception-and-monitoring-systems/
http://rayzone.com/en.piranha.html
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with 3GPP AKA, as described in Section 3.4.2. When a USIM runs AKA, it first
verifies the MAC value, and if MAC verification is successful it performs a further
check on the SQN value (see Section 3.4.1). If the MAC verification fails an error
message is returned to the base station and processing stops; if the SQN verification
fails then a different error message is sent. The fact that the two failures give rise to
two different error types allows an active adversary to gain user-linkable information
from the USIM’s response to a replayed authentication request.
Suppose an active attacker has intercepted a genuine (RAND, AUTN ) pair sent to
a target UE, and is interested in tracing this UE. If this pair is sent by a fake base
station to a specific UE as part of the AKA protocol, there are two possible outcomes
(see Figure 7.1). If the recipient UE is the device to which the (RAND, AUTN ) pair
was originally sent, then it will respond with an authentication failure containing a
sync-failure error code, indicating a SQN check failure. This reveals the presence of
the target UE. Otherwise, if the recipient UE is not the target UE, it will respond
with an authentication failure containing an error code indicating MAC-failure. That
is, the error code can be used to distinguish between a target UE and other UEs.
Figure 7.1: Possible outcomes in a user linkability attack
The attack could be used to profile user movement within a restricted area, such
as in an office building. Given more resources, the attack could be extended to trace
the movements of a target UE in a larger area, e.g. within a city.
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7.4 Addressing the Threats
We now review the extensive prior art aimed at improving user privacy in mobile net-
works, focussing in particular on user identity confidentiality in 3G and 4G networks.
As in Section 7.2.2, user identity confidentiality is provided by using a temporary sub-
scriber identity when communicating across the air interface, as soon as it is available.
Although this approach provides user identity confidentiality against a passive adver-
sary, it has serious vulnerabilities in the presence of an active adversary. Over the
last two decades this weakness has motivated many proposed modifications to existing
network protocols aimed at providing more robust protection for the confidentiality
of the IMSI. We described some of this work in Section 4.6.2, focussing primarily on
GSM-specific proposals. In this section we describe a range of research addressing this
privacy problem in the context of 3G and 4G networks.
Before reviewing the academic research, we note that 3GPP technical report TR
33.821 ([14], Section 5.1.1.2) outlines two general approaches to addressing the identity
confidentiality vulnerability arising from the need to send the IMSI across the air
interface. The first is to use another type of pseudonym to replace the IMSI, where
this pseudonym is managed between the USIM and the HN. The second is to use
public key cryptography, i.e. to enable the mobile device to encrypt the IMSI using a
public key belonging to the SN prior to transmission across the air interface. A range
of more detailed proposals for both approached have been made, and are discussed in
Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 below. We also consider another general approach to addressing
the issue, namely IMSI catcher detection, in Section 7.4.3.
7.4.1 Asymmetric Cryptography Based Schemes
The main reason the IMSI needs to be sent across an unencrypted air interface link is
that, until the mobile device and SN have established a shared secret key using AKA,
there is no key available to perform encryption; thus asymmetric encryption of the
IMSI using a network public key seems the obvious solution to IMSI disclosure. Over
the last two decades a range of schemes using asymmetric key cryptography have been
proposed to try to address the IMSI disclosure threat. We summarise below some of
the proposals of this type.
• Many authors (including [48, 49, 51, 76, 92, 94, 175, 177] and Section 9.4 of [127])
have proposed modifications to AKA and UE identification using public key cryp-
tography. However, all such modifications require the integration of public key
infrastructures (PKIs) into mobile networks, necessitating significant changes to
the operation of the HN, SN, and UE.
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• Køien [113] proposed the use of identity-based encryption to encrypt the IMSI
for transmission across the air interface. Whilst the use of identity-based cryp-
tography avoids the need for a PKI, the scheme nevertheless involves significant
changes to all the system components. A UE has to compute a public identity for
each SN it visits, and an SN has to record the private identity, computed by the
respective HN, for each HN it interacts. As a result, it appears that the scheme
is not deployable with existing systems.
Thus, all the previously proposed privacy-enhancing system enhancements employ-
ing asymmetric key cryptography require significant changes to all the main compo-
nents of the system, including HNs, SNs, phones and USIMs. As we have observed
previously, making such modifications to the existing mobile system infrastructure is
almost certainly impractical in practice; thus the only possible scenario in which such
schemes might find a use is in future generation mobile networks.
7.4.2 Pseudonym-Based Schemes
Over the last 20 years, many authors have proposed pseudonym-based enhancements
to 3G and 4G network protocols to try to address the air interface IMSI disclosure
problem. We summarise below some of the key proposals of this type.
• In the mid-1990s, Mitchell [128] proposed a pseudonym-based user identity pro-
tection scheme for 3G to overcome the shortcoming of disclosure of the permanent
user identity during the initial registration of a mobile device with an SN. The
scheme introduces TMUIS — a temporary user identity managed by the sub-
scriber’s HN. TMUIS is used instead of the IMSI to identify a user to the HN. A
UE uses TMUIS , along with the TMSI
2, to identify itself across the air interface.
When the UE has a valid TMSI, it identifies itself using this TMSI; otherwise,
it uses the TMUIS as its identity. On receiving the TMUIS , the SN forwards
it to the HN, and the HN generates a new TMUIS , masks it, and sends to the
SN along with the authentication data (analogous to an AV). The SN forwards
the received TMUIS to the UE as part of subscriber authentication. The scheme
was proposed before the deployment of 3G, and so it incorporates the use of an
authentication protocol slightly different to UMTS AKA. Maintaining synchro-
nisation of the TMUIS between the UE and the HN is not described, and analysis
of the efficiency of the scheme is kept as future work. Like most of the many sub-
sequently proposed schemes of this type, implementing such a pseudonym system
2Although Mitchell uses the term TMUIN , the role of TMUIN is the same as the TMSI in 3G.
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in 3G would require significant changes to the air interface protocol, and would
affect the operation of all the 3G entities. For further details, see also Section 9.3
of [127].
• Barbeau and Robert [51] present two different pseudonym-based schemes relying
on the use of a one-time alias that is much like an IMSI. Their first scheme
introduces an HN-managed coupon3 to be used in authentication instead of both
the IMSI and the TMSI. Each coupon corresponds to an IMSI known to the
HN. The HN transfers a new coupon via an encrypted channel to the UE in each
authentication session, and the UE uses this coupon in the next service request.
The researchers acknowledge a major drawback of the scheme, namely that it
modifies the message format in the authentication protocol, requiring changes to
the SN, HN and UE.
The second scheme Barbeau and Robert propose uses a one-time alias, the in-
ternational mobile anonymous number (IMAN), that is derived independently
by both the HN and the UE; this allows the scheme to avoid any changes
to the operation of the intermediate network entities. The IMAN is used in-
stead of both the IMSI and the TMSI by the SN. The HN keeps record of
the current and old IMAN corresponding to an IMSI. The IMAN is computed
as IMAN = MD5 (AK ‖ SQN ‖ RAND), where MD5 is the well known crypto-
graphic hash function [124], AK is the anonymity key, SQN is the sequence
number, and RAND is the random number (all as in 3G AKA). The output of
the MD5 function is truncated to the length of an IMSI. When the HN generates
AVs, it may need to repeat the IMAN computing procedure several times with
different RAND values to find an IMAN that is not already in use. The IMAN is
updated by both the UE and the HN in every successful authentication, although
it is not clear how the HN will be aware of which specific AV was used in the
immediate past successful user authentication. This information is required to
enable the HN to update the IMAN correctly. Moreover, how the IMAN will be
transferred from the USIM to the ME to be used by the UE is not discussed in the
scheme. The researchers address the synchronisation of the IMAN between the
HN and the UE, and claim self-synchronisation of the HN and the UE. However,
they do not consider scenarios in which IMAN synchronisation fails, for example,
if an AV is lost or not used the HN will update the IMAN but the UE will not.
Thus, although this scheme has the major advantage of only requiring changes
to the USIM and the HN, it cannot manage possible identity desynchronisation,
3The structure of the coupon is unspecified
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which is critical to the operation of a 3G network.
• Sattarzadeh, Asadpour and Jalili [144] introduce an improved user identity con-
fidentiality mechanism for 3G that replaces use of the IMSI with anonymous
tickets. The HN stores two tickets for each subscriber, and manages the relation-
ship between the tickets and the IMSI. The scheme changes the operation of 3G
AKA to incorporate new messages, which requires changes to the operation of
the UE, SN and HN.
• Juang and Wu [108] propose a modified 3GPP authentication protocol intended
to ensure user identity confidentiality. Their scheme is based on the work of Zhang
and Fang [176], an enhancement to 3G AKA addressing other issues. When a UE
is required to send the IMSI to the network, the UE masks the IMSI with a token,
appends the random number used to compute the token to the masked IMSI, and
sends the combination of the masked IMSI and the random number to the HN via
the SN. On receiving this value, the HN computes the token as H(x ‖ r), where
x is a new master key only known to the HN, r is the received random number,
and H is a MAC function. The HN checks the validity of the request, and uses
the computed token to retrieve the IMSI of the subscriber. The HN computes a
new token using a new random number, and sends the token in encrypted form
with the random number in cleartext to the SN, and the SN forwards these values
to the UE in the next authentication request. After successful authentication the
UE updates its stored token and the random number. Since the UE appends
the random number used to compute the token to the masked IMSI and the
random number is transmitted in cleartext, the relation between the old and the
new random number could be learnt by a passive adversary; hence, this random
number could be used to track a user. The scheme modifies the AKA messages,
and hence involves changes to the operation of the SN, HN and UE.
• Choudhury, Choudhury and Saikia [71] proposed a scheme using a frequently
changing dynamic mobile subscriber identity (DMSI) instead of the IMSI across
the air interface. The DMSI is constructed by concatenating the MCC, the MNC,
a random number chosen by the HN, and a 128-bit encrypted version of the cho-
sen random number. As a result, the structure and length of the DMSI differs
significantly from the IMSI. The variable part of the DMSI is transferred to the
UE during authentication, and is updated on every run of the authentication pro-
tocol. The HN keeps a record of the set of DMSIs allocated to each user, and the
USIM updates its DMSI on receiving a new value after completing authentication.
The use of the DMSI requires changes to the SN, HN and UE.
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Thus, almost all the previous proposals for pseudonym-based schemes require
changes to all the main components of the system, including HNs, SNs, phones and
USIMs. This essentially means that deploying any of these solutions would require
deploying an entirely new network infrastructure, which seems unlikely to occur. The
only scheme which does not require such a major redeployment is the second scheme
of Barbeau and Robert [51]; however, as we have discussed, this scheme appears to
permit loss of synchronisation between the USIM and the HN, which is likely to lead to
a permanent loss of service. As a result, this solution too is unlikely to be deployable
in practice.
7.4.3 IMSI Catcher Detection
The schemes described above try to avoid any threats (active or passive) arising from
disclosure of the IMSI on the air interface. Another approach to addressing this threat
is to detect the presence of an IMSI catcher. Tools to achieve this are known as IMSI-
catcher-catchers.
Debrowski et al. [73] present two independent implementations of an IMSI-catcher-
catcher, i.e. a hardware-based stationary device and a mobile application, intended
to detect the presence of an IMSI catcher. Other such mobile applications in-
clude Snoopsnitch [133, 170], Darshak [64, 165], and Android IMSI catcher detec-
tion(AIMSICD) [164]. These applications have major limitations, i.e. they are sup-
ported only on the android platform and two of them are hardware-dependent. In
general these applications continuously analyse available network information, scan for
any anomalies in the network, and alert the user when anomalies are detected. How-
ever, many of the anomalies detected by these applications could be part of normal
network operation; hence, the alerts could be false positives. Moreover, these applica-
tions simply warn the user of abnormal activities, and do not prevent a mobile device
connecting to a potential IMSI catcher.
7.5 Research Motivation
Although 3G and 4G provide the identity confidentiality feature using temporary sub-
scriber identities, as we discussed in Section 7.3.1, this mechanism does not work in the
presence of an active adversary such as an IMSI catcher. The IMSI is also sometimes
sent for entirely legitimate reasons, meaning that the identity confidentiality mecha-
nism is vulnerable even to a passive interceptor; however, the threat from IMSI catchers
is significantly greater since it allows the IMSI to be revealed at will. It is therefore
vital that any scheme designed to protect the subscriber’s IMSI should be effective
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against both passive and active adversaries; also, for practical reasons, any enhance-
ment to existing mobile systems designed to enhance this feature needs to work with
the existing system infrastructure.
As discussed in Section 7.4, over the years a wide range of possible solutions to the
IMSI catcher problem have been proposed, which vary in their use of cryptographic
techniques. Introducing new cryptographic techniques could solve the problem of the
IMSI catcher; however, such schemes requires significant changes to the deployed infras-
tructure, the USIM, and the phone. It seems likely that making such modifications to
widely deployed mobile systems is almost certainly impractical in practice. In addition,
full implementation details of proposed schemes have not been provided. These obser-
vations motivated a critical examination of a recently proposed set of modifications to
3G. This is the focus of the next chapter.
Since pseudonym-based schemes typically use only the cryptographic techniques
already in use, such an approach is a candidate for use in enhancing existing mobile
systems; unfortunately, as discussed in Section 7.4.2, almost all such schemes require
significant modifications to the air interface protocol, which would require changes to
the operation of all the SNs as well as all the deployed phones. As a result, it seems
likely that making the necessary major modifications to the operation of the air interface
after deployment is infeasible in practice. It would therefore be extremely valuable if a
scheme to reduce the threat from IMSI catchers and thereby better protect user privacy
could be devised, which does not require significant changes to the existing network
infrastructures and has minimal computational cost. This observation motivates our
efforts to devise novel schemes to improve user identity privacy in mobile systems which
could actually be deployed. We describe the novel schemes in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 8
Another Look at Privacy Threats
in 3G
8.1 Introduction
The 3GPP standards, which incorporate a range of security features [3, 31], are the
basis for a large part of the world’s mobile systems. As a result, any security or privacy
flaws identified in these standards potentially have major implications. In this chapter
we are primarily concerned with one particular feature of 3G security, namely the
service known as user identity confidentiality (see Section 7.2.2). This service seeks
to minimise the exposure of the IMSI on the air interface. The main security feature
incorporated into the 3G system designed to provide this service is the use of frequently
changing temporary identities, which act as pseudonyms.
A recently published paper by Arapinis et al. [48] describes two novel attacks on this
service, which enable user device anonymity to be compromised. As well as describing
the two attacks, modifications (‘fixes’) to the protocol are described which aim to
prevent the attacks, and verifications of these fixes using ProVerif are also outlined.
In this chapter we re-examine these proposed fixes, and briefly describe the findings.
We find significant shortcomings in the proposed fixes, and suggest possible alternative
approaches to some of the modifications. We argue that some of the weaknesses in
user identity confidentiality are impossible to fix, meaning that making significant
system changes to address some of them are unlikely to be worth the effort. We
also demonstrate certain limitations in the effectiveness of tools such as ProVerif if
not used with appropriate care, and in particular if they are used without a detailed
understanding of the cryptographic primitives being employed. The discussions here
also apply to 4G, although we use 3G terminology throughout. The main content of this
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chapter was presented at ACISP 2014, and has been published in the proceedings [109].
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 8.2 the attacks
of Arapinis et al. are summarised, together with a description of their proposed fixes.
Sections 8.3 and 8.4 provide analyses of these fixes. Finally, the findings are summarised
and conclusions are drawn in Section 8.5.
8.2 Privacy Threats and Fixes
8.2.1 The Attacks
Arapinis et al. [48] describe two apparently novel attacks that breach user identity
confidentiality in 3G mobile systems. These two threats operate as follows.
• IMSI paging attack : This attack exploits a paging message (or, more formally,
a paging type 1 message — see Section 3.6.3). Such messages are sent from the
network to all mobile devices in a particular area to establish a radio connection
to a specific UE, and can contain either an IMSI or a TMSI. Most importantly,
paging messages are not integrity protected (see Section 3.6.3), and hence an
active adversary can introduce spurious paging messages into the network to
both detect the presence of a UE with a specific IMSI, and also to learn the
current TMSI for this device (see Section 7.3.2). This poses a threat to mobile
identity privacy.
• User linkability attack : This attack exploits the error messages incorporated into
the AKA protocol, as described in Section 3.4.2. Suppose an attacker has inter-
cepted a genuine (RAND, AUTN ) pair sent to a particular UE. As discussed in
Section 7.3.3, if these values are replayed to a specific UE at some later time, two
possible error responses will arise depending on whether the intercepted (RAND,
AUTN ) pair was intended for this UE. That is, the error code can be used to
determine whether or not a UE is the same as a target UE, and this is clearly
another means of breaching user identity confidentiality.
8.2.2 Observations
We start by observing that the first threat, whilst apparently novel, is closely related
to another threat to user identity privacy. As described in Section 6.2 of 3GPP TS
33.102 [31], ‘when the user registers for the first time in a serving network, or when the
serving network cannot retrieve the IMSI from the TMSI by which the user identifies
itself on the radio path’, the serving network must obtain the IMSI from the UE — this
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is performed using a user identity request/user identity response message pair, where
the latter message contains the IMSI. ‘This represents a breach in the provision of
user identity confidentiality’ [31]. This attack, called user identity catching or IMSI
catching (see Section 7.3.1), is further mentioned in A.1 of 3GPP TS 21.133 [3], and is
also noted by Arapinis et al. ([48], Section 2.2).
Given that this attack has long been known, i.e. an active attacker can obtain the
IMSI of any UE by impersonating the network, neither of the new attacks appear to
significantly further weaken the user privacy service. That is, neither of the new attacks
appear to be any easier to launch than the IMSI catching attack — in particular, they
both require active impersonation of the network as is the case for an IMSI catching
attack.
Most interestingly, the second attack seems to be an issue that has not previously
been discussed in the literature. It is just one example of a very broad class of threats
arising from poorly designed error messages that reveal information of value to an
attacker — see, for example, Vaudenay [172].
8.2.3 The Fixes
As well as describing the two privacy issues, Arapinis et al. [48] give three separate
modifications to the operation of 3G systems designed to fix the two newly identified
problems as well as the well known user identity catching attack. We next briefly
describe these proposed modifications.
• Fixing the IMSI paging attack : This modification is not described in complete
detail ([48], Section 5.2), and as a result some suppositions need to be made. It
involves cryptographically protecting the paging message using a secret key UK
known only to the network and the UE. Like CK and IK, this additional key is
generated as a function of the RAND and K by the HN’s AuC, and is provided
to the SN as part of an extended AV.
The paging message format is modified to incorporate two additional fields,
namely a sequence number SQN and a random challenge CHALL. It is not
clear whether SQN is in the same ‘series’ as the SQN sent in the AUTN, or
whether this is a distinct sequence number used for this purpose only. This issue
is discussed further in Section 8.3 below.
The entire paging message is then encrypted using UK . However, the method
of encryption is not specified. This issue is also discussed further in Section 8.3
below.
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Since this message is broadcast, it is received by all UEs currently attached to
a base station. Each UE must use its current UK to decrypt the message. By
some (unspecified) means the recipient UE decides whether or not the decrypted
message is intended for it — Arapinis et al. simply state ([48], Section 5.2) that
each UE ‘has to decrypt and check all the received IMSI paging to determine if it
is the recipient’ (sic). If it is the intended recipient, then the UE checks the SQN
against its stored value to verify its freshness (as in AKA). If it is fresh then
the USIM updates its stored SQN, and sends a paging response containing the
TMSI and the received value of CHALL; otherwise, if the freshness check fails,
the paging message is ignored.
• Fixing user linkability attack : This fix involves leaving the ‘normal’ operation of
AKA unchanged; the only modification is to require (asymmetric) encryption of
authentication failure report messages, thereby hiding the nature of the embed-
ded error message. This encryption is performed using a public encryption key
belonging to the SN. Providing a reliable copy of this key to the UE requires
the pre-establishment of a public key infrastructure (PKI) involving all the 3G
network operators, in which each network operator has an asymmetric encryption
key pair and a signature key pair. Each operator must use its private signature
key to create a certificate for every other network’s public encryption key. Every
USIM must be equipped with the public signature verification key of the issuing
(home) network.
In order for the UE to obtain a trusted copy of the appropriate public encryption
key, the SN must send the UE a copy of a certificate for its public encryption key,
signed using the private signature key of the USIM’s home network (this could
be achieved by modifying an existing signalling message or by introducing a new
such message). The USIM exports its trusted copy of the public verification key
of its home network to the phone, and the phone can use this to verify the cer-
tificate, thereby obtaining the required trusted public encryption key. The phone
can perform the encryption of the failure report message, obviating the need
for the USIM to perform any computationally complex asymmetric encryption
operations.
A further modification to the failure report message is proposed by Arapinis et
al. [48], namely to include the USIM’s current value of SQN . This change is
designed to enable resynchronisation of this value by the network, but is not
explained further.
• Fixing user identity catching : Finally, Arapinis et al. [48] also propose modify-
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ing the procedure by which a UE identifies itself when first joining a network.
They propose that the UE asymmetrically encrypts the user identity response
message containing the IMSI. As in the previous modification, this encryption is
performed using the public encryption key of the SN.
8.3 IMSI Paging Re-Examined
There are a number of significant issues with the fix proposed to mitigate IMSI paging
attacks. We enumerate some of the most serious.
1. Introducing a new type of session key, i.e. the UK, has major ramifications. Since
the SN does not have access to the long term key K, the session key UK will
need to be generated by the HN’s AuC and sent to the SN as part of the AV.
Introducing an additional key type means that the authentication vectors will
need to become 6-tuples to include the UK value, which will involve changing
the formats of messages sent between networks (this is, in itself, a significant
change).
2. As noted in Section 8.2.3 above, there are two possible ways in which the SQN
might be generated and managed. It could be generated and verified using the
same mechanism as employed for the AKA protocol, or a separate sequence num-
ber scheme could be involved. Unfortunately, there are major implementation
difficulties with both options.
(a) Using the same SQN values as are used in the AKA protocol is problematic.
The SN does not have a means of finding out these values, as they are
not included in the authentication vectors sent to the SN. Even if the
current SQN value was sent as part of the authentication vector (which
would affect the inter-network signalling infrastructure), two major problems
remain. Firstly, if the SN is permitted to generate new SQN values and have
them accepted by the USIM, then this means that the SN is able to modify
the SQN value stored by the USIM. This could have the effect of invalidating
any unused authentication vectors that the SN retains for the UE. Secondly,
giving the SN the power to change the SQN value held by the USIM is a
major change in the current trust model, and would give the SN the power
to, deliberately or accidentally, completely block the operation of the USIM
by sending it a very large SQN value.
(b) Using a different SQN value also raises major issues, as there is no obvi-
ous mechanism to keep multiple networks aware of the current value of the
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SQN for a particular UE. This would require the HN to maintain the cur-
rent value, and for serving networks to exchange messages with the HN to
maintain synchronisation between the value held by the USIM and the HN.
3. The ‘encryption’ of the paging message appears to be intended to provide two
distinct security services:
(a) guarantees to the recipient regarding the origin and integrity of the message,
and
(b) confidentiality of the contents so that passive interceptors cannot observe
the link between an IMSI and a TMSI.
It is well known that simple encryption cannot guarantee property (a), especially
if that means use of a stream cipher (see, for example, Section 9.6.5 of Menezes,
van Oorschot and Vanstone [124]). However, stream cipher encryption is the only
encryption primitive available in the current 3G security architecture. Clearly
what is really required is the application of an authenticated encryption technique
[104], which would provide the necessary security guarantees. However, this is
never made explicit by Arapinis et al. [48]. Their success in proving the security
of the modification using ProVerif suggests that their input to ProVerif implicitly
assumed the provision of properties (a) and (b), whereas their description of the
necessary modifications to the system did not make these requirements explicit.
This shows the danger of not carefully considering and making explicit all the
properties of the cryptographic primitives being employed.
Of course, the SN and UE share a pair of keys (CK and IK ) designed explicitly
for confidentiality and integrity protection of data and signalling messages. A
much simpler solution, which achieves precisely the same objectives, would be to
first encrypt the paging message using CK and then generate an accompanying
MAC using IK . This would both achieve the security objectives and avoid the
need to introduce an additional key type.
4. Finally, we note that, even if it could somehow be repaired, the fix imposes very
significant burdens on the system. As stated by the authors (final sentence of
5.2 of [48]) the overheads of the proposed modification are non-trivial. This is
because every UE that receives a paging message is required to decrypt it and
somehow verify whether or not it is intended for them.
In conclusion, the number and seriousness of the issues identified with the fix,
especially relating to the use of the sequence number SQN, suggest that it cannot work
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in practice. Moreover, finding an alternative fix without completely redesigning the 3G
system appears highly problematic. As a result it would appear that accepting that
user identity confidentiality is imperfect seems inevitable, a point we return to below.
8.4 User Linkability and Identity Catching Re-Examined
In evaluating the fix proposed to address the user linkability attack, we start by con-
sidering the practicality of introducing a brand new PKI. Whilst the required PKI is
relatively small scale, involving only the network operators, introducing such a PKI
would nevertheless involve significant changes to the operation of the system. In par-
ticular, over and above requiring changes to all phones, all USIMs and all networks,
every USIM would need to be equipped with a public key, every network would need to
exchange public keys and certificates with every other network, certificates (potentially
quite large) would need to be routinely sent across the air interface, and the USIM
would need to routinely transfer a public key to its host phone (across a smart card
interface with a very limited data transfer capability). That is, whilst the PKI itself
might be relatively small-scale, the changes to the air interface protocol to allow its
use would require fundamental changes to the system infrastructure. It is not even
clear how a phased deployment could be undertaken, and changing the entire system
(including all mobile phones) at a single point in time is clearly infeasible.
It is interesting to note that the difficulty of providing robust identity privacy
without asymmetric cryptography has long been known — see, for example, Mitchell
([130], Section 4.1). Indeed, this point is also made by Arapinis et al. ([48], Section 5.5)
who make similar remarks. This suggests that modifications analogous to the proposed
fix have been considered in the past, and rejected for reasons of complexity and low
pay off (a point previously discussed in Section 7.4.1).
Moreover, deploying the required PKI requires all networks to possess two key pairs,
one for encryption/decryption and one for signature generation and verification. This
is because, in general, the widely accepted principle of key separation (see, for example,
13.5.1 of Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [124]) requires that different keys are
used for different purposes. However, if sufficient care is taken, sometimes the same
key pair can be securely used for both encryption and signature, although this is not
without risks (see, for example, Degabriele et al. [74]).
We further note that if the private decryption key of any network is ever com-
promised, then security is compromised. The usual solution in a PKI is to deploy a
revocation system, e.g. in the form of certificate revocation lists (CRLs). However, de-
ploying CRLs on the scale necessary would appear to be very challenging in a 3G mobile
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system. Indeed, the difficulties of deploying CRLs across networks are well-established,
[112, 131].
One alternative to the proposed solution would simply be to remove the error code
from the error message, or, to minimise protocol modifications, to program mobile
phones to always return the same error message regardless of how AKA actually fails.
This is, in any case, clearly best practice for any security protocol, i.e. if an authen-
tication procedure fails then the only information that should be provided is that the
process has failed, and not how.
Finally we note that implementing the proposed fix to mitigate IMSI catching is
problematic. Requiring a UE to encrypt the IMSI it sends to the network requires the
phone to have a reliable copy of the network’s public key. This will, in turn, require
the network to send the UE a certificate — but which one? The UE will only be able
to verify a certificate signed by the USIM’s HN, but the SN will not know what this is
until it has seen the IMSI. That is, the UE will not be able to encrypt the IMSI for
transmission to the network until the network knows the IMSI, and hence we have a
classic ‘chicken and egg’ problem.
8.5 Summary and Conclusions
It would appear that the modifications proposed to address the identified privacy
threats either do not work or impose a very major overhead on the network, over and
above the huge cost in modifying all the network infrastructure. Very interestingly, the
failures in the fixes arise despite a detailed analysis using formal techniques.
Of course, as discussed in the previous chapter, making significant changes to a
protocol as widely deployed as the 3G air interface protocol is unlikely to be feasible,
so the discussion here is perhaps rather moot. However, even where the fixes appear to
work, in two cases significantly simpler approaches appear to have been ignored. That
is, removing the error messages would mitigate the user linkability attack (and would
also conform to good practice), and it would appear that the introduction of a new key
UK is unnecessary. If changes are to be made, then it is vital to try to minimise their
impact on the operations of the system.
Most significantly in any discussion of whether it might be worth trying to im-
plement ‘fixed up’ versions of the proposed modifications, there exist ‘passive’ attacks
on user identity confidentiality other than those discussed thus far. For example, a
malicious party wishing to discover whether or not a particular phone is present in a
cell could simply inaugurate a call to the phone or send it an SMS, simultaneously
monitoring messages sent across the network (an example of a semi-passive attacker,
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as introduced in Section 4.3). If such a procedure is repeated a few times, then it
seems likely to be sufficient to reveal with high probability whether a particular phone
is present, especially if the network is relatively ‘quiet’. Such an attack only requires
passive observation of the network, and hence would be simpler to launch than attacks
requiring a false base station (which is the case for all the attacks we have discussed
previously). Moreover, addressing such an attack would be almost impossible.
We can thus conclude that not only are the proposed fixes highly problematic,
but providing a robust form of user identity confidentiality is essentially impossible in
practice. That is, if highly robust identity confidentiality is not achievable, then it is
unlikely to be worth the huge cost of making changes of the type proposed. The ‘pay
off’ in mitigating some threats but not others is small relative to the overall cost of
implementing them. Nevertheless, it may still be worth mitigating the most serious
security and privacy threats to currently deployed mobile systems if it can be done in a
cost-effective way, an observation that motivates the work described in the remainder
of this thesis.
Finally, the practical and security issues encountered in considering the detailed
implementation of the proposed modifications suggests that the use of formal tools to
try to guarantee security and privacy properties should be performed with great care.
In particular, any such analysis should always be accompanied by an analysis of the
practical working environment for the security protocol.
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Trashing IMSI Catchers
9.1 Introduction
Although a number of possible modifications to 3G and 4G protocols to enhance user
privacy have been proposed, as described in Section 7.4, unfortunately, they all require
significant alterations to the existing deployed infrastructures, something that is almost
certainly impractical to achieve in practice. In this chapter we describe novel authenti-
cation schemes for 3G and 4G systems designed to defeat IMSI catchers in a way that
does not impose major infrastructure changes. Our first scheme makes use of multiple
IMSIs for an individual USIM to offer a degree of pseudonymity for a user. The second
scheme prevents disclosure of the subscriber’s IMSI by using a dynamic pseudo-IMSI
that is only identifiable by the subscriber’s home network. A major challenge in using
pseudonymous IMSIs is possible loss of identity synchronisation between a USIM and
its home network, an issue that has not been adequately addressed in earlier work.
We present an approach for identity recovery to be used in the event of pseudo-IMSI
desynchronisation.
Both schemes require changes to the home network and the USIM, both owned by
a single entity in the mobile systems, but not to the serving network, mobile phone
or other internal network protocols, enabling simple, transparent and evolutionary
migration. We provide analyses of the schemes, and verify their correctness and security
properties using ProVerif. The first scheme described in this chapter was presented at
SSR 2015, and has been published in the proceedings [110]. It was also presented at an
internal conference of the Fraud and security group (FASG)1 of the GSM association
(GSMA).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The threat model for the
1http://www.gsma.com/aboutus/leadership/committees-and-groups/working-groups/
fraud-security-group
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schemes is described in Section 9.2. Sections 9.3 and 9.4 provide descriptions of two
approaches to the use and management of multiple IMSIs in a USIM. This is followed
in Section 9.5 by an analysis of the second approach, namely the modifiable multiple
IMSIs scheme. In Section 9.6, a version of the pseudonymous IMSI scheme robust
against loss of identity synchronisation is described. An analysis of the robust pseudo-
IMSIs scheme is provided in Section 9.7. In Section 9.8, we present a ProVerif-based
formal verification of the proposed schemes with the goal of verifying the claimed
security and privacy properties. The relationship of the proposed schemes to the prior
art is discussed in Section 9.9. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary in
Section 9.10.
9.2 Threat Model
The threat model underlying the schemes proposed in this chapter is similar to the
threat model described in Section 6.2; that is, we address the threat of disclosure of
the IMSI on the air interface. We follow the same approach to mitigating this threat,
that is, to reduce the impact of IMSI disclosure, thereby enhancing user privacy. In
doing so we make use of pseudonymous IMSIs.
In designing the schemes we make the underlying assumption that the 3G and 4G
AKA protocols are sound, and provide mutually authenticated key establishment. We
also implicitly assume that the USIM, the ME, and the network (both the SN and
HN) have not been compromised by other means. Of course, if these assumptions
are false, then very serious threats exist to both user privacy and security. The main
risk introduced by use of the pseudonymous IMSIs is the possibility of loss of IMSI
synchronisation between UE and HN, and this issue is addressed in Sections 9.5.3 and
9.7.3.
The schemes rely on using RAND hijacking, as described in Section 5.3. From
our assumption regarding the security of AKA, we can assume that RAND hijacking
provides an authenticated channel with replay detection. This is fundamental to the
schemes presented in this chapter.
The schemes are designed to combat active adversaries, as described in the adver-
sary model of Section 4.3. For the schemes described in Sections 9.3 and 9.4, we assume
that an adversary has no control over the core network entities involved in communica-
tions, and communications across the core network are secured. However, in the robust
pseudo-IMSIs scheme described in Section 9.6, we assume that the adversary may have
access to selective core network functionalities (see Section 9.5.7).
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9.3 Predefined Multiple IMSIs
We introduced this scheme in the context of GSM in Section 6.5, where we described
how a fixed set of IMSIs for a user can be used to increase pseudonymity across the
air interface. We introduced two approaches to triggering IMSI changes, namely SIM-
initiated and network-initiated. The SIM-initiated approach can be used in 3G and
4G in the same way as described in Section 6.5.1. In this section we describe how the
network-initiated approach can be used in 3G and 4G.
9.3.1 Protocol Operation
As discussed in Section 6.3, when the HN decides to trigger an IMSI change, it must,
by some means, send an instruction to the USIM. We propose to use the AKA protocol
as the communications channel for this instruction. More specifically, we propose using
the value RAND of AKA to carry the signal; that is, we propose to make use of RAND
hijacking, as described in Section 5.3. The IMSI change procedure operates as follows
(see also Figure 9.1).
1. When the logic in the HN decides that an IMSI change is necessary, a flag is set
for the appropriate user account in the AuC database of the HN.
2. Whenever the AuC generates authentication vectors for use in AKA, it checks
this flag to see if an IMSI change signal is to be embedded in the RAND value.
If so, it resets the flag and executes the following steps (as in Figure 9.1(a)).
(a) The AuC uses the MAC function f12 to generate a 64-bit MAC on the
subscriber’s current sequence number SQN using the subscriber’s long term
key K. We refer to this as the sequence-MAC or SMAC . The SMAC is
used to instruct the USIM to change its IMSI, i.e. it functions as an IMSI
change signal. The reason the SMAC is 64-bits long is because we propose
to compute it using an existing function; however, a value of a different
length could be used, as long as it fits within the 128-bit RAND .
(b) The AuC generates a 64-bit random number R using the same process as
normally used to generate 128-bit RAND values.
(c) The AuC sets RAND to be the concatenation of the R and SMAC.
2For cryptographic cleanliness it should be ensured that the data string input for this additional
use of f1 can never be the same as the data string input to f1 for its other uses; alternatively, a slight
variant of f1 could be employed here.
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Figure 9.1: Additional computations for predefined multiple IMSIs
If an IMSI change signal is not required, the AuC generates RAND in the normal
way.
3. The AuC follows the standard steps to generate the authentication vector from
RAND, and sends the vector (including RAND) to the SN.
Whenever the USIM receives an authentication request, it follows the usual AKA
steps. If the AKA procedure completes successfully, the USIM checks the RAND in
the following way (as shown in Figure 9.1(b)).
1. The USIM uses the received SQN and its stored key K to regenerate SMAC .
2. It compares the computed SMAC with the appropriate part of RAND .
3. If they do not agree then the USIM terminates the checking process. However, if
they agree then the USIM performs the next step.
4. The USIM selects a ‘new’ IMSI value from the stored list in the same way as de-
scribed in Section 6.5.1, and later changes the IMSI using the procedure described
in Section 6.4.
9.3.2 Discussion
We now consider how IMSI changes will work in practice. There are two cases to
consider. If the HN is also the SN then it could potentially force an instance of AKA
to occur at will, i.e. making the IMSI change happen almost immediately. However, if
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the SN is distinct from the HN, then the HN can only send new AVs when requested
by the SN. Moreover, the SN may delay before using the supplied AV in AKA. That
is, there may be a significant delay between the decision being made to change an IMSI
and the signal being sent to the USIM. In either case the phone may be switched
off or temporarily out of range of a base station, in which case there will inevitably
be some delay. However, regardless of the length of the delay in the signal reaching
the USIM (or even if it never reaches the USIM) there is no danger of loss of IMSI
synchronisation between the USIM and the HN, since the HN will always keep the
complete list of IMSIs allocated to the USIM.
We observe that there is always the chance that a randomly chosen RAND will
contain the ‘correct’ SMAC, leading to an unscheduled IMSI change by the USIM.
However, the probability of this occurring is 2−64, which is vanishingly small. In any
case, the occurrence of such an event would not have an adverse impact, since the HN
would always be aware of the link between the new IMSI and the particular USIM.
An active interceptor could introduce its own RAND into the channel to try to
force an IMSI change. However, given that K is not compromised and f1 has the
properties required of a good MAC function, then no strategy better than generating
a random RAND will be available. Replays of old RAND values will be detected and
rejected as a normal part of AKA, which enable the USIM to check the freshness of
an authentication request. Also, assuming the SMAC value is indistinguishable from
a random value, a standard assumption for MAC functions, then an eavesdropper will
be unable to determine when an IMSI change is being requested.
Finally, we briefly observe how this scheme could be combined with the GSM RAND
hijacking approach described in Chapter 5. In the Chapter 5 scheme, the RAND value
in an AV contains a 16-bit field, known as the AMF . This AMF value could be used to
transfer the IMSI change instruction, analogously to the scheme described above. Since
the AMF value in the modified GSM scheme is confidentiality and integrity protected
(see Section 5.8.3), such steps will ensure that the security and privacy properties are
maintained.
9.4 Modifiable Multiple IMSIs
As described in Section 6.6, this scheme involves distributing new IMSI values from
the HN to the USIM after its deployment, where the HN will choose each new IMSI
from its pool of unused values. Such an approach clearly requires a means of commu-
nicating from the HN directly to the USIM. Analogously to the scheme proposed in
Section 9.3.1, we describe how RAND hijacking can be used for this purpose.
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9.4.1 Prerequisites
Before describing the details of the IMSI transfer procedure, we describe below some
relatively minor changes which are required to the operation of the HN in order to
support the scheme.
• The HN must maintain a pool of unused IMSIs, enabling the AuC to dynamically
assign a new IMSI to an existing subscriber.
• For each subscriber account in its database, the HN must maintain an IMSI-
change flag indicating whether an IMSI change is under way. The database must
also hold up to two IMSIs for each subscriber; it will always hold the current
IMSI (with status allocated) and, if the IMSI-change flag is set, it will also hold
the new IMSI (with status in transit), where the possible status values for an
IMSI are discussed below. If use of the new IMSI is observed then IMSI status
changes are triggered (see below).
• The HN must manage the use of IMSIs so that no IMSI is assigned to more than
one subscriber at any one time. This can be achieved by maintaining the status
of each IMSI as one of allocated, free, or in transit. The set of IMSIs with status
free corresponds to the pool of available IMSIs, as above. The status of an IMSI
can be updated in the following ways.
– When the HN selects an available IMSI from the pool to allocate to a USIM,
the status is changed from free to in transit.
– When the HN receives implicit acknowledgement (in the form of a request
for AVS for that IMSI from a network) of a successful IMSI change, the
HN changes the status of the IMSI from in transit to allocated. The HN
also changes the status of the previously used IMSI for that subscriber from
allocated to free after a delay (to avoid potential collisions in network use).
In addition, the current IMSI for the subscriber will be set equal to the new
IMSI, the new IMSI will be set to null, and the IMSI-change flag will be
reset. This will happen when the IMSI in the request message for AVs agrees
with an IMSI with status in transit in the subscriber database. Otherwise
(i.e. when the IMSI in the request message for AVs agrees with an IMSI
with status allocated), the HN computes the AVs according to the procedure
described in Section 9.4.2 below.
– A third case also needs to be considered, that is when an IMSI change
instruction never reaches the USIM. If this case is not addressed then future
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IMSI changes for that USIM will be blocked. On the other hand, making a
decision to abandon an IMSI change could be disastrous, i.e. if a USIM makes
an IMSI change after the HN has terminated this change (and changed the
status of the ‘new’ IMSI back to free), then the USIM could be rendered
unusable. As a result we propose never to abandon an IMSI change, and
instead to resend the new IMSI as many times as necessary until the change
is accepted by the USIM. How this works should be clear from the protocol
operation described in Section 9.4.2 below.
• If the HN is required to do so by its regulatory environment, e.g. to support
lawful interception, it can maintain a log of all the IMSIs assigned to a particular
subscriber for however long is required. It is in any case likely to be necessary to
retain this information for a period to enable processing of billing records received
from visited networks.
9.4.2 Protocol Operation
The scheme introduces changing IMSIs. The new IMSI is used in exactly the same way
as a regular IMSI, i.e. when polled for its IMSI the phone will respond with its new
IMSI. The operation of AKA (see Figure 9.2) is also unchanged; the only difference is
in the composition of RAND, as discussed below, and this difference is transparent to
the SN.
The IMSI transfer procedure requires changes in the HN and the USIM. We now
describe the necessary changes to the operation of an HN in computing the AV.
1. When the logic in the HN decides that an IMSI transfer is necessary for a par-
ticular subscriber, it must set the IMSI-change flag for that subscriber. Observe
that if an IMSI change is already under way then the flag will already be set; in
this case the flag is left as it is.
2. Whenever the AuC needs to generate AVs for use in AKA, it checks this flag to
see whether an IMSI transfer signal and a new IMSI are to be embedded in the
RAND value. If so, it performs the following steps (as shown in Figure 9.3). Note
that this means that, once an IMSI change has been initiated, the new IMSI will
be embedded in all RAND values until evidence of the successful changeover by
the USIM has been observed.
(a) The AuC uses the MAC function f1 to generate a 64-bit MAC on the
subscriber’s current sequence number SQN using the subscriber’s long term
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Figure 9.2: Authentication message flow for modifiable multiple IMSIs
Figure 9.3: Computations in AuC for modifiable multiple IMSIs
cryptographic key K. As in the predefined multiple IMSIs scheme described
in Section 9.3.1, the generated MAC is referred to as the SMAC .
(b) The AuC generates a 48-bit encryption key EK using the key generation
function f5. The function takes SQN as the data input and K as the key
input. Note that observations regarding cryptographic cleanliness and the
use here of functions f1 and f5, analogous to those given in Section 9.3.1
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step 2a, apply here.
(c) If the new IMSI field in the HN database entry for this subscriber is non-
null then a new IMSI has already been assigned, and it is not necessary
to choose another new value. Otherwise a new IMSI is selected from the
pool of unused IMSIs; the status of this IMSI is changed from free to in
transit and the new IMSI field in the database is given the chosen value. We
assume that the MCC and MNC of the IMSI are known to the USIM (since
they are fixed for this network operator) and hence only the 9- or 10-digit
MSIN needs to be sent embedded in RAND . The MSIN is encoded as a 36-
or 40-bit value using binary coded decimal, the ‘standard’ way of encoding
IMSIs, and the result is padded to 48 bits by an agreed padding scheme.
(d) The 48-bit MSIN block is XORed with the encryption key EK, and we refer
to the result as the concealed MSIN.
(e) The AuC generates a 16-bit random number R using the same process as
normally used to generate 128-bit RAND values.
(f) The AuC sets RAND to be the concatenation of the concealed MSIN, R and
SMAC .
If an IMSI transfer is not required, the AuC generates RAND in the normal way.
3. The AuC follows the standard steps to generate the AV from the RAND value,
and sends it (including RAND) to the SN.
We now describe in detail the necessary changes to a USIM to retrieve the new
IMSI and to transfer the IMSI to an ME. On receipt of an authentication request, the
USIM proceeds using the standard AKA procedure. After successful completion of the
AKA protocol, the USIM checks whether the challenge value contains an embedded
IMSI in the following way (as shown in Figure 9.4).
1. The USIM uses the received SQN and its stored long term key K to regenerate
SMAC .
2. It compares the computed SMAC with the appropriate part of RAND .
3. If they do not agree then the USIM terminates the checking process. However, if
they agree then the USIM performs the following steps.
(a) The USIM retrieves the concealed MSIN from RAND .
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Figure 9.4: Computations in USIM for modifiable multiple IMSIs
(b) The USIM regenerates the encryption key EK using f5 with the value of
SQN retrieved during the AKA processing and its long-term stored key K
as inputs.
(c) The EK is XORed with the concealed MSIN to recover the cleartext BCD-
encoded MSIN.
(d) The USIM generates the new IMSI by prefixing the decoded MSIN with the
MCC and MNC.
(e) The USIM checks whether the new IMSI is the same as the value it is using
already; this is essential since it may receive the change instruction more
than once. If they are the same it takes no further action. If they are
different it keeps a record of the new IMSI and later updates its IMSI using
the procedure described in Section 6.4.
To reduce signalling costs, it appears to be standard practice for the AuC to generate
a small set of AVs for provision to an SN. If the procedure specified above is followed
to generate this set of vectors, and an IMSI change is scheduled for the subscriber, then
all the RAND values in the set will contain an embedded concealed MSIN. Whilst this
will cause minimal additional overhead for the USIM, since RAND values are always
checked for an embedded SMAC value, it will have the benefit of maximising the chance
that the IMSI change will be performed by the USIM.
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9.5 Analysis of Modifiable Multiple IMSIs
9.5.1 Correctness of the Scheme
The scheme inherits its security strength from the AKA protocol as it does not modify
the existing AKA except for the method used to generate RAND . The modified AKA
protocol is thus as secure as the existing AKA. The security properties of AKA have
been widely analysed, [1, 120, 155]. We formally verified this claim using ProVerif (see
Section 9.8.1).
The computed RAND is constructed so that it is indistinguishable from a random
value; this claim is based on the assumption that the output of the f1 variant function
and a data string masked using the output of the f5 variant function are indistinguish-
able from random data, cf. [18, 19]. Use of the varying SQN in the scheme randomises
the MSIN-carrying RAND when the same pseudonym is sent in multiple challenges.
The scheme does not change the way the data confidentiality and integrity key are
generated, and so the strength of cryptographic key generation is not affected.
The scheme achieves the following two security goals:
1. the subsequent IMSIs are unlinkable by the air interface adversary; and
2. an IMSI used by a USIM is always the one that was previously communicated by
the HN, i.e. the HN expects every sent pseudonymous IMSI to be used.
We next give more detailed arguments supporting these two claims.
9.5.1.1 Goal 1: IMSI Unlinkability
IMSI unlinkability depends on the following two assumptions.
1. pseudonymous IMSIs are randomly picked from an extensive list; and
2. a pseudonymous IMSI (actually the MSIN part of an IMSI) is confidentially
communicated from the HN to the USIM.
Of these, assumption 1 is an implementation issue, whereas assumption 2 is depen-
dent on the confidentiality method in use. Section 9.4.2 describes how a newly selected
pseudonym, i.e. the MSIN part of a successor IMSI, is sent to a USIM. The confiden-
tiality mechanism involves masking the pseudonym by XORing it with a pseudorandom
sequence output by f5. That is, MSIN confidentiality relies on the effectiveness of a
function already present in a standard USIM. An active or passive adversary without
access to the shared secret key K is therefore unable to learn the new IMSI before it
is used, ensuring unlinkability between consecutive IMSIs. We formally verified the
confidentiality property of the transferred MSIN, using ProVerif (see Section 9.8.1).
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9.5.1.2 Goal 2: IMSI Correctness
Achieving IMSI correctness follows from the security properties of AKA. As the new
pseudonym for a USIM is communicated through the use of AKA, the USIM will
only switch to a new pseudonym if it was communicated inside an authentic and fresh
‘authentication request’ message. That is, as a by-product of network authentication,
AKA guarantees the origin, integrity and the timeliness of the RAND value containing
the new pseudonym. Hence, an active adversary cannot force the USIM to change its
IMSI to something other than a value selected by the HN.
If the ‘authentication request’ message contains an ‘old’ SQN value, then the in-
cluded pseudonym will be ignored by the USIM, which means it will not update its
stored current IMSI. The scheme thus protects against attempts to force the USIM to
switch to an ‘old’ pseudonymous IMSI.
The HN will only accept a switch to a successor pseudonym after receiving a request
for authentication vectors containing the successor pseudonym, which should always
be sent when a new IMSI attaches. Thus even an active attacker cannot force a USIM
to accept a pseudonymous MSIN other then the one expected by the HN.
9.5.2 User Privacy
As discussed in Section 6.8, the scheme does not provide a complete solution to user
identity confidentiality. However, it diminishes the impact of IMSI catchers and im-
proves user identity confidentiality by reducing the effect of IMSI disclosure across the
air interface. Since the IMSI functions as a pseudonym, air interface interactions are
not completely anonymous, potentially enabling the interactions of a single subscriber
to be tracked for a period. However, frequent IMSI changes could lessen the impact of
such tracking.
As discussed in Section 9.5.1.1, the design of the scheme ensures an eavesdropper
is unable to infer any confidential information from the value of RAND . We formally
verified the confidentiality property of the private data embedded in RAND using
ProVerif (see Section 9.8.1).
As discussed in Section 9.5.1, the RAND is constructed so that it is indistinguishable
from a random value. Thus an eavesdropper cannot differentiate between an IMSI-
changing AKA execution from a standard AKA interaction.
9.5.3 IMSI Synchronisation
As discussed in Section 6.8, loss of IMSI synchronisation appears to be a significant
threat; therefore, robust means are necessary to guarantee the correctness and timeli-
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ness of the IMSI held by a USIM.
As discussed in Section 9.3.2, there may be a significant delay in the IMSI change
signal reaching the USIM; however, this will not affect IMSI synchronisation between
the HN and the USIM since the HN will not update the current IMSI entry in the
subscriber database until it receives a request for authentication vectors from an SN
using this new IMSI.
As discussed in Section 9.4.2, once a new IMSI has been assigned to a subscriber
(with the in transit status), every RAND generated for that USIM will contain the
embedded IMSI value until success of the change has been observed; that is, the loss
of authentication data containing an IMSI-embedded RAND will not affect IMSI syn-
chronisation between the HN and the USIM.
As discussed in Section 9.5.1.2, a USIM accepts a new IMSI sent embedded in a
RAND only after AKA has completed successfully, i.e. after the network has been
authenticated. Hence, an active adversary cannot force the USIM to change its IMSI
to a value chosen by the adversary. Further, because SQN is checked by the USIM
during AKA, an active adversary cannot force a USIM to accept an ‘old’ IMSI, since
this checking forces AVs to be used in strict order of generation. Moreover, malicious
changes to a valid RAND, e.g. involving changing the encrypted MSIN whilst leaving
the SMAC unchanged, will be detected by the AKA network authentication process.
These security features combine to help ensure that IMSI synchronisation is preserved.
In the above discussion we assume that SNs always behave honestly and that com-
munications between networks is secure; therefore, IMSI synchronisation is maintained
as long as the assumptions hold. However, if the assumptions do not hold, IMSI desyn-
chronisation could arise in a variety of ways.
One possible scenario involves a compromised SN sending randomly chosen IMSIs
to an HN, e.g. embedded in an AV request. If the received IMSI is equal to a currently
free IMSI, the HN will respond with an error in the standard way. If the IMSI is equal to
a stored current IMSI (an IMSIallocated ), the HN will provide an AV. Finally, and most
importantly here, if the IMSI is equal to a stored future IMSI (an IMSIintransit), then
there will be a loss of IMSI synchronisation if the mobile to which the stored future
IMSI belongs has not received it. This could cause a permanent denial of service,
since there will be no way for synchronisation to be regained. In Section 9.6 below, we
describe an enhanced version of the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme that incorporates
an identity synchronisation recovery process, designed to address this threat.
A related but distinct scenario involves a malicious or malfunctioning ME submit-
ting random IMSIs to an SN. The SN will use a received IMSI to request an AV from
the HN indicated by the PLMN-ID part of the IMSI. The remainder of the attack
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will work exactly as in the scenario described in the previous paragraph; that is, if
the random IMSI happens to equal an IMSIintransit for a USIM which has not yet re-
ceived this IMSI, then the corresponding USIM will suffer from a catastrophic identity
desynchronisation.
The IMSI change instruction in this scheme has similarities to that of the predefined
multiple IMSIs scheme described in Section 9.3. As in Section 9.3.2, there is the chance
that a randomly chosen RAND could contain a ‘correct’ SMAC, triggering an unau-
thorised IMSI change. However, for similar arguments to those given in Section 9.3.2,
the probability of such an event is vanishingly small, and certainly orders of magnitude
smaller than the probability of a USIM failure.
9.5.4 Performance and Overhead
The scheme introduces minimum overhead for a USIM. We add one MAC function
(to decode the IMSI change instruction) and one key generating function (to retrieve
a new IMSI), both of which are similar to the existing USIM functions. Transferring
a new IMSI to the ME is a new task for a USIM, which could be performed when the
ME is in idle state. We believe that this overhead should be manageable, even for a
USIM with limited computational power.
The scheme adds overhead to the HN for managing multiple IMSIs for a subscriber.
It adds new database transactions, e.g. to update an IMSI. It adds two cryptographic
functions for computing an AV, and introduces a new function to refresh an IMSI.
Since none of these are particularly complex, it seems likely that this could be achieved
with some combination of allocating more resources, clustering subscribers in multiple
HLRs/HSSs, and efficient database design.
The scheme does not affect any operations in the SN or introduce any additional
communications. The only impact is an increase in the apparent number of subscribers
at the SN, since subscribers switching to a new IMSI appear like new subscribers.
Since multiple IMSIs are allocated for each subscriber, pressure could be created
on the number of IMSIs available to an operator. To address this issue, multiple MNC
codes could be allocated to an operator, and three-digit MNCs could be used to avoid
wastage of IMSIs allocated to small operators.
9.5.5 Deployment and Interoperability
The scheme modifies only the USIM and the HN, which are owned by a single entity,
and is transparent to the intermediate SN and mobile phone. This allows phased
deployment, e.g. by including the additional functionality in newly issued USIMs while
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existing USIMs continue to function as at present.
There are certain practical issues to be considered. For example, the set of ‘normal’
IMSIs used by existing USIMs needs to be kept distinct from the range of changing
IMSIs used by the new USIMs; however, choosing them from completely distinct ranges
would not be desirable since it would enable them to be distinguished.
The scheme will not work for GSM, as it depends on the mutual authentication
feature of 3G and 4G AKA. If a UE using a new-style USIM needs to connect to a
GSM network, it should continue to use the current IMSI as long as it is connected
to that network. The IMSI can be updated when the UE next roams to a 3G or 4G
network.
9.5.6 A Related Scheme
As mentioned in Section 6.6, a related scheme, developed in parallel by van den Broek,
Verdult and de Ruiter [163], proposes an approach similar to the modifiable multiple
IMSIs scheme described in Section 9.4. We next describe this scheme.
The subscriber’s IMSI is replaced with a changing pseudonym, the PMSI, which is
only resolvable by the USIM’s HN. The structure of a PMSI is the same as that of an
IMSI, and it is treated like an IMSI by the SN which is unaware of the fact it is not an
IMSI. The scheme requires the AuC to store three additional values for each USIM:
a new shared secret key Ke, the current PMSI in use by the subscriber, and a future
PMSI. When requested by an SN for an AV for a particular PMSI, the AuC executes
the following steps (see Figure 9.5(a)).
Figure 9.5: Additional computations for the van den Broek et al. scheme [163]
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1. It compares the PMSI with all current and future PMSIs, and continues if it finds
a match.
2. If the match is with a future PMSI, the AuC updates the subscriber’s current
PMSI to equal the received PMSI, and assigns a randomly chosen PMSI from
the pool of free PMSIs to be the subscriber’s future PMSI. If the match is
with a current PMSI then the AuC database is unchanged. Note that only the
MSIN part of the PMSI is actually sent, encoded as a 34-bit string by taking the
(at most) 10 decimal-digit MSIN, treating it as a number, and using its binary
representation.
3. The AuC computes the RAND by AES-encrypting the concatenation of the 34-bit
binary-coded MSIN part of the future PMSI and the subscriber’s current SQN,
using the key Ke.
4. The AuC computes the other authentication parameters in the AV as a function
of the computed RAND (in the standard way), and transmits the AV to the SN.
The USIM must possess Ke, along with the current and future PMSIs. On receiving
an authentication challenge (RAND and AUTN ), the USIM executes the usual AKA
steps; if AKA is successful, the USIM decrypts the received RAND and compares the
recovered SQN value with the received SQN . If they agree, the USIM extracts the
binary-encoded MSIN, converts it to binary coded decimal, and uses it to create the
new stored future PMSI. The process is illustrated in Figure 9.5(b).
The USIM continues for the moment to use its current PMSI. When the USIM
next receives an identity request, it sets its stored current PMSI to the stored future
PMSI, and responds with this new value. That is, an updated PMSI is only used on
the next occasion that the USIM receives an identity request, preventing linking of new
and old PMSI values by observers. However, how the ME will be made aware of the
new PMSI is not discussed.
9.5.7 Practical Issues
In the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme discussed in Section 9.4.2, network operators
selectively change subscriber IMSIs, embedding a USIM-specific value in RAND to
instruct the USIM to change its IMSI. The van den Broek et al. scheme, described
in Section 9.5.6, uses a similar RAND-embedded value, but changes PMSIs at every
authentication. Both schemes involve updating the IMSI held by the HN as soon as
use of the new IMSI by the mobile is observed.
127
9.6. ROBUST PSEUDO-IMSIS
In both schemes, and as discussed in Section 9.5.3, it is implicitly assumed that SNs
always behave honestly and that communications between networks is secure. However,
security flaws in the core network protocols and their implementation have recently
been widely discussed, [57, 77, 80, 95, 97, 133, 139, 140, 161]. Bilogrevic, Jadliwala and
Hubaux [57] and Golde, Redon and Borgaonkar [97] describe possible vulnerabilities in
the mobile core network in the presence of femtocell, a miniature cellular base station
widely deployed in LTE networks. Rao et al. [139, 140] describe attacks exploiting flaws
in the signalling system 7 (SS7) and diameter protocols, widely used in core network
communications. Nohl [133] and Engel [80] independently demonstrate flaws in the SS7
protocol. This means that the assumptions underlying the modifiable multiple IMSIs
and van den Broek et al. schemes are questionable, meaning that the possibility of loss
of identity synchronisation needs to be addressed.
Also, both the schemes involve changing the IMSI at the HN. This introduces
major management concerns because the IMSI is the only unique identifier in the HN,
and other services, for example the IP multimedia subsystem (IMS), depends on fixed
IMSIs. Thus, a scheme supporting pseudonyms without changing the IMSIs in the HN
would be highly advantageous.
These observations have motivated the development of an enhanced pseudonym-
based scheme that can provide pseudonymity across the air interface, allows recovery
from loss of identity synchronisation, in a way that minimises changes to the deployed
network infrastructure. We describe such a scheme in the next section.
9.6 Robust Pseudo-IMSIs
We now describe a new set of modifications to the operation of 3G and 4G systems
designed to address the same privacy concerns as the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme,
and using very similar ideas. However, it incorporates significant additional features
that protect against permanent loss of identity synchronisation between a USIM and
its HN. The scheme also avoids changing the IMSI in the HN, i.e. it addresses both
the major concerns raised in Section 9.5.7.
9.6.1 Overview
Just like modifiable multiple IMSIs, the scheme uses changing pseudonyms. The scheme
avoids sending the subscriber IMSI across any communication channels, including the
radio path and the core network, and instead uses a transient identity (TID), i.e. a
temporary identity managed by the HN with the same length as an MSIN. The TID
works rather like the TMSI except that TIDs are managed by the HN instead of the
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SN. The TID provides subscriber pseudonymity on the air interface, avoiding the need
for cleartext transmission of the IMSI. TIDs are mapped to fixed IMSIs in the HN
database, and the IMSI is only accessible by the HN.
The initial pseudonym (the pseudo-IMSI ), equal to the concatenation of the PLMN-
ID and the initial TID, must be stored in a USIM during personalisation. The pseudo-
IMSI is indistinguishable from an IMSI to any party other than the USIM and HN.
As in modifiable multiple IMSIs, the pseudo-IMSI is treated as an IMSI by the SN,
and is periodically refreshed by the HN. An unauthenticated UE (without a valid
TMSI/GUTI) identifies itself to the SN using the pseudo-IMSI, exactly as an IMSI
is used currently. The SN learns the identity of the HN from the pseudo-IMSI, and
forwards it to the HN as part of an AV request. The HN uses the TID from the pseudo-
IMSI to learn the IMSI. It then chooses a new TID to refresh the pseudo-IMSI, embeds
this new TID into the RAND analogously to modifiable multiple IMSIs, and computes
the AV, which is sent to the SN for use in AKA.
After a successful AKA procedure, the USIM has the new TID, and uses it to
construct the next pseudo-IMSI. At the same time, the SN allocates the UE a local
TMSI or GUTI. As in modifiable multiple IMSIs, the old pseudo-IMSI remains in use
by the current SN, e.g. in mobile terminated services (if required). The new pseudo-
IMSI is used in subsequent AKA executions. We also introduce the notion of a recovery
identity (RID) for each USIM, to enable pseudo-IMSI recovery in a privacy-preserving
way.
9.6.2 Modifications to AKA
The pseudo-IMSI is indistinguishable from an IMSI to the SN, and is used in exactly
the same way, i.e. when polled for its IMSI the phone will respond with its pseudo-IMSI.
The operation of AKA (see Figure 9.6) is also unchanged; the only difference is in the
composition of RAND, as discussed in Sections 9.6.3 and 9.6.4, and this difference is
transparent to the SN.
The only other change of relevance here is in error handling. As described in
Section 3.4.2, if a USIM fails to authenticate a network, it responds with either a
MAC-failure message (sent via the signalling channel), or a sync-failure message (sent
in a failure token that is forwarded by the SN to the HN). As part of the novel scheme
(discussed in greater detail in Section 9.6.4.2) if the authentication fails due to a MAC
mismatch, the USIM incorporates a novel failure type indication in an error token that
is sent to the SN (and hence to the HN) just like a sync-failure error. Since the SN does
not process the error token, the incorporation of a new type of error code is transparent
to it.
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Figure 9.6: Authentication message flow for robust pseudo-IMSIs
That is, the only change from the SN perspective is that it will never see a MAC-
failure message; a malicious third party could use this to distinguish between an IMSI
and a pseudo-IMSI by sending a modified (and hence incorrect) MAC value to a UE
and seeing what error message is returned.
9.6.3 Modifications to Home Network
We now describe in detail the necessary changes to the HN processes.
9.6.3.1 Fundamentals
We first introduce certain data structures which form part of the modified scheme.
• TID : A TID substitutes for the MSIN, and so its maximum length is 40 bits
(i.e. ten binary coded decimal digits). If the HN implementation encodes the
HSS/HLR identity in the MSIN, as is done in some networks, the bit-length of
a TID could equal the number of bits used to uniquely identify a subscriber of
that specific HSS/HLR.
• RID : Like the TID, a RID is a 48-bit USIM identifier, used only in the pseudo-
IMSI recovery procedure described in Section 9.6.5.2.
130
9.6. ROBUST PSEUDO-IMSIS
• Linked TID : This is a specific TID, sent with a RID to a subscriber. This TID
(if not null) is equal to the value of TIDfuture stored by the HN (see below).
• RID Flag : This bit, maintained for every subscriber in the HN database, indicates
whether or not a RID value should be embedded into the next RAND for this
subscriber. Initially the flag is cleared. The use of the flag is similar to that of
the IMSI-change flag in modifiable multiple IMSIs.
• Keystream 1 (EK1 ): Like EK in modifiable multiple IMSIs, the 48-bit EK1 is
derived from subscriber-specific secrets using a key derivation function. It is used
to mask the TID when sent from the HN to a USIM.
• Keystream 2 (EK2 ): This is another 48-bit string generated using a different KDF
from subscriber-specific secrets. It is used to mask the RID when it is transferred
from the HN to a USIM.
• Padding data: Pad1 and Pad2 (each of 80 bits) are used to extend the subscriber’s
SQN value to a 128-bit string, as required for input to the f5 variant functions.
• Instruction byte: This is used to instruct a USIM to perform certain operations.
We use specific values of the byte (INSregular , INSRID and INSreset) to instruct
the USIM to perform certain tasks. All other values are reserved for future use,
e.g. to give the USIM other types of instruction — on receipt of a reserved value
the USIM should not take any action.
For each subscriber account in the database, the HN must maintain a RID flag
indicating whether a RID change is under way. The database must also hold up to
three TIDs (TIDpast , TIDcurrent and TIDfuture), three RIDs (RIDpast , RIDcurrent and
RIDfuture) and a linked TID for each subscriber. It will always hold a TIDcurrent and
a RIDcurrent . When a new TID is transferred to the USIM, the database will hold a
TIDfuture ; after a TID update, described in Section 9.6.3.3, it will hold a TIDpast . If the
RID flag is set, the database will also hold a linked TID and a RIDfuture . Analogously
to the TID, after a RID update, the database will hold a RIDpast . The HN must also
maintain a pool of unused TIDs and RIDs, enabling the AuC to dynamically assign a
new TID or RID to an existing subscriber.
The following functions are used in the scheme described below.
• f5∗∗: This KDF is a variant of the existing f5. It takes as input a 128-bit string
and the shared secret key K, and generates EK1 . The function must be chosen
so that it is computationally infeasible to derive the key K from knowledge of
the string and EK1 , i.e. exactly as is required of f5 as described in Section 3.4.3.
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Figure 9.7: Computations in AuC for robust pseudo-IMSIs
• f5∗∗∗: This function, used to generate EK2 , must have similar properties to f5∗∗,
but for cryptographic cleanliness we use a distinct function.
• Randgen: This function takes as input an integer, and returns a pseudo-random
number of the length specified.
9.6.3.2 AV Generation
On receiving a request for an AV for a pseudo-IMSI, the AuC first retrieves the TID
from the pseudo-IMSI and searches its subscriber database for the corresponding IMSI.
If the IMSI is not found, the AuC generates an arbitrary AV in which all the values
are chosen at random (to initiate pseudo-IMSI recovery by the receiving USIM, as
described in Section 9.6.5.2), and sends it to the SN. Otherwise, the AuC retrieves the
IMSI and proceeds as follows (see Figure 9.7). Algorithm 9.1 provides a pseudocode
description of this process.
1. It retrieves the shared key K, SQN, RID flag, and stored value of TIDfuture for
this IMSI.
2. It sets EK1 to equal f5
∗∗(SQN ‖ Pad1 ,K ).
3. If the value of TIDfuture is null, the AuC sets it to equal a fresh TID selected
from the pool of unused TIDs. The AuC also removes the allocated TID from
the unused TID pool.
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Algorithm 9.1: AV generation in robust pseudo-IMSIs
Data: Pseudo-IMSI
Result: An authentication vector
1 begin
2 RTID ←− TID part of the Pseudo-IMSI ;
3 if (RTID is not in subscriber database) then
4 Generate an arbitrary AV ;
5 return;
6 else
7 Fetch relevant data (assume in Row structure) from subscriber database
associated with RTID;
8 IMSI ←− Row.IMSI; K ←− Row.K ;
9 SQN ←− Subscriber specific SQN ;
10 ESQN1 ←− SQN ‖ Pad1; EK1 ←− f5∗∗(ESQN1,K);
11 NTID ←− Row.TIDfuture;
12 if NTID 6= Ø then TIDfresh ←− NTID;
13 else
14 TIDfresh ←− an unused TID ;
15 Update the value of TIDfuture with TIDfresh;
16 Flag ←− Row.RID-Flag;
17 if Flag = 1 then /* Both TID and RID are embedded into RAND */
18 NRID ←− Row.RIDfuture;
19 if NRID 6= Ø then RIDfresh ←− NRID;
20 else
21 RIDfresh ←− an unused RID ;
22 Update the value of RIDfuture with RIDfresh;
23 Update the value of Linked-TID with TIDfresh;
24 Encoded-TID ←− TIDfresh ‖ INSRID;
25 Masked-TID ←− Encoded-TID ⊕ EK1;
26 ESQN2 ←− SQN ‖ Pad2; EK2 ←− f5∗∗∗(ESQN2,K);
27 Masked-RID ←− RIDfresh ⊕ EK2;
28 RAND ←−Masked-TID ‖Masked-RID ‖ randgen(32);
29 else /* TID is embedded into RAND */
30 Encoded-TID ←− TIDfresh ‖ INSregular;
31 Masked-TID ←− Encoded-TID ⊕ EK1;
32 RAND ←−Masked-TID ‖ randgen(80);
33 Generate AV using the RAND in the standard way ;
4. If the RID flag is not set, the AuC sets masked-TID to (TIDfuture ‖ INSregular )⊕
EK1 , and sets RAND to equal masked-TID‖randgen(80). Otherwise, the AuC
computes RAND as follows.
(a) It sets EK2 to equal f5
∗∗∗(SQN ‖ Pad2 ,K ), and linked-TID to equal TIDfuture .
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(b) If the value of RIDfuture is null, the AuC sets it to equal a fresh RID selected
from the pool of unused RIDs. The AuC also removes the RID from the
pool of unused RIDs.
(c) It sets masked-TID to (TIDfuture ‖ INSRID)⊕EK1 , and the masked-RID to
RIDfuture ⊕ EK2 .
(d) It sets RAND to equal masked-TID‖masked-RID‖randgen(32).
5. The AuC generates the AV using the computed RAND in the standard way.
9.6.3.3 Identity Update
Although an HN keeps the subscriber’s security credentials to itself, it delegates au-
thentication responsibility to an SN by passing it an AV; the HN is therefore not aware
when a specific AV is used in AKA. Thus the HN does not have a direct means of
knowing when a USIM receives a new TID. As discussed in Section 3.6.2, a location
update request from an SN is preceded by a successful AKA; we therefore use the re-
ceipt by an HN of a location update request as implicit indication that a USIM has
received the TID in the provided pseudo-IMSI; we use this to trigger a TID update.
This approach differs from the schemes described in Sections 9.4 and 9.5.6, and, as
we describe in the next paragraph, this change to some extent restricts unauthorised
updates to the HN database.
The schemes described in Sections 9.4 and 9.5.6 both involve the HN updating its
database as soon as evidence is seen of use of a new IMSI, i.e. when there is a request
for an AV for this IMSI. However, in Section 9.5.3 we described a scenario in which
a malicious ME could, by inserting attach requests to a network for randomly chosen
IMSIs, trigger an unauthorised update to the database if one of the random IMSIs
equalled a ‘new IMSI’ which had not yet reached the intended USIM. That is, both
the modifiable multiple IMSIs and van den Broek et al. schemes are vulnerable to such
an attack, which could cause permanent loss of synchronisation between a USIM and
its HN. This attack is prevented if the HN database update is delayed until a location
update request is received for the ‘new IMSI’, since, as described in Section 3.6.2, such a
message is not sent by the SN until the SN has successfully authenticated the MS using
this IMSI. Of course, a variant of the other attack scenario described in Section 9.5.3,
in which a malicious or faulty SN submits location update requests for randomly chosen
IMSIs is not prevented, but this appears less likely than the malicious ME attack.
When an HSS receives a location update request it sends the embedded pseudo-IMSI
to the AuC for a possible identity update. (In 3G, the location update request is sent
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to the HLR and not the AuC although, since they are controlled by the same network,
adding the necessary intercommunication should not be difficult.)
Algorithm 9.2: Identity update in robust pseudo-IMSIs
Data: Pseudo-IMSI
Result: Updated identities in the subscriber database
1 begin
2 RTID ←− TID part of the Pseudo-IMSI ;
3 Fetch relevant data (assume in Row structure) from subscriber database
associated with RTID;
4 NTID ←− Row.TIDfuture;
5 if RTID = NTID then /* Acknowledgement of a sent TID */
6 CTID ←− Row.TIDcurrent;
7 OTID ←− Row.TIDpast;
8 Flag ←− Row.RID-Flag;
9 Update the value of TIDcurrent with NTID;
10 Update the value of TIDpast with CTID;
11 Set TIDfuture = Ø;
12 Add OTID to the unused TID pool ;
13 if Flag = 1 then
14 NRID ←− Row.RIDfuture;
15 CRID ←− Row.RIDcurrent;
16 ORID ←− Row.RIDpast;
17 Update the value of RIDcurrent with NRID;
18 Update the value of RIDpast with CRID;
19 Add ORID to the unused RID pool ;
20 Set RIDfuture = Ø;
21 Set RID-Flag = Ø;
22 Set Linked-TID = Ø;
23 else
24 return;
25 else
26 return;
On receiving the pseudo-IMSI, the AuC first retrieves the embedded TID, and
searches its subscriber database for the corresponding IMSI. If the retrieved TID is
not found (as might occur with a maliciously generated location update request), the
AuC takes no further action; otherwise, the AuC retrieves the IMSI and compares the
embedded TID with the value of TIDfuture for this IMSI. If they do not agree (including
if the TID matches either TIDpast or TIDcurrent for this IMSI), the AuC takes no further
action; otherwise, the AuC performs the following steps. Algorithm 9.2 provides a
pseudocode description of this process, in which ‘←−’ indicates an assignment that
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is an atomic instruction and ‘update’ indicates a corresponding database update that
varies depending on the implementation of the subscriber’s database.
1. It deletes the value of TIDpast for the retrieved IMSI, and adds the value of
TIDpast to the pool of unused TIDs.
2. It sets TIDpast to equal TIDcurrent , TIDcurrent to equal TIDfuture , and TIDfuture
to null.
3. It checks the RID flag. If the flag is clear, the AuC takes no further action.
Otherwise, it updates the RID information in its subscriber database as follows.
(a) It deletes the value of RIDpast for the retrieved IMSI, and adds this to the
unused RID pool.
(b) It sets RIDpast to equal RIDcurrent , and RIDcurrent to equal RIDfuture .
(c) It sets RIDfuture , RID flag, and Linked-TID to null.
9.6.3.4 RID Flag Setting
The RID flag is used to indicate to the AuC that the RID should be updated at the
next opportunity. The flag is cleared initially, and is also cleared during identity update
(when the RID is changed); however, we do not specify when it is set, since this is a
matter for network policy. A possible trigger for setting the flag would be if the network
believes the RID may have been disclosed, e.g. if a MAC-failure token is received.
9.6.4 Modifications to USIM
To support the scheme, a USIM will need to store certain additional information. We
propose that the pseudo-IMSI is stored in the existing file EFIMSI (in fact this is
necessary since the ME is assumed to be unaware of the scheme), and that the RID is
stored in a new EF. We further suppose that the initial RID value is set during USIM
personalisation.
We next describe how the new pseudo-IMSI and the novel error token are computed
by the USIM.
9.6.4.1 New Identity Retrieval
On receipt of an authentication challenge, i.e. RAND and AUTN, the USIM proceeds
using the standard AKA procedure. After successful completion of AKA, the USIM
processes the RAND to retrieve the new identities as follows (see Figure 9.8(a)). Al-
gorithm 9.3 provides a pseudocode description of this process.
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Algorithm 9.3: USIM process in robust pseudo-IMSIs
Data: RAND, AUTN
Result: New pseudo-IMSI and RID, failure tokens
1 begin
2 K ←− shared master key ;
3 SIMSI ←− stored pseudo-IMSI ;
4 AMFnew ←− dummy value set by specification;
5 AK ←− f5(RAND,K);
6 SQN ←− AK ⊕AUTN.(SQN ⊕AK);
7 XMAC ←− f1(RAND,AUTN.AMF, SQN,K);
8 SRID ←− stored RID ;
9 if XMAC 6= AUTN.MAC then /* Generate novel error token */
10 MAC-M ←− f1∗(SRID, SIMSI,AMFnew,K);
11 AUTM ←− SRID ‖MAC-M ;
12 return AUTM ;
13 if SQN is out of range then
14 SQNMS ←− Stored SQN ;
15 MAC-S ←− f1∗(AMFnew, SQNMS , RAND,K);
16 AKnew ←− f5∗(RAND,K);
17 AUTS ←− (SQNMS ⊕AKnew) ‖MAC-S;
18 return AUTS;
19 ESQN1 ←− SQN ‖ Pad1;
20 EK1 ←− f5∗∗(ESQN1,K);
21 Masked-TID ←− appropriate part of RAND ;
22 Encoded-TID ←−Masked-TID ⊕ EK1;
23 INSByte←− appropriate part of Encoded-TID ;
24 TID ←− appropriate part of Encoded-TID ;
25 RIMSI ←− PLMN -ID ‖ TID;
26 if RIMSI 6= SIMSI then
27 Update stored pseudo-IMSI with RIMSI;
28 if INSByte = INSRID then /* Retrieve new RID */
29 ESQN2 ←− SQN ‖ Pad2;
30 EK2 ←− f5∗∗∗(ESQN2,K);
31 Masked-RID ←− appropriate part of RAND ;
RRID ←−Masked-RID ⊕ EK2;
32 if RRID 6= SRID then
33 Update stored RID with RRID;
34 if INSByte = INSreset then /* Resynchronise pseudo-IMSI */
35 Reset the USIM ;
1. It sets EK1 to equal f5
∗∗(SQN ‖ Pad1 ,K ).
2. It retrieves masked-TID from RAND, and parses masked-TID⊕EK1 to obtain
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the TID and instruction byte.
3. It compares the retrieved instruction byte with the three predefined values
(INSregular , INSRID and INSreset). If it equals any of these values then the USIM
concatenates the received TID with the PLMN-ID to obtain the new pseudo-
IMSI, and compares the concatenated value with the stored pseudo-IMSI (an
essential step since the same TID may be received multiple times). If they are
the same, the USIM takes no further action; otherwise, it keeps a record of the new
pseudo-IMSI and later updates its pseudo-IMSI using the procedure described in
Section 6.4.
(a) If the received instruction byte equals INSRID , then the USIM also performs
the following steps.
i. It sets EK2 to equal f5
∗∗∗(SQN ‖ Pad2 ,K ). It retrieves masked-RID
from RAND, and parses masked-RID⊕EK2 to obtain a RID.
ii. It compares the retrieved RID with the stored RID (an essential step
since the same RID may be received multiple times). If they are the
same the USIM takes no further action; otherwise it updates its stored
RID.
(b) If the received instruction byte equals INSreset , then the USIM immediately
updates its pseudo-IMSI with the received pseudo-IMSI, using the proce-
dure described in Section 6.4. This case will arise when an HN wishes to
synchronise the pseudo-IMSI between the USIM and the HN, as described
in Section 9.6.5.
9.6.4.2 Failure Token Generation
As mentioned in Section 9.6.2, we introduce a novel error token, the AUTM, to enable a
USIM to report a MAC-failure arising during authentication. To construct AUTM, the
USIM computes a 64-bit MAC, the MAC-M, as a function of its stored RID, the current
pseudo-IMSI, the key K, and a dummy AMF, using the existing f1∗ function (see
Figure 9.8(b)), and sets AUTM to (RID ‖ MAC -M) (see line 9–11 in Algorithm 9.3).
The structure of AUTM is similar to that of the sync-failure token AUTS, discussed
in Section 3.4.2. When a USIM detects a MAC-failure in authentication, it computes
AUTM, and reports it to the SN in the same way as an AUTS .
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Figure 9.8: Computations in USIM for robust pseudo-IMSIs
9.6.5 Pseudo-IMSI Recovery
9.6.5.1 A Desynchronisation Scenario
Unfortunately, the robust pseudo-IMSIs scheme described here is not completely free
from possible pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation. However, the scheme allows pseudo-
IMSI synchronisation to be regained as soon as its loss is detected. Pseudo-IMSI
desynchronisation can arises if the HN updates the subscriber’s pseudo-IMSI but the
corresponding USIM does not. Analogous to the discussion in Section 9.5.3, one possible
scenario for such an event is as follows.
Suppose a malicious entity, e.g. a compromised SN, able to initiate a location update
request sends such a request containing a randomly chosen pseudo-IMSI. If, by chance,
the TID in this pseudo-IMSI happens to match a stored TIDfuture , then the HN will
incorrectly update its subscriber database. If this ‘new’ TID has not been received
by the corresponding USIM, then the current TID in the USIM will equal the value
of TIDpast in the HN database (see steps 1 and 2 of Section 9.6.3.3). Unlike the
analogous scenario discussed in Section 9.5.3, this scenario does not cause pseudo-IMSI
desynchronisation in the scheme described here, since the AuC is still able to map the
IMSI to the TID currently stored in the USIM.
However, even in the scheme described here, the AuC will lose its mapping from
the IMSI to the received pseudo-IMSI if the malicious entity could successfully cause
another unauthorised TID update in the HN database. If pseudo-IMSI synchronisation
is lost (and cannot be recovered), AKA will always fail, and the UE will not be able
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to receive any network service until the USIM is replaced. The likelihood of such a
pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation is reduced in the new scheme, in that it requires two
false updates to the HN database; however, such an event is disastrous, and so a
way to recover from this failure state is needed. We describe the recovery process in
Section 9.6.5.2 below.
9.6.5.2 Synchronisation Recovery Process
In all the current mobile systems, there are scenarios in which various forms of desyn-
chronisation can occur. For example, TMSI-IMSI synchronisation can be lost by an
SN if it receives repeated MAC-failure messages as a result of failed authentications.
In such a situation, the SN recovers by requesting the cleartext IMSI, obtaining a new
set of AVs from the HN, running AKA, and then allocating a new TMSI.
Also, as discussed in Section 3.4.2, if a USIM identifies loss of SQN synchronisation
between it and the HN, it resynchronises SQN by sending a sync-failure token to the
HN. On receiving such a token, the HN adjusts its stored value of SQN, computes an
AV with the new value, and sends the AV to the SN for use in AKA.
Analogously, in the scheme described here, if a USIM detects a possible pseudo-IMSI
desynchronisation when authentication fails because of a MAC mismatch, it sends an
AUTM error token to the HN (via the SN). The SN sends other relevant information
with the AUTM or AUTS token when sending it to the HN, notably the pseudo-IMSI
(which the SN thinks is an IMSI) and the failure cause. As AUTS and AUTM are
indistinguishable to the SN, the SN reports both types of token as a sync-failure.
On receiving the token, the AuC first runs the standard validation steps for an
AUTS . If validation succeeds, the AuC performs the standard process for SQN recovery
(as specified in Section 3.4.2); otherwise, it further verifies the token to check whether
it is an AUTM . AUTM checking involves the following steps.
1. It parses the token to retrieve a RID and MAC-M.
2. It searches its subscriber database for the IMSI for this RID. If the RID is not
found, validation fails; otherwise, the AuC retrieves the IMSI and the correspond-
ing K.
3. It computes MAC as f1∗(RID, pseudo-IMSI, AMF, K) using the pseudo-IMSI
sent with the token by the SN, and compares it with the retrieved MAC-M . If
they agree, the token is validated; otherwise, validation fails.
If AUTM validation fails, the AuC reports the issue to the SN; otherwise, it rectifies
the TID entries in its subscriber database using the procedure described in the following
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paragraphs, computes an AV, and sends the AV to the SN for authentication.
As noted in the previous paragraph, if AUTM validation succeeds, the SN must
adjust its TID values appropriately; this is achieved as follows. The AuC first retrieves
the TID from the pseudo-IMSI sent with the AUTM token by the SN, and compares it
with the three stored TID values (TIDpast , TIDcurrent and TIDfuture) for this IMSI. If
it equals any of the these values then the MAC-failure does not indicate that a pseudo-
IMSI desynchronisation has occurred. Hence, in this case the AuC does not modify its
subscriber database, computes an AV using the procedure described in Section 9.6.3.2,
and sends the AV to the SN.
Otherwise, the AuC proceeds as follows (see also Algorithm 9.4).
1. It deletes the values of TIDpast and TIDcurrent for the IMSI concerned, and adds
them to the pool of unused TIDs.
2. It checks whether the TID retrieved from the SN-supplied pseudo-IMSI is in the
pool of unused TIDs. If the TID is available, the AuC sets TIDcurrent to equal
this TID, computes an AV using the procedure described in Section 9.6.3.2, and
sends the AV to the SN. Otherwise, the pseudo-IMSI reported by the USIM must
have been allocated to another subscriber, and the AuC performs the following
steps (see steps 22 to 33 of Algorithm 9.4).
(a) It computes EK1 and selects a TID using steps 2 and 3 of Section 9.6.3.2.
(b) The AuC sets RAND to equal ((TIDfuture ‖ INSreset)⊕EK1 ) ‖ randgen(80 ).
(c) It generates an AV using the computed RAND in the standard way, and
sends the AV to the SN.
Note that a MAC-failure token reported by an honest subscriber as a result of
a loss of synchronisation between its TMSI and the corresponding pseudo-IMSI will
be deemed invalid by the HN. This is because the MAC component of the token is
computed over the USIM’s actual pseudo-IMSI, whereas the SN will send to the HN
the (different) pseudo-IMSI it believes is currently associated with the TMSI used by
the mobile device. To deal with this case, the SN could either use the HN’s response
in processing the failure token, or simply request the cleartext pseudo-IMSI before
forwarding a failure token.
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Algorithm 9.4: Pseudo-IMSI recovery in robust pseudo-IMSIs
Data: Pseudo-IMSI, AUTM
Result: An AV, synchronised pseudo-IMSI
1 begin
2 RRID ←− AUTM.RID;
3 Fetch relevant data (assume in Row structure) from subscriber database
associated with RRID;
4 K ←− Row.K;
5 IMSI ←− Row.IMSI;
6 CTID ←− Row.TIDcurrent;
7 NTID ←− Row.TIDfuture;
8 OTID ←− Row.TIDpast;
9 RTID ←− TID part of the Pseudo-IMSI ;
10 if RTID ∈ {OTID,CTID,NTID} then
11 Generate an AV using Algorithm 9.1;
12 return AV;
13 else
14 Add OTID to the unused TID pool ;
15 Add CTID to the unused TID pool ;
16 Set TIDpast = Ø;
17 if RTID is unused then
18 Update the value of TIDcurrent with RTID;
19 Generate an AV using Algorithm 9.1;
20 return AV ;
21 else /* Generate a special AV */
22 Set TIDcurrent = Ø;
23 if NTID 6= Ø then TIDfresh ←− NTID;
24 else
25 TIDfresh ←− an unused TID ;
26 Update the value of TIDfuture with TIDfresh;
27 SQN ←− subscriber-specific SQN ;
28 ESQN1 ←− SQN ‖ Pad1;
29 EK1 ←− f5∗∗(ESQN1,K);
30 Encoded-TID ←− TIDfresh ‖ INSreset;
31 Masked-TID ←− Encoded-TID ⊕ EK1;
32 RAND ←−Masked-TID ‖ randgen(80);
33 Generate AV using the RAND in the standard way ;
34 return AV ;
9.7 Analyses of Robust Pseudo-IMSIs
9.7.1 Correctness of the Scheme
The scheme is an extension to the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme described in
Section 9.4; the security properties described in Section 9.5.1 therefore hold. We next
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provide detailed arguments supporting this claim.
The modified AKA protocol is as secure as the existing AKA, since we have not mod-
ified the existing AKA except to replace the random RAND with a cryptographically
constructed RAND . We formally verified this claim using ProVerif (see Section 9.8.2).
The constructed RAND has the same properties as a randomly (or pseudorandomly)
chosen value. It is indistinguishable from a random value on the assumption that a data
string masked using the output of the functions f5∗∗ and f5∗∗∗ is indistinguishable from
a randomly chosen string, cf. [18, 19]. As for the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme,
the use of SQN randomises the pseudonym-encoded RAND if the same TID or RID is
embedded in multiple RAND values.
For similar reasons as in the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme, described in Sec-
tion 9.5.1, cryptographic key generation is not affected.
The extended scheme provides the following security features:
1. pseudo-IMSIs and RIDs for the same subscriber are unlinkable;
2. a USIM will only accept a genuine pseudo-IMSI or a RID, i.e. a value originated
by its HN; and
3. a request for pseudo-IMSI synchronisation recovery cannot be forged.
We next give more detailed arguments supporting these three claims.
9.7.1.1 Goal 1: Pseudo-IMSI/RID Unlinkability
The argument follows similar lines to that given in Section 9.5.1.1. Pseudo-IMSI and
RID unlinkability depends on the following three assumptions.
1. The TID part of the pseudo-IMSI is randomly selected from an extensive list.
2. The RID is randomly selected from an extensive list;
3. The TID and the RID are confidentially communicated from the HN to the USIM.
Of these, assumptions 1 and 2 depend on correct implementation of the scheme,
while assumption 3 depends on the confidentiality method that is used to protect a TID
or a RID whilst in transit from an HN to a USIM. As described in Section 9.6.3.2, the
TID and RID are protected in the same way as the MSIN part of a replacement IMSI
is protected in the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme. That is, both the TID and RID
are masked by XORing them with a pseudorandom sequence output by a variant of
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the f5 function. We formally verified that RID and TID confidentiality is maintained
using ProVerif (see Section 9.8.2). Hence, an adversary without access to the key K
is unable to learn a pseudo-IMSI or a RID before they are used, ensuring unlinkability
between consecutive pseudo-IMSIs, and also between consecutive RIDs.
9.7.1.2 Goal 2: Pseudo-IMSI/RID Correctness
As for the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme, new TIDs and RIDs are sent to a USIM
using AKA, and a USIM will only accept a new RID or TID if AKA is successful,
i.e. after the network (and hence the RAND) has been authenticated. Hence, AKA
guarantees the origin, integrity and timeliness of the new pseudo-IMSI and RID.
Moreover, because the SQN value is checked by the USIM during AKA, an active
adversary cannot force a USIM to accept an ‘old’ pseudo-IMSI or RID, since this
checking forces AVs to be used in strict order of generation. That is, the timeliness of
pseudo-IMSIs and RIDs is also guaranteed.
9.7.1.3 Goal 3: Pseudo-IMSI Synchronisation Correctness
This property holds because of the way in which a synchronisation recovery request
is constructed and processed. As discussed in Section 9.6.5.2, the synchronisation
recovery request contains an error token, the AUTM, computed by the USIM requesting
synchronisation recovery. As described in Section 9.6.4.2, AUTM contains a MAC
computed over the USIM’s current RID, pseudo-IMSI, and a value of AMF, using the
key K. The MAC guarantees detection of malicious changes to the RID or pseudo-IMSI,
preventing an adversary falsely initiating a pseudo-IMSI synchronisation recovery. We
formally verified this claim using ProVerif (see Section 9.8.2). To do so we proved that
if an HN initiates a pseudo-IMSI synchronisation recovery for a USIM, then the process
must have been initiated by the appropriate USIM.
9.7.2 User Identity Confidentiality
The scheme diminishes the impact of IMSI catchers and improves user identity confi-
dentiality by preventing the IMSI ever being sent across the air interface. However, air
interface interactions are not completely anonymous, since the pseudo-IMSI functions
as a pseudonym, potentially enabling the interactions of a single phone to be tracked
for a period; of course, this is always true if a subscriber resides in a single location
area, even when only a temporary identity, i.e. a TMSI or GUTI, is used.
Frequent AKA execution could lessen the impact of such tracking, which would also
alleviate the problem of long TMSI validity periods over multiple geographic areas, as
144
9.7. ANALYSES OF ROBUST PSEUDO-IMSIS
reported by Arapinis et al. [47]. Although the requirement to execute AKA frequently
is reduced in 4G, the importance of frequent AKA execution in preventing security
attacks is discussed in recent research [101].
However, as described in Section 9.7.1.1, pseudo-IMSIs and RIDs for the same USIM
are unlinkable, ensuring user identity confidentiality.
9.7.3 Identity Synchronisation
As discussed in Section 9.7.1.2, an adversary cannot force an unauthorised pseudo-IMSI
change to occur. Nevertheless, an adversary can stop or delay the arrival of a RAND
containing a new pseudo-IMSI at a USIM. However, such an event does not affect
pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation, since, as in the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme, the
HN retransmits a pseudo-IMSI until the HN has reliable evidence that it has been
received by the USIM.
Unlike the modifiable multiple IMSIs and van den Broek et al. schemes, described
in Sections 9.4 and 9.5.6, an HN updates its subscriber database only when it receives
a specific location update request from an SN, and it keeps the immediate past pseudo-
IMSI for each subscriber. These changes help to minimise the likelihood of identity
desynchronisation, as discussed in Section 9.6.5.1. Moreover, inclusion of a pseudo-
IMSI synchronisation recovery process guarantees synchronisation of the pseudo-IMSI
between a USIM and its HN.
Although RIDs and TIDs are managed in the same way, a RID is only used to
recover pseudo-IMSI synchronisation. The frequency of RID updates is a policy matter
for the network. It might be possible to deploy other methods to guarantee RID-IMSI
synchronisation, a possible avenue for future research.
9.7.4 Synchronisation Recovery
As discussed in Section 9.7.1.3, the synchronisation recovery mechanism prevents an
adversary falsely initiating a pseudo-IMSI recovery. We formally verified correctness of
the synchronisation recovery process using ProVerif (see Section 9.8.2).
The pseudo-IMSI synchronisation recovery process is similar to the existing SQN
synchronisation recovery process. Unlike for SQN, the RID in the pseudo-IMSI synchro-
nisation recovery request is transferred in cleartext, since the HN is unable to identify
the subscriber from the reported pseudo-IMSI while pseudo-IMSIs are desynchronised.
This allows possible user tracking using the RID. As the RID changes over time, the
threat of RID traceability is comparable to that arising from the current temporary
identities (TMSI and GUTI).
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9.7.5 Performance and Overhead
The scheme introduces minimal additional overhead to a USIM. We add two KDFs (to
retrieve identities) and one MAC function (to support identity recovery), all of which
are similar to the existing USIM functions. Transferring a new pseudo-IMSI to the ME
is an additional task for a USIM, which could be performed when the ME is idle. This
overhead seems likely to be manageable, even for a USIM with limited computational
power.
The scheme requires the HN to manage new types of identifier. It increases database
transactions, adds two KDFs for computing an AV, and introduces new functionalities,
notably the need to refresh an identity on receiving an appropriate location update
request and identity recovery in the event of pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation. Since
none of these are particularly complex, it seems likely that these could be achieved
with some combination of allocating more resources, clustering subscribers in multiple
HSSs, and efficient database design.
As in the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme, the scheme does not affect any func-
tionality in the SN or introduce any additional communications. The only impact is an
increase in the apparent number of subscribers at the SN, since subscribers switching
to a new pseudo-IMSI appear like new subscribers.
Pseudo-IMSIs and IMSIs for a single HN must all be distinct. Since multiple pseudo-
IMSIs are allocated for each subscriber, pressure could be created on the number of
IMSIs available to an operator. To address this issue, the approaches described in
Section 9.5.4 could be implemented.
9.7.6 Deployment and Interoperability
Like the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme described in Section 9.4, the scheme modifies
only the USIM and the HN, owned by a single entity, and is transparent to the SN
and mobile phone. This allows phased deployment, e.g. by including the additional
functionality in newly issued USIMs while existing USIMs continue to function as at
present. In addition, the scheme does not affect existing services dependent on the
IMSI, e.g. lawful interception and billing, making deployment simpler than for the
modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme, as well as the van den Broek et al. scheme described
in Section 9.5.6.
There are certain practical issues to be considered. For example, the set of ‘normal’
IMSIs used by existing USIMs needs to be kept distinct from the range of pseudo-IMSIs
used by the new USIMs. Also, the HN should use location information from both the
user’s current and past pseudo-IMSI in supporting mobile terminated services; that is,
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the HN might use the location information for the pseudo-IMSI containing TIDpast if
delivery of a mobile terminated service using the pseudo-IMSI containing TIDcurrent
fails.
Like the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme described in Section 9.4.2, the scheme
will not work for GSM as it depends on the mutual authentication feature of 3G and 4G
AKA. If a UE using a new-style USIM needs to connect to a GSM network, it should
continue to use the fixed pseudo-IMSI as long as it is connected to that network. The
pseudo-IMSI can be updated when the UE next roams to a 3G or 4G network.
9.7.7 Impact on Other Attacks
Arapinis et al. [48] describe a user linkability attack, discussed in Section 8.2.1, that
allows an adversary to distinguish between UEs based on the error messages arising from
a failed AKA execution. The change to the use of AUTM for reporting MAC-failures
renders them indistinguishable from sync-failures, hence invalidating this attack.
An attack on the USIM provision process could compromise the key K [145], thereby
defeating all the security features. However, the scheme described here could reduce
the impact of key compromise, since the initial mapping from a pseudo-IMSI to the
key K is lost as soon as the subscriber changes its pseudo-IMSI, and even an adversary
knowing K would not be able to readily track a device.
9.8 Formal Verification
In this section we describe details of formal verifications of the modifiable multiple
IMSIs scheme described in Section 9.4 and the robust pseudo-IMSI scheme described
in Section 9.6. We used the ProVerif tool introduced in Section 5.8.1 for these formal
analyses. We modelled the modified AKA protocol for both schemes, and verified the
security and privacy properties discussed in Sections 9.5 and 9.7.
9.8.1 Modifiable Multiple IMSIs
In this section we first describe a ProVerif model of the modifiable multiple IMSIs
scheme and present a formalisation of the security and privacy properties of interest
here. We then discuss the results obtained from the ProVerif analysis.
9.8.1.1 Formal Model
As described in Section 5.8.2, a ProVerif model of a protocol is divided into the dec-
larations, process macros, and the main process; we start by providing a summary of
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these parts of the model for the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme — full details are
provided in Appendix B.1. The ProVerif model we present immediately below is an
extension of the model described in Section 5.8.2.
Listing 9.1 contains the salient parts of the declarations for the model of modifiable
multiple IMSIs. The full listing is given in Appendix B.1. In Listing 9.1, the f1, f2, f3,
f4, f5 constructors model the authentication-specific cryptographic functions used in
AKA, and the f11 and f51 constructors model the additional cryptographic functions
introduced in the scheme. The values mac, nonce, key, resp, cipherKey, integrityKey,
anonymityKey and maskKey are user-defined types. The constructors aencrypt and
mencrypt model the ⊕ operator used to conceal the SQN and MSIN values. As we
used the same operation to conceal both the values, a single constructor could be used.
However, we employed separate constructors for flexibility. To retrieve the SQN and
MSIN value in the UE, the destructors adecrypt and mdecrypt are used.
Listing 9.1: Modifiable multiple IMSIs model: Summary of declarations
1 (∗ Construc tors and d e s t r u c t o r s ∗)
2 fun f 1 ( bitstring , mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : mac .
3 fun f 11 ( bitstring , key ) : mac .
4 fun f 2 (mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : r e sp .
5 fun f 3 (mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : cipherKey .
6 fun f 4 (mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : in t eg r i tyKey .
7 fun f 5 (mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : anonymityKey .
8 fun f 51 ( bitstring , key ) : maskKey .
9 fun aencrypt ( bitstring , anonymityKey ) : bitstring .
10 fun mencrypt ( bitstring , maskKey) : bitstring .
11 reduc fora l l m: bitstring , k : anonymityKey ; adecrypt ( aencrypt (m, k
) , k ) = m.
12 reduc fora l l n : bitstring , l : maskKey ; mdecrypt ( mencrypt (n , l ) , l )
= n .
14 free sqn : bitstring [ private ] .
15 free msin : bitstring [ private ] .
17 (∗ Secrecy q u e r i e s ∗)
18 query attacker ( sqn ) .
19 query attacker ( msin ) .
21 (∗ A u t h e n t i c a t i o n q u e r i e s ∗)
22 query x1 : ident , x2 : cipherKey , x3 : in t eg r i tyKey ; event ( endSN( x1 ,
x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
23 query x1 : ident , x2 : cipherKey , x3 : in t eg r i tyKey ; event (endUE( x1 ,
x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begUE( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
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As described in Section 5.8.2.1, the declarations part also formalises the security
properties to be verified. We are interested in verifying the secrecy property of SQN
and of the transferred identity, i.e. an MSIN, when sent from the HN to the USIM. We
are also interested in verifying that the scheme provides mutual authentication between
the USIM and the SN. These are achieved by using the reachability and correspondence
assertion queries, described below.
In lines 14 and 15 of Listing 9.1, we declared private free variables sqn and msin, rep-
resenting the private data in the model. Lines 18, 19, 22, and 23 in Listing 9.1 query the
secrecy (reachability query) and authenticity (correspondence assertion query) proper-
ties of interest in our analysis. The events begSN, endSN, begUE, endUE are described
below, as part of the process description in which they are used.
As in the model described in Section 5.8.2, we define three process macros to model
the processes of the UE, SN, and HN. The most significant parts of the UE process
are given in Listing 9.2 below. Similarly, we assume that the communication channel
between the UE and SN (the pubChannel variable in the model) is public and that the
communication channel between the SN and HN (the secureChannel variable in the
model) is private.
Listing 9.2: Modifiable multiple IMSIs model: UE process (highlights)
1 l et processUE=
2 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , imsi ms ) ) ;
3 in ( pubChannel , (=CHALLENGE, SMAC ms: mac , masked msin ms : bitstring
, r ms : nonce , enc sqn ms : bitstring , mac ms : mac) ) ;
4 l et ak ms : anonymityKey = f5 (SMAC ms, masked msin ms , r ms , k i ) in
5 l et sqn ms : bitstring = adecrypt ( enc sqn ms , ak ms ) in
6 i f f 1 ( sqn ms , SMAC ms, masked msin ms , r ms , k i ) = mac ms then
7 l et res ms : re sp = f2 (SMAC ms, masked msin ms , r ms , k i ) in
8 l et ck ms : cipherKey = f3 (SMAC ms, masked msin ms , r ms , k i ) in
9 l et ik ms : in t eg r i tyKey = f4 (SMAC ms, masked msin ms , r ms , k i ) in
10 event endUE( imsi ms , ck ms , ik ms ) ;
11 event begSN( imsi ms , ck ms , ik ms ) ;
12 out ( pubChannel , (RES, res ms ) ) .
The UE process, specified in the processUE macro (see Listing 9.2), sends the
subscriber identity across the public channel for authentication, and then waits for an
authentication challenge (RAND and AUTN ), in which RAND is the concatenation
of the SMAC, the masked MSIN and a random number. On receiving the challenge,
the process uses the destructor functions to retrieve SQN, to compute a MAC, and
to compare it with the received MAC. If they agree, the SN has been successfully
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authenticated; in such a case, the process marks the event endUE (line 10 in Listing 9.2)
with the IMSI and the corresponding session keys as event parameters. The event
endUE indicates that authentication of the SN by the UE has completed. The process
also marks the event begSN (line 11 in Listing 9.2) with the IMSI and the corresponding
session keys as event parameters and sends the computed RES across the public channel
to be received by the SN process. The event begSN indicates that authentication of
the UE by the SN has started.
SN protocol execution is described in the processSN macro (see Listing 9.3). On
receiving the subscriber identity from the public channel, this process sends the identity
across the private channel to the HN, and waits for an AV. When it receives the AV,
it marks the event begUE (line 5 in Listing 9.3), with the IMSI and the corresponding
session keys as event parameters, and sends the received authentication challenge across
the public channel to the UE. Like the events described in processUE, the event begUE
indicates that authentication of the SN by the UE has started. The process then waits
for the RES, and on receiving a value from the public channel, it compares it with the
XRES in the AV. If they agree then authentication of the UE to the SN is complete; in
such a case, the process marks the event endSN (line 9 in Listing 9.3), with the IMSI
and corresponding session keys as event parameters. The event endSN indicates that
authentication of the UE by the SN has completed.
Listing 9.3: Modifiable multiple IMSIs model: SN process (highlights)
1 l et processSN=
2 in ( pubChannel , (=ID , ims i sn : ident ) ) ;
3 out ( secureChannel , (AV REQ, i ms i sn ) ) ;
4 in ( secureChannel , (=AV, ims i hn sn : ident , SMAC sn : bitstring ,
masked msin sn : bitstring , r s n : nonce , enc sqn sn : bitstring ,
mac sn : mac , x r e s s n : resp , ck sn : cipherKey , i k s n :
in t eg r i tyKey ) ) ;
5 event begUE( ims i hn sn , ck sn , i k s n ) ;
6 out ( pubChannel , (CHALLENGE, SMAC sn , masked msin sn , r sn ,
enc sqn sn , mac sn ) ) ;
7 in ( pubChannel , (=RES, r e s s n : re sp ) ) ;
8 i f r e s s n = x r e s s n then
9 event endSN( ims i hn sn , ck sn , i k s n ) .
HN protocol execution is modelled in the processHN macro (see Listing 9.4). The
HN receives an AV request from the SN (line 2 in Listing 9.4), computes an AV using
the defined constructors (lines 5–13 in Listing 9.4), and sends the AV to the SN (line
14 in Listing 9.4).
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Listing 9.4: Modifiable multiple IMSIs model: HN process (highlights)
1 l et processHN=
2 in ( secureChannel , (=AV REQ, ims i hn : ident ) ) ;
3 get keys(=imsi hn , k i hn ) in
4 new r hn : nonce ;
5 l et SMAC hn : mac = f11 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
6 l et ek hn : maskKey = f51 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
7 l et masked msin hn : bitstring = mencrypt ( msin , ek hn ) in
8 l et mac hn : mac = f1 ( sqn , SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn , k i hn ) in
9 l et xres hn : re sp = f2 (SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn , k i hn ) in
10 l et ck hn : cipherKey = f3 (SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn , k i hn ) in
11 l et i k hn : in t eg r i tyKey = f4 (SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn , k i hn )
in
12 l et ak hn : anonymityKey = f5 (SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn , k i hn )
in
13 l et enc sqn hn : bitstring = aencrypt ( sqn , ak hn ) in
14 out ( secureChannel , (AV, imsi hn , SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn ,
enc sqn hn , mac hn , xres hn , ck hn , ik hn ) ) .
Just as in Section 5.8.2.3, the main process of the ProVerif model encodes the
complete protocol; it captures the modified AKA protocol for the modifiable multiple
IMSIs scheme using the macros defined above. Listing 9.5 shows the main process. A
full listing of the ProVerif code for the model can be found in Appendix B.1.
Listing 9.5: Modifiable multiple IMSIs model: Main process
1 process
2 ( ( ! processUE ) | processSN | processHN )
9.8.1.2 Verification Results
We ran the encoded protocol in ProVerif to verify the secrecy and authenticity prop-
erties. The ProVerif tool successfully verified that the secrecy of SQN and MSIN is
maintained, when transferred from the HN to the USIM. The tool output RESULT
not attacker(sqn[]) is true, which means that the attacker is not able to learn the value
of SQN . It also output RESULT not attacker(msin[]) is true, which means that the
attacker is not able to learn the value of MSIN .
The ProVerif tool also verified mutual authentication between the USIM and the
SN. In response to the first correspondence assertion query, the tool output RESULT
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event(endSN (x11937, x21938, x31939)) =⇒ event(begSN (x11937, x21938, x31939)) is true,
which indicates that authentication of the UE by the SN is achieved. In response to the
second correspondence assertion query, ProVerif returned RESULT event(endUE(x1,
x2, x3)) =⇒ event(begUE(x1, x2, x3)) is true, which indicates that network authenti-
cation by the UE is achieved. These two results imply that the mutual authentication
property holds.
These proofs increase confidence that the scheme offers effective protection against
IMSI catchers while maintaining the original functionality of the protocol. The ProVerif
outputs for modifiable multiple IMSIs are given in Appendix B.3.1.
9.8.2 Robust Pseudo-IMSIs
In this section we first describe a ProVerif model of the robust pseudo-IMSIs scheme
and present a formalisation of the security and privacy properties of interest here. We
then discuss the results obtained from the ProVerif analysis.
9.8.2.1 Formal Model
We extend the model described in Section 9.8.1.1. The objective of the modelling
process is to verify that the following security and privacy properties hold:
• the SQN remains confidential;
• the TID and the RID remain confidential when transferred from the HN to the
USIM;
• mutual authentication between the USIM and the SN is provided;
• correctness of the synchronisation recovery process is maintained.
To establish the desired properties we follow the same approach as in Section 9.8.1.1,
i.e. we use reachability and correspondence assertion queries. We next provide a sum-
mary of the model — full details are provided in Appendix B.2.
Listing 9.6 contains the most significant parts of the declarations part of the model
of the robust pseudo-IMSIs scheme. The full listing is given in Appendix B.2. In
Listing 9.6, the f1, f2, f3, f4, f5 constructors model the authentication-specific cryp-
tographic functions used in AKA. The constructor f12 models the MAC computation
required to construct an error token. The constructors f52 and f53 model the gener-
ation of the two types of additional masking keys. The values nonce, key, mac, ident,
resp, cipherKey, integrityKey, anonymityKey and maskKey are user-defined types.
The constructors aencrypt and mencrypt model the ⊕ operator used to conceal the
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Listing 9.6: Robust pseudo-IMSIs model: Summary of declarations
1 (∗ Construc tors and d e s t r u c t o r s ∗)
2 fun f 1 ( bitstring , bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : mac .
3 fun f 12 ( bitstring , ident , key ) : mac .
4 fun f 2 ( bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : r e sp .
5 fun f 3 ( bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : cipherKey .
6 fun f 4 ( bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : in t eg r i tyKey .
7 fun f 5 ( bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : anonymityKey .
8 fun f 52 ( bitstring , key ) : maskKey .
9 fun f 53 ( bitstring , key ) : maskKey .
10 fun aencrypt ( bitstring , anonymityKey ) : bitstring .
11 fun mencrypt ( bitstring , maskKey) : bitstring .
12 reduc fora l l m: bitstring , k : anonymityKey ; adecrypt ( aencrypt (m, k )
, k ) = m.
13 reduc fora l l n : bitstring , l : maskKey ; mdecrypt ( mencrypt (n , l ) , l )
= n .
15 free sqn : bitstring [ private ] .
16 free t i d : bitstring [ private ] .
18 (∗ Queries ∗)
19 query attacker ( sqn ) .
20 query attacker ( t i d ) .
21 query x1 : ident , x2 : cipherKey , x3 : in t eg r i tyKey ; event ( endSN( x1 ,
x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
22 query x1 : ident , x2 : cipherKey , x3 : in t eg r i tyKey ; event (endUE( x1 ,
x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begUE( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
23 query x1 : ident , x2 : bitstring ; event ( endRecoveryHN ( x1 , x2 ) ) ==>
event ( begRecoveryHN ( x1 , x2 ) ) .
SQN, TID and RID values. To retrieve the SQN, TID and RID values at the UE, the
destructors adecrypt and mdecrypt are used.
In lines 15 and 16 of Listing 9.6, private free variables sqn and tid are declared.
Lines 19 and 20 in Listing 9.6 query the secrecy property for the SQN and TID. We did
not include a query for the secrecy property of RID, since the synchronisation recovery
process is included in the model, in which a RID is transmitted in cleartext across the
air interface; that is, the property cannot be established. However, since the RID is
transferred to the USIM in exactly the same way as TID, the fact that we can establish
the secrecy of the TID during its transfer, means that the same property holds for the
RID during transfer if not when it is used.
Lines 21 and 22 in Listing 9.6 query the correspondence of events to establish the
success of mutual authentication between the USIM and the SN. Similarly, line 23
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queries the correspondence of events to prove the correctness of the synchronisation
recovery process. The events begSN, endSN, begUE, endUE, begRecoveryHN, and en-
dRecoveryHN are described below in the specifications of the processes in which they
are used.
In the model, we assume that communications between the UE and SN are public
and that communications between the SN and HN are private. The most significant
parts of the UE process are given in Listing 9.7 below. The UE process, described
in processUE macro (see Listing 9.7), sends the subscriber identity across the public
channel for authentication, and then waits for an authentication challenge (RAND and
AUTN ), in which RAND is the concatenation of the masked RID, the masked TID
and a random number.
Listing 9.7: Robust pseudo-IMSIs model: UE process (highlights)
1 l et processUE=
2 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , imsi ms ) ) ;
3 in ( pubChannel , (=CHALLENGE, masked rid ms : bitstring , masked tid ms
: bitstring , r ms : nonce , enc sqn ms : bitstring , mac ms : mac) ) ;
4 new d mac : mac ;
5 new d r i d : bitstring ;
6 l et ak ms : anonymityKey = f5 ( masked rid ms , masked tid ms , r ms , k i
) in
7 l et sqn ms : bitstring = adecrypt ( enc sqn ms , ak ms ) in
8 i f f 1 ( sqn ms , masked rid ms , masked tid ms , r ms , k i ) = mac ms then
(
9 l et res ms : re sp = f2 ( masked rid ms , masked tid ms , r ms , k i ) in
10 l et s u c c e s s = true in
11 event endUE( imsi ms , ck ms , ik ms ) ;
12 event begSN( imsi ms , ck ms , ik ms ) ;
13 out ( pubChannel , (RES, succes s , res ms , d r id , d mac ) ) )
14 e l s e (
15 new d r e s : r e sp ;
16 l et s u c c e s s = fa l se in
17 l et ek2 ms : maskKey = f53 ( sqn ms , k i ) in
18 l et r id ms : bitstring = mdecrypt ( masked rid ms , ek2 ms ) in
19 l et mac m ms : mac = f12 ( rid ms , imsi ms , k i ) in
20 event begRecoveryHN ( imsi ms , r id ms ) ;
21 out ( pubChannel , (RES, succes s , d res , r id ms , mac m ms) ) ) .
On receiving the challenge, the UE process uses the destructor functions to retrieve
SQN, to compute a MAC, and to compare it with the received MAC. If they agree,
the SN has successfully been authenticated; in such a case, the process computes RES
(line 9 in Listing 9.7) and marks the event endUE (line 11 in Listing 9.7) with the IMSI
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and the corresponding session keys as event parameters. The event endUE indicates
that authentication of the SN by the UE has completed. The process also marks the
event begSN (line 12 in Listing 9.7) with the IMSI and the corresponding session keys
as event parameters and sends the computed RES across the public channel to be
received by the SN process. The event begSN indicates that authentication of the UE
by the SN has started.
Otherwise, i.e. if the MACs do not agree, then authentication of the SN by the UE
has failed, and the UE process computes an error token (lines 17–19 in Listing 9.7).
The process also marks the event begRecoveryHN (line 20 in Listing 9.7) with the IMSI
and the corresponding RID as event parameters and sends the error token across the
public channel to be received by the SN process. The event begRecoveryHN indicates
that synchronisation recovery has started in the UE.
SN protocol execution is specified in the processSN macro (see Listing 9.8). On
receiving the subscriber identity from the public channel, the SN process sends the
identity across the private channel to the HN, and waits for an AV. When it receives
the AV, it marks the event begUE (line 5 in Listing 9.8), with the IMSI and the
corresponding session keys as event parameters, and sends the authentication challenge
from the received AV across the public channel to the UE. The event begUE indicates
that authentication of the SN by the UE has started. The process then waits for an
authentication response from the UE. On receiving a value from the public channel,
it first verifies whether the received value is a RES or an error token. If the received
value is a RES, the process compares it with the XRES in the AV. If they agree then
authentication of the UE is completed; in such a case, the process marks the event
endSN (line 9 in Listing 9.8), with the IMSI and corresponding session keys as event
parameters. The event endSN indicates that authentication of the UE by the SN has
completed. Otherwise, the received value is an error token, and the SN process forwards
the value to the HN.
HN protocol execution is specified in the processHN macro (see Listing 9.9). The
HN receives an AV request from the SN (line 2 in Listing 9.9), computes an AV using
the defined constructors (lines 7–16 in Listing 9.9), and sends the AV to the SN (line
17 in Listing 9.9). The HN process then waits for an error token from the SN.
On receiving the token (line 19 in Listing 9.9), the HN process verifies it (lines
20–23 in Listing 9.9). If the verification is successful, the HN process marks the event
endRecoveryHN (line 24 in Listing 9.9) with the IMSI and the corresponding RID as
event parameters. The event endRecoveryHN indicates that synchronisation recovery
has completed in the HN.
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Listing 9.8: Robust pseudo-IMSIs model: SN process (highlights)
1 l et processSN=
2 in ( pubChannel , (=ID , ims i sn : ident ) ) ;
3 out ( secureChannel , (AV REQ, i ms i sn ) ) ;
4 in ( secureChannel , (=AV, ims i hn sn : ident , masked r id sn : bitstring
, masked t id sn : bitstring , r s n : nonce , enc sqn sn : bitstring ,
mac sn : mac , x r e s s n : resp , ck sn : cipherKey , i k s n :
in t eg r i tyKey ) ) ;
5 event begUE( ims i hn sn , ck sn , i k s n ) ;
6 out ( pubChannel , (CHALLENGE, masked r id sn , masked t id sn , r sn ,
enc sqn sn , mac sn ) ) ;
7 in ( pubChannel , (=RES, s u c c e s s s n : bool , r e s s n : resp , r i d s n :
bitstring , mac m sn : mac) ) ;
8 i f s u c c e s s s n = true then
9 ( i f r e s s n = x r e s s n then event endSN( ims i hn sn , ck sn ,
i k s n ) )
10 e l s e
11 out ( secureChannel , (ERROR, ims i hn sn , r id sn , mac m sn ) ) .
Just as in the model described in Section 9.8.1.1, we model the modified AKA
protocol using the macros defined above. Listing 9.10 gives the main process. A full
listing of the ProVerif code for the model can be found in Appendix B.2.
9.8.2.2 Verification Results
We ran the protocol model in ProVerif to analyse the security and privacy properties
of interest. The ProVerif tool successfully verified that the secrecy of SQN and TID
is maintained, when transferred from the HN to the USIM. The tool output RESULT
not attacker(sqn[]) is true, which means that the attacker is not able to learn the value
of SQN . Similarly, it output RESULT not attacker(tid[]) is true, which means that
the attacker is not able to learn the value of TID when it is transferred from the HN
to the USIM. As discussed in Section 9.8.2.1, the model does not include a means
to verify that RID secrecy is preserved; as discussed there, this is because the RID is
revealed if it is used for identity synchronisation recovery (i.e. its secrecy cannot be
guaranteed if it is ever used). However, also as discussed in Section 9.8.2.1, the fact
that we can establish the secrecy of the TID during its transfer, means that the same
property holds for the RID during transfer.
The ProVerif tool verified that mutual authentication is achieved between the USIM
and the SN. In response to the first correspondence assertion query, the tool output RE-
SULT event(endSN (x12891, x22892, x32893)) =⇒ event(begSN (x12891, x22892, x32893))
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Listing 9.9: Robust pseudo-IMSIs model: HN process (highlights)
1 l et processHN=
2 in ( secureChannel , (=AV REQ, ims i hn : ident ) ) ;
3 get keys(=imsi hn , k i hn ) in
4 new r hn : nonce ;
5 new r id hn : bitstring ;
6 insert r i d s ( r id hn , ims i hn ) ;
7 l et ek2 hn : maskKey = f53 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
8 l et masked rid hn : bitstring = mencrypt ( r id hn , ek2 hn ) in
9 l et ek hn : maskKey = f52 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
10 l et masked tid hn : bitstring = mencrypt ( t id , ek hn ) in
11 l et mac hn : mac = f1 ( sqn , masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn , k i hn
) in
12 l et xres hn : re sp = f2 ( masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn , k i hn )
in
13 l et ck hn : cipherKey = f3 ( masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn , k i hn
) in
14 l et i k hn : in t eg r i tyKey = f4 ( masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn ,
k i hn ) in
15 l et ak hn : anonymityKey = f5 ( masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn ,
k i hn ) in
16 l et enc sqn hn : bitstring = aencrypt ( sqn , ak hn ) in
17 out ( secureChannel , (AV, imsi hn , masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn
, enc sqn hn , mac hn , xres hn , ck hn , ik hn ) ) ;
19 in ( secureChannel , (=ERROR, i m s i h n s : ident , r r i d h n : bitstring ,
mac m hn : mac) ) ;
20 get r i d s (= r r id hn , ims i hn2 ) in
21 i f i m s i h n s = imsi hn2 then
22 get keys(=imsi hn2 , k i hn2 ) in
23 i f f 12 ( r r i d hn , imsi hn2 , k i hn2 ) = mac m hn then
24 event endRecoveryHN ( imsi hn2 , r r i d h n ) .
Listing 9.10: Robust pseudo-IMSIs model: Main process
1 process
2 ( ( ! processUE ) | processSN | processHN )
is true, which indicates that authentication of the UE by the SN is achieved. In
response to the second correspondence assertion query, ProVerif returned RESULT
event(endUE(x1, x2, x3)) =⇒ event(begUE(x1, x2, x3)) is true, which implies that
network authentication by the UE is achieved.
ProVerif also verified correctness of the synchronisation recovery process; this is
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achieved by the response to the third correspondence assertion query described in Sec-
tion 9.8.2.1 (see line 23 in Listing 9.6). The tool output RESULT event(endRecoveryHN
(x15235, x25236)) =⇒ event(begRecoveryHN (x15235, x25236)) is true, which indicates
that if the HN initiates a synchronisation recovery for a USIM, it must have been
requested by the legitimate USIM.
These proofs increase confidence that the scheme offers effective protection against
IMSI catchers while maintaining the original functionality of the protocol. The proof of
correctness for pseudo-IMSI synchronisation recovery gives assurance that the scheme
is able to regain pseudo-IMSI synchronisation without introducing any new vulnerabil-
ities. The ProVerif outputs for robust pseudo-IMSIs are given in Appendix B.3.2.
9.9 Relationship to the Prior Art
The schemes described in this chapter are designed with the objective of enhancing
user privacy in current mobile systems, whilst avoiding significant modifications to the
already deployed infrastructure. While other authors have observed that significant
changes to widely deployed infrastructure are unlikely to be feasible, very few realistic
and practical proposals for privacy enhancements which do not require such changes
have been made (as discussed in Section 7.4).
Indeed, apart from the recent work of van den Broek, Verdult and de Ruiter
(described in Section 9.5.6) and the work of Barbeau and Robert (described in Sec-
tion 7.4.2), we know of no other proposed modifications to the operation of 3G and
4G with the objective of enhancing user privacy that do not involve major changes to
the network infrastructure. However, both of these schemes are susceptible to possible
identity desynchronisation, which is a critical threat to the operation of the 3G and 4G
mobile systems.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the robust pseudo-IMSIs scheme described
in this chapter is the first proposed scheme using a pseudonymous IMSI that both in-
corporates IMSI synchronisation recovery and minimises modifications to the deployed
infrastructure. However, as discussed in Section 7.4.2, other pseudonym-based schemes
designed to enhance user privacy have been proposed, although they all require changes
to all the main components of the system, including HNs, SNs, phones and USIMs.
9.10 Summary
In this chapter we have described two approaches to using multiple IMSIs for a 3G/4G
USIM. The goal of both schemes is to improve user privacy by reducing the impact
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of IMSI disclosure on the air interface. They do not require any changes to the exist-
ing deployed network infrastructures, i.e. to the SN, air interface protocols or mobile
devices. The overhead introduced is modest and should be feasible to manage in real-
world networks. One major advantage is that the proposed schemes could be deployed
immediately since they are completely transparent to the existing deployed infrastruc-
ture.
We also described a novel and robust authentication scheme for 3G and 4G that
does not affect existing SNs and mobile phones, and preserves IMSI confidentiality.
That is, the IMSI is never sent across a communication channel; instead a changing
pseudo-IMSI is used. The pseudo-IMSIs appear as new subscribers to the SN, and are
unlinkable. The scheme also addresses the possible loss of pseudo-IMSI synchronisation
between USIM and HN, by incorporating an approach for pseudo-IMSI synchronisation
recovery to be used if pseudo-IMSI synchronisation is lost.
Both of the schemes introduce changes to the operation of the HN and USIM, but
not to the SN, the mobile device, or other internal network protocols, which enables
transparent migration. We discussed the strengths and limitations of the schemes,
and reported the results of formal analyses using ProVerif. The schemes alleviate the
decades-old privacy problem of IMSI disclosure on the air interface, and hence ‘trash
the IMSI catchers’.
159
Part IV
Conclusion
160
Overview
Part IV concludes the thesis by summarising the main contributions as well as high-
lighting possible areas for future work. This part of the thesis consists of a single
chapter, Chapter 10 .
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Possible Future
Work
In this chapter we summarise both the research achievements and possible limitations
of the work described in this thesis. We also discuss opportunities for future work.
10.1 Conclusions
The overall goal of this thesis is to propose techniques for improving the security and
privacy properties of current mobile systems without changing the deployed network
infrastructure, i.e. the serving networks and mobile phones. The first step was to
critically review prior research on the security and privacy of 2G, 3G and 4G mobile
systems. As has been widely discussed, there are significant security and privacy threats
arising from use of such systems. This motivated the work described in this thesis
designed to address the security threats stemming from lack of mutual authentication
in 2G GSM and the privacy threat arising from IMSI disclosure that applies to all
mobile systems.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we described those aspects of the system architecture, user
identities, air interface protocols, and services of 2G, 3G, and 4G systems necessary to
understand the work described in this thesis.
In Chapter 4, we described the security and privacy threats arising from use of
GSM. We critically analysed previously proposed schemes to address these threats.
We did not find any previously proposed scheme that adds mutual authentication to
GSM that does not require significant changes to the operation of all the entities in
a GSM network. Similarly, almost all the previously proposed system enhancements
designed to enhance user identity privacy protection in GSM require major changes
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to the operation of all networks, including modifications to the serving networks and
mobile equipment (i.e. mobile phones). Since any changes to the operation of the
serving network have a very major impact on global GSM networks, it seems likely that
such changes after deployment are infeasible in practice. The only scheme designed to
enhance user identity privacy protection in GSM that does not require any changes to
the existing deployed network infrastructures is the scheme, developed in parallel to
the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme described in this thesis, proposed by van den
Broek, Verdult and de Ruiter (described in Section 6.6). However, as discussed in
Section 9.5.7, this scheme appears to permit loss of identity synchronisation between
the SIM and the home network, which is likely to lead to a permanent loss of service.
As a result, it is unlikely that any of the schemes will ever be deployed in practice.
In Chapter 5, we proposed an enhanced GSM AKA scheme to provide authentica-
tion of the network to the mobile station, complementing the MS-to-network authen-
tication already provided. This provides protection against some of the most serious
threats to the security of GSM networks. This is achieved in a way which leaves the ex-
isting serving network infrastructure unchanged, and also does not require any changes
to existing mobile phones. That is, unlike previously proposed schemes, it is practi-
cally realisable. The scheme only requires SIMs and the home network to be upgraded.
Since both the SIM and the home network are managed by a single entity in mobile
systems, such a solution can be rolled out piecemeal with no impact on the existing
global infrastructure. We also analysed the proposed modification to GSM AKA using
the ProVerif tool. The analysis confirmed that the modified protocol provides mutual
authentication without leaking any confidential data.
One limitation of the proposed scheme is the requirement that mobile devices must
support the ‘class e’ STK commands. Other possible limitations are that AVs must be
used in the correct order, and that it is not clear what happens if the serving network
never performs AKA. These issues therefore need further investigation, as discussed in
Section 10.2 below.
In Chapter 6, we introduced two general approaches (i.e. the predefined multiple
IMSIs scheme and the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme) to using multiple IMSIs
for a mobile subscriber intended to improve air interface user privacy. We described a
privacy-enhancing scheme for GSM which does not require modifications to the existing
deployed network infrastructures, i.e. to the SN, air interface protocols or mobile de-
vices. We reported the results of the experiments to validate part of the schemes.
In Chapter 7, we analysed a wide range of research addressing the problem of the
lack of robust user identity privacy in 3G and 4G. Unfortunately, just as for GSM,
almost all the previously proposed schemes require changes to all the main components
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of the system, including home networks, serving networks, phones and USIMs. This
essentially means that deploying them would require implementing an entirely new
network infrastructure, which seems unlikely to occur. The two schemes which do
not require such a major redeployment are the second scheme of Barbeau and Robert
(described in Section 7.4.2) and a recent proposal of van den Broek, Verdult and de
Ruiter (described in Section 9.5.6). However, as we discussed, both the schemes appear
to permit loss of identity synchronisation between the USIM and the home network,
which is likely to lead to a permanent loss of service. As a result, these solutions too
are unlikely to be deployable in practice.
In Chapter 8, we critically analysed the proposals of Arapinis et al. [48], intended
to address a range of user privacy threats. This analysis revealed that the proposed
modifications are impractical in a variety of ways; not only are there security and
implementation issues, but the necessary changes to the operation of the system are
very significant and much greater than was envisaged by the authors. In fact, some of
the privacy issues appear almost impossible to address without a complete redesign of
the security system, meaning that making significant system changes to address some of
them are unlikely to be worth the effort. The shortcomings of the proposed ‘fixes’ exist
despite the fact that the modifications have been verified using a logic-based modelling
tool, suggesting that such tools need to be used with great care. We also suggested
possible alternative approaches to some of the modifications.
In Chapter 9, we described two approaches (i.e. the predefined multiple IMSIs
scheme and the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme) to using multiple IMSIs for a mobile
subscriber in 3G and 4G. The goal of these proposals is to improve user privacy by
reducing the impact of IMSI disclosure on the air interface. These approaches do not
require any changes to the existing deployed network infrastructures, i.e. to the serving
networks, air interface protocols or mobile devices. The only changes required are to
the operation of the authentication centre in the home network and to the USIM, both
owned by a single entity. The overhead introduced is modest and should be feasible to
manage in real-world networks. One major advantage is that the proposed schemes can
be deployed immediately since they are completely transparent to the existing deployed
infrastructure.
We also described a related scheme, developed in parallel to the modifiable multiple
IMSIs scheme described in Section 9.4, proposed by van den Broek, Verdult and de
Ruiter (see Section 9.5.6). Both the modifiable multiple IMSIs and van den Broek et
al. schemes have limitations; in particular, both schemes appear to permit possible loss
of identity synchronisation between the USIM and the home network, which is likely
to lead to a permanent loss of service.
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We enhanced the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme to address the possible short-
comings. This enhanced scheme incorporates two major improvements: it addresses
possible loss of identity synchronisation, and avoids the need for an HN to change its
subscriber’s IMSI by using instead a pseudo-IMSI (which is indistinguishable from an
IMSI to a serving network). We present an approach for identity recovery to be used in
the event of pseudo-IMSI desynchronisation. The scheme requires changes to the home
network and the USIM, but not to the serving network, mobile phone or other inter-
nal network protocols, enabling simple, transparent and evolutionary migration. We
discussed the strengths and limitations of both schemes, and verified their correctness
and security properties using ProVerif.
One limitation of the pseudonymous IMSIs schemes is the pressure it potentially
causes on the number of IMSIs available to a network operator. The schemes also
involve additional overhead for the operation of the home network. These issues merit
further examination, as discussed in Section 10.2.
To conclude, the work described in this thesis is an important contribution in im-
proving the security and privacy features in current mobile systems. We strongly
believe that significant changes to widely deployed infrastructures are unlikely to be
feasible; therefore, a realistic and practical proposal for improving security and privacy
in current mobile systems must do so in such a way that major infrastructure changes
are not required, and this is what we have achieved.
10.2 Future Work
We conclude the thesis by highlighting possible areas for future work.
• There are a number of aspects of the GSM mutual authentication scheme de-
scribed in Chapter 5 that require further investigation. Of particular significance
is the behaviour of mobile devices in networks that do not perform the AKA
protocol. Understanding mobile device behaviour in such circumstances is of
importance in all mobile networks, not just GSM.
• In the robust pseudo-IMSIs scheme, the RID is solely used in pseudo-IMSI syn-
chronisation recovery. The RID and TID are managed in the same way. However,
it might be possible to deploy other methods to guarantee synchronisation be-
tween RID and IMSI, a possible avenue for future research.
• Simulating the proposed protocols in test networks with the support of real op-
erators would increase confidence in their feasibility. It would also enable the
overhead on the home network to be better quantified.
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• It would be of interest to investigate the business and technical aspects of deciding
when, and how often, to trigger identity updates, notably the changeable IMSI in
the modifiable multiple IMSIs scheme, and the RID in the robust pseudo-IMSIs
scheme.
• We have (implicitly) assumed that the protocols running in the core network
are secure; this seems reasonable given that the core network is only accessible
to trusted parties. However, in the future with likely changes in modes and
business models for service delivery, this assumption may no longer hold. It would
therefore be of interest to investigate what threats arise and what mitigations
might be deployed, if assumptions about the integrity and security of the core
network are weakened.
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Appendix A
GSM Analysis
A.1 ProVerif Model of Modified GSM AKA
1 (∗ Communication Channels ∗)
2 free pubChannel : channel .
3 free secureChannel : channel [ private ] .
5 (∗ Type d e c l a r a t i o n ∗)
6 type key .
7 type sess ionKey .
8 type anonymityKey .
9 type mac .
10 type i dent .
11 type re sp .
12 type msgHdr .
14 const ID : msgHdr .
15 const AV REQ: msgHdr .
16 const AV: msgHdr .
17 const CHALLENGE: msgHdr .
18 const SRES : msgHdr .
20 (∗ P r i v a t e data which s e c r e c y we are i n t e r e s t e d in ∗)
21 free sqn : bitstring [ private ] .
23 (∗ Cryptographic f u n c t i o n s ∗)
24 fun a3 ( bitstring , mac , key ) : r e sp .
25 fun a8 ( bitstring , mac , key ) : sess ionKey .
26 fun f 1 ( bitstring , key ) : mac .
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27 fun f 5 (mac , key ) : anonymityKey .
28 fun encrypt ( bitstring , anonymityKey ) : bitstring .
30 (∗ Reduction r u l e ∗)
31 reduc fora l l m: bitstring , k : anonymityKey ; decrypt ( encrypt (
m, k ) , k ) = m.
33 (∗ Store i d e n t i t y and key p a i r ∗)
34 table keys ( ident , key ) .
36 event begSN( ident , sess ionKey ) .
37 event endSN( ident , sess ionKey ) .
38 event begMS( ident , sess ionKey ) .
39 event endMS( ident , sess ionKey ) .
41 (∗ R e a c h a b i l i t y / Secrecy Query ∗)
42 query attacker ( sqn ) .
44 (∗ A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Query ∗)
45 (∗ To v e r i f y t h a t SN a u t h e n t i c a t e s MS ∗)
46 query x1 : ident , x2 : sess ionKey ; event ( endSN( x1 , x2 ) ) ==>
event (begSN( x1 , x2 ) ) .
47 (∗ To v e r i f y t h a t MS a u t h e n t i c a t e s SN ∗)
48 query x1 : ident , x2 : sess ionKey ; event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==>
event (begMS( x1 , x2 ) ) .
50 (∗ Mobile S t a t i o n Sub−Process ∗)
51 l et processMS=
52 new imsi ms : ident ;
53 new k i : key ;
54 insert keys ( imsi ms , k i ) ;
55 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , imsi ms ) ) ;
56 in ( pubChannel , (=CHALLENGE, enc sqn ms : bitstring , mac ms :
mac) ) ;
57 l et ak ms : anonymityKey = f5 (mac ms , k i ) in
58 l et sqn ms : bitstring = decrypt ( enc sqn ms , ak ms ) in
59 i f f 1 ( sqn ms , k i ) = mac ms then (
60 l et res ms : re sp = a3 ( enc sqn ms , mac ms , k i ) in
61 l et kc ms : sess ionKey = a8 ( enc sqn ms , mac ms , k i )
in
62 event endMS( imsi ms , kc ms ) ;
63 event begSN( imsi ms , kc ms ) ;
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64 out ( pubChannel , (SRES, res ms ) ) ) e l s e (
65 new d r e s : r e sp ;
66 out ( pubChannel , (SRES, d r e s ) ) ) .
68 (∗ Serv ing Network Sub−Process ∗)
69 l et processSN=
70 in ( pubChannel , (=ID , ims i sn : ident ) ) ;
71 out ( secureChannel , (AV REQ, i ms i sn ) ) ;
72 in ( secureChannel , (=AV, ims i hn sn : ident , enc sqn sn :
bitstring ,
73 mac sn : mac , x r e s s n : resp , kc sn : sess ionKey ) ) ;
74 event begMS( ims i hn sn , kc sn ) ;
75 out ( pubChannel , (CHALLENGE, enc sqn sn , mac sn ) ) ;
76 in ( pubChannel , (=SRES, r e s s n : re sp ) ) ;
77 i f r e s s n = x r e s s n then
78 event endSN( ims i hn sn , kc sn ) .
80 (∗ Home Network Sub−Process ∗)
81 l et processHN=
82 in ( secureChannel , (=AV REQ, ims i hn : ident ) ) ;
83 get keys(=imsi hn , k i hn ) in
84 l et mac hn : mac = f1 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
85 l et ak hn : anonymityKey = f5 ( mac hn , k i hn ) in
86 l et enc sqn hn : bitstring = encrypt ( sqn , ak hn ) in
87 l et xres hn : re sp = a3 ( enc sqn hn , mac hn , k i hn ) in
88 l et kc hn : sess ionKey = a8 ( enc sqn hn , mac hn , k i hn ) in
89 out ( secureChannel , (AV, imsi hn , enc sqn hn , mac hn , xres hn
, kc hn ) ) .
91 (∗ Main Process ∗)
92 process
93 ( ( ! processMS ) | processSN | processHN )
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A.2 ProVerif Model of GSM AKA
1 (∗ Communication Channels ∗)
2 free pubChannel : channel .
3 free secureChannel : channel [ private ] .
5 (∗ Type d e c l a r a t i o n ∗)
6 type key .
7 type sess ionKey .
8 type nonce .
9 type i dent .
10 type re sp .
11 type msgHdr .
13 const ID : msgHdr .
14 const AV REQ: msgHdr .
15 const AV: msgHdr .
16 const CHALLENGE: msgHdr .
17 const RES: msgHdr .
19 (∗ Cryptographic f u n c t i o n s ∗)
20 fun a3 ( nonce , key ) : r e sp .
21 fun a8 ( nonce , key ) : sess ionKey .
23 (∗ Store i d e n t i t y and key p a i r s ∗)
24 table keys ( ident , key ) .
26 event begSN( ident , sess ionKey ) .
27 event endSN( ident , sess ionKey ) .
28 event begMS( ident , sess ionKey ) .
29 event endMS( ident , sess ionKey ) .
31 (∗ A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Query ∗)
32 (∗ To v e r i f y t h a t SN a u t h e n t i c a t e s MS ∗)
33 query x1 : ident , x2 : sess ionKey ; event ( endSN( x1 , x2 ) ) ==>
event (begSN( x1 , x2 ) ) .
34 (∗ To v e r i f y t h a t MS a u t h e n t i c a t e s SN ∗)
35 query x1 : ident , x2 : sess ionKey ; event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==>
event (begMS( x1 , x2 ) ) .
37 (∗ Mobile S t a t i o n Sub−Process ∗)
38 l et processMS=
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39 new imsi ms : ident ;
40 new k i : key ;
41 insert keys ( imsi ms , k i ) ;
42 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , imsi ms ) ) ;
43 in ( pubChannel , (=CHALLENGE, rand ms : nonce ) ) ;
44 l et res ms : re sp = a3 ( rand ms , k i ) in
45 l et kc ms : sess ionKey = a8 ( rand ms , k i ) in
46 event endMS( imsi ms , kc ms ) ;
47 event begSN( imsi ms , kc ms ) ;
48 out ( pubChannel , (RES, res ms ) ) .
50 (∗ Serv ing Network Sub−Process ∗)
51 l et processSN=
52 in ( pubChannel , (=ID , ims i sn : ident ) ) ;
53 out ( secureChannel , (AV REQ, i ms i sn ) ) ;
54 in ( secureChannel , (=AV, ims i hn sn : ident , rand sn : nonce ,
x r e s s n : resp , kc sn : sess ionKey ) ) ;
55 event begMS( ims i hn sn , kc sn ) ;
56 out ( pubChannel , (CHALLENGE, rand sn ) ) ;
57 in ( pubChannel , (=RES, r e s s n : re sp ) ) ;
58 i f r e s s n = x r e s s n then
59 event endSN( ims i hn sn , kc sn ) .
61 (∗ Home Network Sub−Process ∗)
62 l et processHN=
63 in ( secureChannel , (=AV REQ, ims i hn : ident ) ) ;
64 new rand hn : nonce ;
65 get keys(=imsi hn , k i hn ) in
66 l et xres hn : re sp = a3 ( rand hn , k i hn ) in
67 l et kc hn : sess ionKey = a8 ( rand hn , k i hn ) in
68 out ( secureChannel , (AV, imsi hn , rand hn , xres hn , kc hn ) ) .
70 (∗ Main Process ∗)
71 process
72 ( ( ! processMS ) | processSN | processHN )
191
A.3 ProVerif Output of Model Execution
A.3.1 Modified GSM AKA
1 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Property : SN A u t h e n t i c a t i o n ∗)
3 −− Query event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 ) )
4 Completing . . .
5 Sta r t i ng query event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 ) )
6 goa l r eachab l e : begin (begMS( imsi ms [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] , a8 ( encrypt ( sqn
[ ] , f 5 ( f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) ) , f 1 (
sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) ) , kc sn = a8 (
encrypt ( sqn [ ] , f 5 ( f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 =
ends id 1016 ] ) ) , f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016
] ) , x r e s s n = a3 ( encrypt ( sqn [ ] , f 5 ( f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) ,
k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) ) , f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 =
ends id 1016 ] ) , mac sn = f1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) ,
enc sqn sn = encrypt ( sqn [ ] , f 5 ( f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) , k i
[ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) ) , ims i hn sn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ,
im s i sn = ims i sn 1017 , @sid 417 = @sid 1018 , @occ21 = @occ cst )
&& attacker ( ims i sn 1017 ) −> end ( ends id 1016 , endMS( imsi ms [ ! 1 =
ends id 1016 ] , a8 ( encrypt ( sqn [ ] , f 5 ( f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) ,
k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) ) , f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 1016 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 =
ends id 1016 ] ) ) )
8 RESULT event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 ) ) i s true .
10 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Property : MS A u t h e n t i c a t i o n ∗)
12 −− Query event ( endSN( x1 1029 , x2 1030 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 1029 ,
x2 1030 ) )
13 Completing . . .
14 Sta r t i ng query event ( endSN( x1 1029 , x2 1030 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 1029
, x2 1030 ) )
15 goa l r eachab l e : begin (begSN( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1782 ] , a8 ( encrypt ( sqn
[ ] , f 5 ( f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1782 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1782 ] ) ) , f 1 ( sqn [ ] ,
k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1782 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1782 ] ) ) ) −> end (endSN( imsi ms [ ! 1
= @sid 1782 ] , a8 ( encrypt ( sqn [ ] , f 5 ( f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1782 ] ) , k i
[ ! 1 = @sid 1782 ] ) ) , f 1 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1782 ] ) , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1782
] ) ) )
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17 RESULT event ( endSN( x1 1029 , x2 1030 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 1029 , x2 1030
) ) i s true .
19 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f Secrecy Property ∗)
21 −− Query not attacker ( sqn [ ] )
22 Completing . . .
23 Sta r t i ng query not attacker ( sqn [ ] )
25 RESULT not attacker ( sqn [ ] ) i s true .
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A.3.2 Original GSM AKA
1 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Property : MS A u t h e n t i c a t i o n ∗)
3 −− Query event ( endSN( x1 575 , x2 576 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 575 , x2 576 ) )
4 Completing . . .
5 Sta r t i ng query event ( endSN( x1 575 , x2 576 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 575 ,
x2 576 ) )
6 goa l r eachab l e : begin (begSN( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1040 ] , a8 ( rand hn [
ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1040 ] , ! 1 = @sid 1041 ] , k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 1040 ] ) ) ) −> end (endSN( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1040 ] , a8 ( rand hn [
ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1040 ] , ! 1 = @sid 1041 ] , k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 1040 ] ) ) )
8 RESULT event ( endSN( x1 575 , x2 576 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 575 , x2 576 ) )
i s true .
10 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Property : SN A u t h e n t i c a t i o n ∗)
12 −− Query event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 ) )
13 Completing . . .
14 Sta r t i ng query event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 ) )
15 goa l r eachab l e : attacker ( rand ms 548 ) −> end ( ends id 549 , endMS(
imsi ms [ ! 1 = ends id 549 ] , a8 ( rand ms 548 , k i [ ! 1 = ends id 549 ] ) ) )
16 Abbrev iat ions :
17 ims i = imsi ms [ ! 1 = ends id 557 ]
18 k i 560 = k i [ ! 1 = ends id 557 ]
20 1 . We assume as hypothes i s that
21 attacker ( rand ms 555 ) .
23 2 . Using the func t i on CHALLENGE the attacker may obta in CHALLENGE.
24 attacker (CHALLENGE) .
26 3 . By 2 , the attacker may know CHALLENGE.
27 By 1 , the attacker may know rand ms 555 .
28 Using the func t i on 2−tup l e the attacker may obta in (CHALLENGE,
rand ms 555 ) .
29 attacker ( (CHALLENGE, rand ms 555 ) ) .
31 4 . The message (CHALLENGE, rand ms 555 ) that the attacker may have by
3 may be r e c e i v e d at input {6} .
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32 So event endMS( imsi , a8 ( rand ms 555 , k i 560 ) ) may be executed at {9}
in s e s s i o n ends id 557 .
33 end ( ends id 557 , endMS( imsi , a8 ( rand ms 555 , k i 560 ) ) ) .
35 A more d e t a i l e d output o f the t r a c e s i s a v a i l a b l e with
36 s e t t ra ceD i sp l ay = long .
38 new imsi ms c r e a t i n g imsi ms 562 at {2} in copy a
40 new k i c r e a t i n g k i 563 at {3} in copy a
42 insert keys ( imsi ms 562 , k i 563 ) at {4} in copy a
44 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , imsi ms 562 ) ) at {5} in copy a
46 in ( pubChannel , (CHALLENGE, a 561 ) ) at {6} in copy a
48 event (endMS( imsi ms 562 , a8 ( a 561 , k i 563 ) ) ) at {9} in copy a
50 The event endMS( imsi ms 562 , a8 ( a 561 , k i 563 ) ) i s executed in s e s s i o n
a .
52 A trace has been found .
54 RESULT event (endMS( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 ) ) i s fa l se .
56 RESULT event (endMS( x1 550 , x2 551 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 550 , x2 551 ) )
i s fa l se . )
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Appendix B
3G and 4G Analysis
B.1 ProVerif Model of Modifiable Multiple IMSIs
1 (∗ Communication Channels ∗)
2 free pubChannel : channel .
3 free secureChannel : channel [ private ] .
5 (∗ Type d e c l a r a t i o n ∗)
6 type key .
7 type cipherKey .
8 type i n t eg r i tyKey .
9 type anonymityKey .
10 type maskKey .
11 type nonce .
12 type mac .
13 type i dent .
14 type re sp .
15 type msgHdr .
17 const ID : msgHdr .
18 const AV REQ: msgHdr .
19 const AV: msgHdr .
20 const CHALLENGE: msgHdr .
21 const RES: msgHdr .
23 (∗ Cryptographic f u n c t i o n s ∗)
24 fun f 1 ( bitstring , mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : mac .
25 fun f 11 ( bitstring , key ) : mac .
26 fun f 2 (mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : re sp .
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27 fun f 3 (mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : cipherKey .
28 fun f 4 (mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : in t eg r i tyKey .
29 fun f 5 (mac , bitstring , nonce , key ) : anonymityKey .
30 fun f 51 ( bitstring , key ) : maskKey .
31 fun aencrypt ( bitstring , anonymityKey ) : bitstring .
32 fun mencrypt ( bitstring , maskKey) : bitstring .
34 (∗ Reduction Rules ∗)
35 reduc fora l l m: bitstring , k : anonymityKey ; adecrypt (
aencrypt (m, k ) , k ) = m.
36 reduc fora l l n : bitstring , l : maskKey ; mdecrypt ( mencrypt (n ,
l ) , l ) = n .
38 (∗ Store i d e n t i t y and key p a i r ∗)
39 table keys ( ident , key ) .
41 (∗ P r i v a t e data which s e c r e c y we are i n t e r e s t e d in ∗)
42 free sqn : bitstring [ private ] .
43 free msin : bitstring [ private ] .
45 (∗ R e a c h a b i l i t y / Secrecy q u e r i e s ∗)
46 query attacker ( sqn ) .
47 query attacker ( msin ) .
49 (∗ Event d e c l a r a t i o n : To mark e v e n t s o f i n t e r e s t ∗)
50 event begSN( ident , cipherKey , in t eg r i tyKey ) .
51 event endSN( ident , cipherKey , in t eg r i tyKey ) .
52 event begUE( ident , cipherKey , in t eg r i tyKey ) .
53 event endUE( ident , cipherKey , in t eg r i tyKey ) .
55 (∗ A u t h e n t i c a t i o n q u e r i e s ∗)
57 (∗ SN a u t h e n t i c a t e s UE ∗)
58 query x1 : ident , x2 : cipherKey , x3 : in t eg r i tyKey ; event (
endSN( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
59 (∗ UE a u t h e n t i c a t e s SN ∗)
60 query x1 : ident , x2 : cipherKey , x3 : in t eg r i tyKey ; event (
endUE( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begUE( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
62 (∗ S u b s c r i b e r sub−pr oce ss ∗)
63 l et processUE=
64 new imsi ms : ident ;
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65 new k i : key ;
66 insert keys ( imsi ms , k i ) ;
67 (∗ MSG 1 Send ∗)
68 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , imsi ms ) ) ;
69 (∗ MSG 4 Receive ∗)
70 in ( pubChannel , (=CHALLENGE, SMAC ms: mac , masked msin ms :
bitstring , r ms : nonce , enc sqn ms : bitstring , mac ms :
mac) ) ;
71 l et ak ms : anonymityKey = f5 (SMAC ms, masked msin ms , r ms ,
k i ) in
72 l et sqn ms : bitstring = adecrypt ( enc sqn ms , ak ms ) in
73 i f f 1 ( sqn ms , SMAC ms, masked msin ms , r ms , k i ) = mac ms
then
74 l et res ms : re sp = f2 (SMAC ms, masked msin ms , r ms ,
k i ) in
75 l et ck ms : cipherKey = f3 (SMAC ms, masked msin ms ,
r ms , k i ) in
76 l et ik ms : in t eg r i tyKey = f4 (SMAC ms, masked msin ms
, r ms , k i ) in
77 event endMS( imsi ms , ck ms , ik ms ) ;
78 event begSN( imsi ms , ck ms , ik ms ) ;
79 (∗ MSG 5 Send ∗)
80 out ( pubChannel , (RES, res ms ) )
81 i f f 11 ( sqn ms , k i ) = SMAC ms then
82 l et ek ms : maskKey = f51 ( sqn ms , k i ) in
83 l et msin ms : bitstring = mdecrypt (
masked msin ms , ek ms ) in 0 .
85 (∗ Serv ing Network sub−pr oces s ∗)
86 l et processSN=
87 (∗ MSG 1 Receive ∗)
88 in ( pubChannel , (=ID , ims i sn : ident ) ) ;
89 (∗ MSG 2 Send ∗)
90 out ( secureChannel , (AV REQ, i ms i sn ) ) ;
91 (∗ MSG 3 Receive ∗)
92 in ( secureChannel , (=AV, ims i hn sn : ident , SMAC sn :
bitstring , masked msin sn : bitstring , r s n : nonce ,
enc sqn sn : bitstring , mac sn : mac , x r e s s n : resp , ck sn :
cipherKey , i k s n : in t eg r i tyKey ) ) ;
93 event begMS( ims i hn sn , ck sn , i k s n ) ;
94 (∗ MSG 4 Send ∗)
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95 out ( pubChannel , (CHALLENGE, SMAC sn , masked msin sn , r sn ,
enc sqn sn , mac sn ) ) ;
96 (∗ MSG 5 Receive ∗)
97 in ( pubChannel , (=RES, r e s s n : re sp ) ) ;
98 i f r e s s n = x r e s s n then
99 event endSN( ims i hn sn , ck sn , i k s n ) .
101 (∗ Home Network sub−pr oces s ∗)
102 l et processHN=
103 (∗ MSG 2 Receive ∗)
104 in ( secureChannel , (=AV REQ, ims i hn : ident ) ) ;
105 get keys(=imsi hn , k i hn ) in
106 new r hn : nonce ;
107 l et SMAC hn : mac = f11 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
108 l et ek hn : maskKey = f51 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
109 l et masked msin hn : bitstring = mencrypt ( msin , ek hn ) in
110 l et mac hn : mac = f1 ( sqn , SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn ,
k i hn ) in
111 l et xres hn : re sp = f2 (SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn , k i hn )
in
112 l et ck hn : cipherKey = f3 (SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn ,
k i hn ) in
113 l et ik hn : in t eg r i tyKey = f4 (SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn ,
k i hn ) in
114 l et ak hn : anonymityKey = f5 (SMAC hn, masked msin hn , r hn ,
k i hn ) in
115 l et enc sqn hn : bitstring = aencrypt ( sqn , ak hn ) in
116 (∗ MSG 3 Send ∗)
117 out ( secureChannel , (AV, imsi hn , SMAC hn, masked msin hn ,
r hn , enc sqn hn , mac hn , xres hn , ck hn , ik hn ) ) .
119 (∗ Main pr oces s ∗)
120 process
121 ( ( ! processMS ) | processSN | processHN )
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B.2 ProVerif Model of Robust Pseudo-IMSIs
1 (∗ Communication Channels ∗)
2 free pubChannel : channel .
3 free secureChannel : channel [ private ] .
5 (∗ Type d e c l a r a t i o n ∗)
6 type key .
7 type cipherKey .
8 type i n t eg r i tyKey .
9 type anonymityKey .
10 type maskKey .
11 type nonce .
12 type mac .
13 type i dent .
14 type re sp .
15 type msgHdr .
17 const ID : msgHdr .
18 const AV REQ: msgHdr .
19 const AV: msgHdr .
20 const CHALLENGE: msgHdr .
21 const RES: msgHdr .
22 const ERROR: msgHdr .
24 (∗ Cryptographic f u n c t i o n s ∗)
25 fun f 1 ( bitstring , bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : mac .
26 (∗ Function to compute MAC used in the err or token ∗)
27 fun f 12 ( bitstring , ident , key ) : mac .
28 fun f 2 ( bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : re sp .
29 fun f 3 ( bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : cipherKey .
30 fun f 4 ( bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : in t eg r i tyKey .
31 fun f 5 ( bitstring , bitstring , nonce , key ) : anonymityKey .
32 fun f 52 ( bitstring , key ) : maskKey .
33 fun f 53 ( bitstring , key ) : maskKey .
34 fun aencrypt ( bitstring , anonymityKey ) : bitstring .
35 fun mencrypt ( bitstring , maskKey) : bitstring .
37 (∗ Reduction Rules ∗)
38 reduc fora l l m: bitstring , k : anonymityKey ; adecrypt ( aencrypt (m, k ) ,
k ) = m.
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39 reduc fora l l n : bitstring , l : maskKey ; mdecrypt ( mencrypt (n , l ) , l ) =
n .
41 (∗ Store r e l e v a n t data ∗)
42 table keys ( ident , key ) .
43 table r i d s ( bitstring , i d ent ) .
45 (∗ P r i v a t e data which s e c r e c y we are i n t e r e s t e d in ∗)
46 free sqn : bitstring [ private ] .
47 free t i d : bitstring [ private ] .
48 free s u c c e s s : bool [ private ] .
50 (∗ R e a c h a b i l i t y / Secrecy q u e r i e s ∗)
51 query attacker ( sqn ) .
52 query attacker ( t i d ) .
54 (∗ Event d e c l a r a t i o n : To mark e v e n t s o f i n t e r e s t ∗)
55 event begRecoveryHN ( ident , bitstring ) .
56 event endRecoveryHN ( ident , bitstring ) .
57 event begSN( ident , cipherKey , in t eg r i tyKey ) .
58 event endSN( ident , cipherKey , in t eg r i tyKey ) .
59 event begUE( ident , cipherKey , in t eg r i tyKey ) .
60 event endUE( ident , cipherKey , in t eg r i tyKey ) .
62 (∗ A u t h e n t i c a t i o n q u e r i e s ∗)
63 (∗ SN a u t h e n t i c a t e s MS ∗)
64 query x1 : ident , x2 : cipherKey , x3 : in t eg r i tyKey ; event ( endSN( x1 , x2
, x3 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
65 (∗ MS a u t h e n t i c a t e s SN ∗)
66 query x1 : ident , x2 : cipherKey , x3 : in t eg r i tyKey ; event (endUE( x1 , x2
, x3 ) ) ==> event (begUE( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
68 (∗ Correc tness o f pseudo−IMSI s y n c h r o n i s a t i o n recovery query ∗)
69 (∗ HN Confirms t h a t the r i d i s sen t by a v a l i d s u b s c r i b e r ∗)
70 query x1 : ident , x2 : bitstring ; event ( endRecoveryHN ( x1 , x2 ) ) ==>
event ( begRecoveryHN ( x1 , x2 ) ) .
72 (∗ S u b s c r i b e r sub−pr oce ss ∗)
73 l et processUE=
74 new imsi ms : ident ;
75 new k i : key ;
76 insert keys ( imsi ms , k i ) ;
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77 (∗ MSG 1 Send ∗)
78 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , imsi ms ) ) ;
79 (∗ MSG 4 Receive ∗)
80 in ( pubChannel , (=CHALLENGE, masked rid ms : bitstring , masked tid ms
: bitstring , r ms : nonce , enc sqn ms : bitstring , mac ms : mac) ) ;
81 new d mac : mac ;
82 new d r i d : bitstring ;
83 l et ak ms : anonymityKey = f5 ( masked rid ms , masked tid ms , r ms , k i
) in
84 l et sqn ms : bitstring = adecrypt ( enc sqn ms , ak ms ) in
85 i f f 1 ( sqn ms , masked rid ms , masked tid ms , r ms , k i ) = mac ms then
(
86 l et res ms : re sp = f2 ( masked rid ms , masked tid ms , r ms , k i ) in
87 l et ck ms : cipherKey = f3 ( masked rid ms , masked tid ms , r ms , k i )
in
88 l et ik ms : in t eg r i tyKey = f4 ( masked rid ms , masked tid ms , r ms ,
k i ) in
89 l et s u c c e s s = true in
90 event endMS( imsi ms , ck ms , ik ms ) ;
91 event begSN( imsi ms , ck ms , ik ms ) ;
92 (∗ MSG 5a Send ∗)
93 out ( pubChannel , (RES, succes s , res ms , d r id , d mac ) ) )
94 e l s e (
95 (∗ Generate MAC−er ror and sen t MSG 5b ∗)
96 new d r e s : r e sp ;
97 l et s u c c e s s = fa l se in
98 l et ek2 ms : maskKey = f53 ( sqn ms , k i ) in
99 l et r id ms : bitstring = mdecrypt ( masked rid ms , ek2 ms ) in
100 l et mac m ms : mac = f12 ( rid ms , imsi ms , k i ) in
101 (∗ MSG 5b Send ∗)
102 event begRecoveryHN ( imsi ms , r id ms ) ;
103 out ( pubChannel , (RES, succes s , d res , r id ms , mac m ms) ) ) .
105 (∗ Serv ing Network sub−pr oces s ∗)
106 l et processSN=
107 (∗ MSG 1 Receive ∗)
108 in ( pubChannel , (=ID , ims i sn : ident ) ) ;
109 (∗ MSG 2 Send ∗)
110 out ( secureChannel , (AV REQ, i ms i sn ) ) ;
111 (∗ MSG 3 Receive ∗)
112 in ( secureChannel , (=AV, ims i hn sn : ident , masked r id sn : bitstring
, masked t id sn : bitstring , r s n : nonce , enc sqn sn : bitstring ,
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mac sn : mac , x r e s s n : resp , ck sn : cipherKey , i k s n :
in t eg r i tyKey ) ) ;
113 event begMS( ims i hn sn , ck sn , i k s n ) ;
114 (∗ MSG 4 Send ∗)
115 out ( pubChannel , (CHALLENGE, masked r id sn , masked t id sn , r sn ,
enc sqn sn , mac sn ) ) ;
116 (∗ MSG 5a/5 b Receive ∗)
117 in ( pubChannel , (=RES, s u c c e s s s n : bool , r e s s n : resp , r i d s n :
bitstring , mac m sn : mac) ) ;
118 i f s u c c e s s s n = true then
119 ( i f r e s s n = x r e s s n then event endSN( ims i hn sn , ck sn , i k s n ) )
120 e l s e
121 (∗ MSG 6 Send ∗)
122 out ( secureChannel , (ERROR, ims i hn sn , r id sn , mac m sn ) ) .
124 (∗ Home Network sub−pr oces s ∗)
125 l et processHN=
126 (∗ MSG 2 Receive ∗)
127 in ( secureChannel , (=AV REQ, ims i hn : ident ) ) ;
128 get keys(=imsi hn , k i hn ) in
129 new r hn : nonce ;
130 new r id hn : bitstring ;
131 insert r i d s ( r id hn , ims i hn ) ;
132 l et ek2 hn : maskKey = f53 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
133 l et masked rid hn : bitstring = mencrypt ( r id hn , ek2 hn ) in
134 l et ek hn : maskKey = f52 ( sqn , k i hn ) in
135 l et masked tid hn : bitstring = mencrypt ( t id , ek hn ) in
136 l et mac hn : mac = f1 ( sqn , masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn , k i hn
) in
137 l et xres hn : re sp = f2 ( masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn , k i hn )
in
138 l et ck hn : cipherKey = f3 ( masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn , k i hn
) in
139 l et i k hn : in t eg r i tyKey = f4 ( masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn ,
k i hn ) in
140 l et ak hn : anonymityKey = f5 ( masked rid hn , masked tid hn , r hn ,
k i hn ) in
141 l et enc sqn hn : bitstring = aencrypt ( sqn , ak hn ) in
142 (∗ MSG 3 Send ∗)
143 out ( secureChannel , (AV, imsi hn , masked rid hn , masked tid hn ,
r hn , enc sqn hn , mac hn , xres hn , ck hn , ik hn ) ) ;
144 (∗ MSG 6 Receive ∗)
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145 in ( secureChannel , (=ERROR, i m s i h n s : ident , r r i d h n : bitstring ,
mac m hn : mac) ) ;
146 get r i d s (= r r id hn , ims i hn2 ) in
147 i f i m s i h n s = imsi hn2 then
148 get keys(=imsi hn2 , k i hn2 ) in
149 i f f 12 ( r r i d hn , imsi hn2 , k i hn2 ) = mac m hn then
150 (∗ AUTM token v e r i f i c a t i o n s u c c e s s f u l ∗)
151 event endRecoveryHN ( imsi hn2 , r r i d h n ) .
153 (∗ Main pr oces s ∗)
154 process
155 ( ( ! processMS ) | processSN | processHN )
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B.3 ProVerif Output of Model Execution
B.3.1 Modifiable Multiple IMSIs
1 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Property : SN A u t h e n t i c a t i o n ∗)
3 −− Query event (endMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) )
4 Completing . . .
5 Sta r t i ng query event (endMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) )
6 goa l r eachab l e : begin (begMS( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] , f 3 ( f11 ( sqn [ ] , k i
[ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) , mencrypt ( msin [ ] , f 51 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) ) ,
r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1933
] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) , f 4 ( f11 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) , mencrypt (
msin [ ] , f 51 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 1933 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] )
) ) −> end (endMS( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] , f 3 ( f11 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 1933 ] ) , mencrypt ( msin [ ] , f 51 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) ) , r hn [
k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ] , k i
[ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) , f 4 ( f11 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) , mencrypt ( msin
[ ] , f 51 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933
] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 1933 ] ) ) )
8 RESULT event (endMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) i s true .
10 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Property : MS A u t h e n t i c a t i o n ∗)
12 −− Query event ( endSN( x1 1937 , x2 1938 , x3 1939 ) ) ==> event (begSN(
x1 1937 , x2 1938 , x3 1939 ) )
13 Completing . . .
14 Sta r t i ng query event ( endSN( x1 1937 , x2 1938 , x3 1939 ) ) ==> event (begSN
( x1 1937 , x2 1938 , x3 1939 ) )
15 goa l r eachab l e : begin (begSN( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] , f 3 ( f11 ( sqn [ ] , k i
[ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) , mencrypt ( msin [ ] , f 51 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) ) ,
r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 3452
] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) , f 4 ( f11 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) , mencrypt (
msin [ ] , f 51 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 3452 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] )
) ) −> end (endSN( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] , f 3 ( f11 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 3452 ] ) , mencrypt ( msin [ ] , f 51 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) ) , r hn [
k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ] , k i
[ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) , f 4 ( f11 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) , mencrypt ( msin
[ ] , f 51 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452
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] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 3452 ] ) ) )
17 RESULT event ( endSN( x1 1937 , x2 1938 , x3 1939 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 1937
, x2 1938 , x3 1939 ) ) i s true .
19 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f Secrecy Property ∗)
21 −− Query not attacker ( msin [ ] )
22 Completing . . .
23 Sta r t i ng query not attacker ( msin [ ] )
25 RESULT not attacker ( msin [ ] ) i s true .
27 −− Query not attacker ( sqn [ ] )
28 Completing . . .
29 Sta r t i ng query not attacker ( sqn [ ] )
31 RESULT not attacker ( sqn [ ] ) i s true .
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B.3.2 Robust Pseudo-IMSIs
1 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Property : SN A u t h e n t i c a t i o n ∗)
3 −− Query event (endMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) )
4 Completing . . .
5 Sta r t i ng query event (endMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) )
6 goa l r eachab l e : begin (begMS( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] , f 3 ( mencrypt (
r id hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 =
@sid 2887 ] ] , f 53 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) ) , mencrypt ( t i d [ ] , f 52 ( sqn
[ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] , ims i hn =
imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) , f 4 ( mencrypt ( r id hn [
k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ] , f 53
( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) ) , mencrypt ( t i d [ ] , f 52 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 2887 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1
= @sid 2887 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) ) ) −> end (endMS( imsi ms [ ! 1 =
@sid 2887 ] , f 3 ( mencrypt ( r id hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] , ims i hn
= imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ] , f 53 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) ) ,
mencrypt ( t i d [ ] , f 52 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1
= @sid 2887 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887
] ) , f 4 ( mencrypt ( r id hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] , ims i hn =
imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ] , f 53 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) ) , mencrypt (
t i d [ ] , f 52 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 2887 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 2887 ] )
) )
8 RESULT event (endMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> event (begMS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) i s true .
10 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c a t i o n Property : MS A u t h e n t i c a t i o n ∗)
12 −− Query event ( endSN( x1 2891 , x2 2892 , x3 2893 ) ) ==> event (begSN(
x1 2891 , x2 2892 , x3 2893 ) )
13 Completing . . .
14 Sta r t i ng query event ( endSN( x1 2891 , x2 2892 , x3 2893 ) ) ==> event (begSN
( x1 2891 , x2 2892 , x3 2893 ) )
15 goa l r eachab l e : begin (begSN( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] , f 3 ( mencrypt (
r id hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 =
@sid 5231 ] ] , f 53 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) ) , mencrypt ( t i d [ ] , f 52 ( sqn
[ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] , ims i hn =
imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) , f 4 ( mencrypt ( r id hn [
k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ] , f 53
( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) ) , mencrypt ( t i d [ ] , f 52 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 =
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@sid 5231 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1
= @sid 5231 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) ) ) −> end (endSN( imsi ms [ ! 1 =
@sid 5231 ] , f 3 ( mencrypt ( r id hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] , ims i hn
= imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ] , f 53 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) ) ,
mencrypt ( t i d [ ] , f 52 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1
= @sid 5231 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231
] ) , f 4 ( mencrypt ( r id hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] , ims i hn =
imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ] , f 53 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) ) , mencrypt (
t i d [ ] , f 52 ( sqn [ ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ) ) , r hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1 =
@sid 5231 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] ] , k i [ ! 1 = @sid 5231 ] )
) )
17 RESULT event ( endSN( x1 2891 , x2 2892 , x3 2893 ) ) ==> event (begSN( x1 2891
, x2 2892 , x3 2893 ) ) i s true .
19 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f Correc tness o f the Pseudo−IMSI s y n c h r o n i s a t i o n
Recovery ∗)
21 −− Query event ( endRecoveryHN ( x1 5235 , x2 5236 ) ) ==> event (
begRecoveryHN ( x1 5235 , x2 5236 ) )
22 Completing . . .
23 Sta r t i ng query event ( endRecoveryHN ( x1 5235 , x2 5236 ) ) ==> event (
begRecoveryHN ( x1 5235 , x2 5236 ) )
24 goa l r eachab l e : begin ( begRecoveryHN ( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 7636 ] , r id hn [
k i hn = k i [ ! 1 = @sid 7636 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 7636 ] ] ) )
−> end ( endRecoveryHN ( imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 7636 ] , r id hn [ k i hn = k i [ ! 1
= @sid 7636 ] , ims i hn = imsi ms [ ! 1 = @sid 7636 ] ] ) )
26 RESULT event ( endRecoveryHN ( x1 5235 , x2 5236 ) ) ==> event ( begRecoveryHN
( x1 5235 , x2 5236 ) ) i s true .
28 (∗ V e r i f i c a t i o n o f Secrecy Property ∗)
30 −− Query not attacker ( t i d [ ] )
31 Completing . . .
32 Sta r t i ng query not attacker ( t i d [ ] )
34 RESULT not attacker ( t i d [ ] ) i s true .
36 −− Query not attacker ( sqn [ ] )
37 Completing . . .
38 Sta r t i ng query not attacker ( sqn [ ] )
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40 RESULT not attacker ( sqn [ ] ) i s true .
209
